Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2019

The Bank of New York Mellon FKA the Bank of New York, as
Trustee for the Certificateholders Cwmbs Series 2006-Hyb5,
Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Paula A. Mitchell, Defendant and
Appellant. America First Federal Credit Union, Pepperwood
Homeowner's Association, and John Does 1-5, Defendants (Not
Participating) : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; hosted by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Douglas R. Short, Consumer Law Center of Utah; attorney for appellant.
Brigham J. Lundberg, Hillary R. McCormack, Lundberg & Associates PC; counsel for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, New York Bank v. Mitchell, No. 20180141 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2019).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3769

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON
FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS
TRUSTEE FOR THE
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWMBS
SERIES 2006-HYB5,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Appellate Case No. 20180141-CA

v.

Trial Court Case No. 160902472

PAULA A. MITCHELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
AMERICA FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, and
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants (not participating).

APPELLEE'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Orders of the Third Judicial District Court
by The Honorable Todd Shaughnessy
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
Paula A. Mitchell:
Douglas R. Short
Consumer Law Center of Utah
2290 East 4500 South, Suite 220
Holladay, UT 84117
mail@consumerlawutah.com

Counsel for Appellee/Plaintiff The Bank of
New York Mellon fka The Bank of New
York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders
CWMBS Series 2006-HYB5:
Brigham J. Lundberg
Hillary R. McCormack
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES, PC
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
litigationdept@lundbergfirm.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................................................2
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................6
STATEMENT OF ISSUES..............................................................................................................6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.........................................................................................................7
A. The Mortgage Loan...............................................................................................................7
B. The Mitchell I Litigation........................................................................................................9
C. This Mitchell II Litigation....................................................................................................10
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.............................................................................................13
ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................15
I. The Trial Court Properly Denied Ms. Mitchell's Motions to Dismiss...................................15
A. BNYM Had Standing to Foreclose..................................................................................15
1. Ms. Mitchell Was Estopped from Contesting BNYM's Standing...............................15
2. BNYM's Complaint Sufficiently Alleged Standing to Foreclose................................19
B. BNYM Did Not Waive Its Judicial Foreclosure Claim...................................................22
1. Rule 13(a) Did Not Mandate a Judicial Foreclosure Claim When BNYM Had Already
Commenced a Non-judicial Foreclosure Action..............................................................22
2. No Error in Examining Other Courts' Rule 13(a) Interpretations................................25
II. The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed Ms. Mitchell's Counterclaim.....................................29
A. The Trial Court Properly Accepted as True the Facts in Ms. Mitchell's Counterclaims. 29
B. Ms. Mitchell's Counterclaims Were Barred By Res Judicata..........................................30
1. Claim Preclusion..........................................................................................................30
2. Issue Preclusion...........................................................................................................32
3. Mitchell I Resulted in a Final Judgment on the Merits...............................................33
C. No Error in Dismissing Collateral Attack of Mitchell I...................................................35
III. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment......................................................36
A. No Error in Application of the Summary Judgment Standard.........................................36
B. BNYM's Claims Were Proven With Evidence. ...............................................................37
C. No Error in Admission of the Denmon Affidavit............................................................40
D. Ms. Mitchell Had No to Valid Defense to Preclude Summary Judgment.......................43
IV. All Claims Were Decided Against Ms. Mitchell.................................................................45
A. Case Is Ripe for Appeal...................................................................................................45
B. No Error In Issuing Order of Foreclosure Sale................................................................47
C. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Motion to Alter or Amend......................................49
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES..................................................................................................50
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................50
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE..............................................................................................52
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.......................................................................................................53
ADDENDUM................................................................................................................................54

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 801...........................................26
A Good Brick Mason, Inc. v. Spectrum Dev. Corp., 2010 UT App 145U, 2010 WL
2244374 (mem.)...........................................................................................................41, 42
Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)...............................18
APS v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)............................................................27
Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, 250 P. 3d 56..............................................................................7
Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, 20 P.3d 388...................................................37
Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, 391 P.3d 196...........................................................48
Belote v. McLaughlin, 673 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)............................................27
Bergmann v. Bergmann, 2018 UT App 130, 428 P.3d 89....................................................7
Brunson v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2012 UT App 222, 286 P.3d 934 (per curiam).........31, 32
Burnett v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013)..........20
Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co., 797 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1990)......................................31
Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982).................................................18
Cannon v. PNC Bank, No. 2:15-cv-00131, 2016 WL 9779290 (D. Utah Aug. 2016).......19
Chase Mortgage Co.-West v. Bufalini, No. 25782, 2004 WL 2866978 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec.
14, 2004)............................................................................................................................24
City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991).......................................27
Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d
1194 (10th Cir. 2011)...................................................................................................17, 21
Concepts Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987).......................49
Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, 221 P.3d 256........................42
Deschamps v. Treasure State Trailer Court, Ltd., 254 P.3d 566 (Mont. 2011)..................27
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson, 340 P.2d 416 (Utah 1959).....................................44
Douglas v. NCNB Texas Nat. Bank, 979 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1992)...........23, 25, 26, 27, 28
Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water & Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, 214 P.3d 120...............7
Erickson v. Ditech Fin., LLC, No. CV-14-08089-PCT-NVW, 2016 WL 4059607 (D. Ariz.
July 29, 2016).........................................................................................................23-24, 28
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Paul, 735 F. Supp. 375 (D. Utah 1990)...................................18
FNBN-Rescon I LLC v. Citrus El Dorado LLC, No. SA CV 13-0474-DOC, 2015 WL
11416171 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2015)..............................................................................27, 28
Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, 361 P.3d 63......................................................24
In re Cannon, 521 B.R. 686 (D. Utah, Oct. 23, 2014).......................................................20
In re Draffen, 731 S.E.2d 435 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)...................................................24, 27
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah 1985)..............................................................18
Kaspar v. Keller, 466 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)............................................23, 26
Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, 221 P.3d 194...........................18, 31
2

Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214.............................30
Maddox v. Ky. Fin. Co., 736 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984).......................................................27
Marty v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00033, 2010 WL 4117196
(D. Utah Oct. 19, 2010).....................................................................................................19
Massey v. Bd. of Trustees of Ogden Area Cmty. Action Comm., Inc., 2004 UT App 27, 863
P.3d 120..............................................................................................................................18
McQuarrie v. McQuarrie, 2017 UT App 209, 407 P.3d 1096...........................................46
Miller v. San Juan County, 2008 UT App 186, 186 P.3d 965............................................19
Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT App 88, 373 P.3d 189................................passim
Mitchell v. ReconTrust, 397 P.3d 508 (table) (Utah 2016).....................................10, 17, 34
Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 65..........................................41
Nunnery v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 641 Fed. App'x 430 (5th Cir. 2016)............24, 27
Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d 1226............................7
Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, 194 P.3d 956.......................................................30
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600.......................................................................44
Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983).........................................18
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App 255, 314 P.3d 1069. .41, 42
Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, 147 P.3d 439.......................................................................39
Pyper v. Bond, 2011 UT 45, 258 P.3d 575.........................................................................49
Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206, 285 P.3d 7 ........................................................29
Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 P.2d 1382 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)....................................40
Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah
1992)..................................................................................................................................18
Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah 1993)............................................18
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, 73 P.3d 325........................................16, 33, 33
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994).........................18-19
State v. Bates, 61 P. 905 (Utah 1900)...........................................................................35, 36
State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645...................................................................7, 37
State v. Smith, 2010 UT App 231, 238 P.3d 1103................................................................7
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998).................................................................15, 50
Steptoe v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 464 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App. 2015).....................24
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 144 P.2d 276 (Utah 1943)...............................................47
Sweeney v. Northeast Ill. Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., No. 97C7622, 1998 WL
812546 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1998).........................................................................................6
Threadgill v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. E2016-02339-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 3268957
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2017)..................................................................................................26, 27
Umouyo v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:16-CV-01576-RAJ, 2019 WL 383958 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 30, 2019).....................................................................................................................24
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998).............................................................50
Van Den Eikhof v. Vista School, 2012 UT App 125, 278 P.3d 622........................15, 29, 35
Weber v. Henderson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Penn. 2003).............................................6
3

Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983)........................................................................41
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 2072................................................................................................................27
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23...............................................................................21, 25, 28, 39
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-24.................................................................................................25
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27.................................................................................................25
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-901 et seq................................................................................47
Other Authorities
50 C.J.S. Judgment § 716 (1997).......................................................................................18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)...........................................................................................................26
Utah R. App. P. 24..............................................................................................................15
Utah R. App. P. 24(a).....................................................................................................7, 50
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8).........................................................................................15, 29, 35
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)............................................................................................................7
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).....................................................................................................19
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a)..................................................................................22, 23, 25, 26, 29
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)(A)................................................................................................22
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a)(2)(A)..........................................................................................22, 23
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)....................................................................................................42, 43
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4).....................................................................................................43
Utah R. Civ. P. 52...............................................................................................7, 12, 49, 50
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a)..........................................................................................................46
Utah R. Civ. P. 56...............................................................................................................36
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a)..........................................................................................................36
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)......................................................................................................40
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(d)..........................................................................................................43

4

Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c).......................................................................................................45
Utah R. Civ. P. 59...............................................................................................7, 12, 49, 50
Utah R. Civ. P. 61...............................................................................................................43
Utah R. Civ. P. 73(a)..........................................................................................................46

5

INTRODUCTION
“Litigation . . . is not a case of 'if at first you don't succeed, try, try again.'” Weber
v. Henderson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622 (E.D. Penn. 2003). Paula A. Mitchell (Ms.
Mitchell) has already brought and lost most of these claims on previous occasions. She
argues the judgment in this case is not final, just as she argued regarding the judgment in
the previous appeal before this Court. See Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT App
88, 373 P.3d 189. She will undoubtedly continue to argue, in other courts,1 that these
judgments are not final.
Rather than pinpoint one or two pertinent issues on appeal and properly
demonstrating why they were erroneously decided below, Ms. Mitchell “uses a 'throw it
at the wall and see what sticks' approach” on appeal. See Sweeney v. Northeast Ill.
Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., No. 97C7622, 1998 WL 812546, *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
18, 1998). Ms. Mitchell challenges almost every ruling made by the trial court, in hopes
of success on one of them, so as to prolong the litigation related to this property and keep
her in her home. However, Ms. Mitchell's claims, whether new or being dusted off and
brought anew, are meritless. Her assertions of error and abuse of discretion by the trial
court are unsupported by law or facts in the record, and necessarily fail.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Ms. Mitchell's brief contains a “statement of issues” section, but it fails to provide
this Court with the appropriate standard of review or to include complete record citations.
1 See infra Note 3 for a list of other lawsuits in which Ms. Mitchell continues to argue
these issues and tie up the real property that is the subject of litigation.
6

(Ini. Bri. 9-10.) A vague reference to cases that may set forth a standard is inadequate and
not compliant. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a). Neither this Court nor BNYM should be
required to conduct Ms. Mitchell's research to allow for appellate review. See, e.g., State
v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 33, 326 P.3d 645 (authorizing the Court to reject a brief that
fails to adequately state the standard of review); State v. Smith, 2010 UT App 231, ¶¶ 2-3,
238 P.3d 1103 (“Briefs that do not comply with the detailed requirements set forth in rule
24(a) may be disregarded or stricken by the court.”). Nevertheless, BNYM will attempt to
tease out the numerous issues raised by Ms. Mitchell and provide the appropriate review
standard.
With her first five (5) stated issues, Ms. Mitchell challenges the court's summary
judgment and Rule 12(b) rulings, which are reviewed de novo. See Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT
19, ¶ 16, 250 P. 3d 56 (summary judgment reviewed for correctness, giving no deference
to the trial court's decision); Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 9,
104 P.3d 1226 (dismissal rulings under 12(b)(6) given no deference and reviewed under
correctness standard). Specifically, “[w]hether a party has standing is primarily a question
of law, which [is] review[ed] for correctness.” Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water &
Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 120.
Ms. Mitchell's challenge to the court's Rule 59/52 ruling is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Bergmann v. Bergmann, 2018 UT App 130, ¶ 12, 428 P.3d 89.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
A.

The Mortgage Loan
In 2006, Ms. Mitchell signed a promissory note (the Note) and a deed of trust (the

Deed of Trust), and thereby obtained a $1,000,000 home loan from America's Wholesale
Lender. (R. 2-3, 14-28, 30-33.) The loan enabled her to purchase and obtain title to a
home located at 3 South Mistywood Lane (the Property) in the Pepperwood Subdivision
of Sandy, Utah. (R. 2-3, 11-12.) The Bank of New York Mellon fka The Bank of New
York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders CWMBS Series 2006-HYB5 (BNYM) holds
the endorsed Note. (R. 3, 33.) The Deed of Trust was also assigned to BNYM. (R. 3, 3536.) In April 2010, Ms. Mitchell defaulted on her loan by failing to make the required
payments when due. (R. 4-5.) Ms. Mitchell has managed to tie up the Property in various
lawsuits3 and she still resides in the Property, despite having failed to make a payment on
her loan since April 2010. (R. 5.)
2 Considerable factual background for this matter is summarized in this Court's
opinion in Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT App 88, 373 P.3d 189 (hereinafter,
Mitchell I). (R. 636-666.) Though the Mitchell I opinion is found in the record, citations
will be made to the opinion using the universal citation format. Citations herein to
Mitchell I refer specifically to this Court's appellate opinion issued on April 28, 2016,
while discussion involving and textual references to Mitchell I refer to the first litigation
matter and its subsequent appeals generally.
3 This brief will principally discuss the current matter and Mitchell I, the 2011 lawsuit
involving the Property. However, it is worth noting that at least two (2) other actions are
pending regarding the Property: (1) an eviction action in the Third Judicial District Court,
State of Utah, No. 180906841, filed by BNYM in September 2018 to obtain possession
of the Property, and (2) a litigation action in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, No. 2:18-cv-00636-BCW, filed by Ms. Mitchell against BNYM and its
attorneys who successfully prosecuted this judicial foreclosure.
8

On August 17, 2010, BNYM, by and through ReconTrust Company NA
(ReconTrust), the then-current successor trustee of the Deed of Trust, commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure action by recording a Notice of Default. Mitchell I, 2016 UT App 88,
¶ 3.
B.

The Mitchell I Litigation
In 2011, Ms. Mitchell attempted to prevent the foreclosure of the Property by

filing suit4 against BNYM, the foreclosure trustee, and the loan servicer, among others.
(R. 110, 273.) Ms. Mitchell claimed BNYM could not foreclose because it did not own
her mortgage loan. Mitchell I, 2016 UT App 88, ¶ 7. The district court dismissed nine of
her eleven claims and entered summary judgment against her on two remaining claims.
Id. ¶¶ 6-11. (R. 110.) Specifically, the court found that BNYM had authority to
commence foreclosure proceedings, the debt had not been satisfied, the trust deed had not
been severed from the debt, BNYM had a valid, enforceable claim against the Property
based on the deed of trust, and Ms. Mitchell was not entitled to quiet title. Mitchell I,
2016 UT App 88, ¶¶ 17, 34, 38. Undeterred, Ms. Mitchell asked the court to correct its
order, arguing that the court had not actually decided all her claims. (R. 629 n.3.) The
district court disagreed and denied her motion. (R. 628-30.)
4 On January 18, 2011, Paula A. Mitchell and her then-husband Wade Mitchell
(collectively, “the Mitchells”) filed suit in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah,
No. 110400816, naming as defendants BNYM, ReconTrust, Armand J. Howell, America's
Wholesale Lender, and BAC Home Loans Servicing LP. The Mitchells' claims in that
matter are summarized in this Court's opinion in Mitchell I. While the Mitchell I claims
are attributable to both of the Mitchells, because Wade Mitchell is not a party to this
current appeal, all references to the Mitchell I claims herein will be deemed to be Ms.
Mitchell's claims, for simplicity's sake.
9

In January 2014, Ms. Mitchell appealed (R. 273), but then moved to dismiss her
own appeal. (Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction, Mitchell v. ReconTrust
Co. NA, No. 20140113-CA (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2014); R. 633.) She argued it did not
matter that the district court said it was deciding all her claims—supposedly, because the
district court had not expressly addressed all her arguments, it had not actually resolved
all outstanding controversies and its judgment was not final. (Id.) She lost the motion. (R.
633.) The Utah Court of Appeals ruled, “The district court has resolved all causes of
action raised in the litigation.” (Order, Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. N.A., No. 20140113CA (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2015); R. 633.) Then, this Court affirmed. See Mitchell I,
2016 UT App 88, ¶ 68. (R. 110, 273.)
Ms. Mitchell moved for rehearing, again claiming the district court's judgment was
not final because it had not resolved all her claims. Her petition for rehearing was denied.
Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT App 88, 373 P.3d 189, rehearing denied (Utah
Ct. App. Jun. 29, 2016). She raised the same argument again when she petitioned the
Utah Supreme Court for certiorari. That petition was denied, too. See Mitchell v.
ReconTrust, 397 P.3d 508 (table) (Utah 2016). (R. 373-75.)
C.

This Mitchell II Litigation
The litigation of Mitchell I ultimately delayed the non-judicial foreclosure

proceedings sufficiently that BNYM had no choice but to forgo further efforts at nonjudicial foreclosure due to statute of limitations concerns. Accordingly, in April 2016,
BNYM filed a judicial foreclosure complaint against Ms. Mitchell. (R. 1-46.) Ms.
10

Mitchell moved to dismiss (“1st Motion to Dismiss”), arguing that the statute of
limitations had expired and BNYM lacked standing. (R. 96-106.) BNYM opposed
dismissal. (R. 109-27.) Ms. Mitchell replied. (R. 148-65.)
Before the first motion to dismiss was decided, Ms. Mitchell moved to dismiss
again (“2nd Motion to Dismiss”), arguing the judicial foreclosure was a compulsory
counterclaim that should have been brought in Mitchell I. (R. 202-15.) BNYM again
opposed dismissal. (R. 272-79.) Ms. Mitchell replied. (R. 311-27.)
The court denied the 2nd Motion to Dismiss. (R. 360-68, 384.) Ms. Mitchell
sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal of the district court's ruling. (R. 386406.) This Court denied Ms. Mitchell's petition for permission to file an interlocutory
appeal. (R. 417-20.) Thereafter, relying on this Court's decision in Mitchell I, the trial
court denied the 1st Motion to Dismiss. (R. 421-24.)
Ms. Mitchell then filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 444-507.) BNYM moved
to dismiss the counterclaim. (R. 514-20, 523-30.) Ms. Mitchell filed an Amended Answer
and Counterclaim. (R. 538-612.) BNYM moved to dismiss the amended counterclaim.
(R. 615-23.) Ms. Mitchell opposed dismissal. (R. 711-34.) BNYM replied. (R. 738-45.)
The court granted BNYM's motion to dismiss and Ms. Mitchell's amended counterclaim
was dismissed. (R. 754-55.)
BNYM moved for summary judgment on its breach of contract and judicial
foreclosure claims. (R. 782-807.) The motion was supported by documents from the
public records and the Affidavit of Alvin Denmon (the Denmon Affidavit), a foreclosure
11

specialist for New Penn Financial, LLC dba Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint
Mortgage), as servicing agent for BNYM. (R. 808-41.) Ms. Mitchell filed a
“preliminary” opposition (R. 858-77), followed by a second opposition (R. 901-28). The
second opposition was supported by declarations by Paula Mitchell and her spouse, Wade
Mitchell. (R. 929-35, 936-45.) BNYM replied. (R. 955-68.)
At the conclusion of the November 6, 2017 oral argument, the court granted
BNYM's summary judgment motion. (R. 987.) On November 27, 2017, the court entered
an Order Granting Summary Judgment (R. 1016-23) and a Final Judgment (Final
Judgment) (R. 1027-32.) Pursuant to these rulings, the court also entered an Order of
Foreclosure Sale. (R. 1076-77.)
Ms. Mitchell objected to the entry of the Final Judgment (R. 1033-39) and moved
to alter or amend the judgment under Rules 59 and 52 (R. 1081-1108). BNYM opposed
the motion to alter or amend. (R. 1124-30.) Ms. Mitchell replied. (R. 1134-49.) On
January 18, 2018, the court denied Ms. Mitchell's motion to alter or amend the judgment.
(R. 1161-62.)
Having timely filed an Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs (R. 1062-72) as
directed by the court in the Final Judgment, on January 24, 2018, BNYM filed a motion
to determine the reasonableness of those amounts. (R. 1163-65.) Ms. Mitchell objected to
the motion for attorney fees (R. 1224-42.) BNYM replied. (R. 1246-50.)
At the same time the parties were briefing the reasonableness of the attorney fees,
Ms. Mitchell moved to recall the Order of Foreclosure Sale. (R. 1166-1217.) BNYM
12

opposed the motion to recall. (R. 1278-82.) Ms. Mitchell replied. (R. 1298-3121.)
Before the pending motions on attorney fees and foreclosure sale order recall
could be heard, the property was sold at a sheriff's sale on February 13, 2018. (R. 136596.) On February 16, 2018, Ms. Mitchell filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 1290-94.) The
court heard oral argument on the pending motions on March 13, 2018. (R. 1357-58.) The
court issued a Ruling and Order upholding the attorney fee award as reasonable and
denying Ms. Mitchell's recall motion. (R. 1364.)
Ms. Mitchell further challenged the affidavits filed by BNYM in support of its
award of attorney fees. (R. 1554-70.) BNYM opposed. (R. 1574-77.) Ms. Mitchell
replied. (R. 1583-89.) On June 21, 2018, the court issued a Ruling and Order overruling
Ms. Mitchell's objections and upholding the award of attorney fees as reasonable.
On July 20, 2018, Ms. Mitchell filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (R. 1613-18.)
Ms. Mitchell then filed her initial brief on February 8, 2019.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal is nothing more than a second attempt by Ms. Mitchell to avoid
repayment of her $1,000,000 mortgage loan and tie the Property up in litigation to avoid
her eventual eviction. She has now successfully lived in the Property without payment of
her loan for nine (9) years. Ms. Mitchell unconvincingly challenges nearly every ruling
by the court below in an attempt to further tie up this Property and prevent its disposition.
Ms. Mitchell's claims regarding BNYM's standing to foreclose and nearly all of
her counterclaims are barred by res judicata and this Court's decision in Mitchell I. The
13

claims involve the same parties, the same claims and/or issues that were raise or could
have been raised in Mitchell I, and the claims and issues were completely and fairly
litigated in Mitchell I, which resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Her challenge to BNYM's judicial foreclosure as a waived compulsory
counterclaim also fails as it ignores the fact that BNYM had already commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure at the time Ms. Mitchell filed her Mitchell I lawsuit in an attempt to
prevent foreclosure. It also fails to recognize case law from other predominantly nonjudicial foreclosure states across the nation supporting the position that a judicial
foreclosure is not a compulsory counterclaim to a defaulting borrower's suit brought to
prevent or impede foreclosure.
Ms. Mitchell's arguments regarding the trial court's summary judgment ruling
misstate the court's findings and ignore BNYM's summary judgment evidence. Instead of
identifying evidence in the record that might have created an issue of fact precluding
summary judgment, Ms. Mitchell instead tries to convince this Court that BNYM bears
the responsibility of disproving each of her defenses, regardless of whether she put forth
any evidence to prove those defenses, in the face of BNYM's evidence.
Ms. Mitchell repeats her modus operandi from Mitchell I, arguing that no final
judgment has been entered in this matter and consequently no foreclosure sale should
have occurred. However, she fails to identify any matters that remain outstanding and
unresolved before the trial court, and identifies no fraud, inadequacy of price, unfairness,
or other prejudice that have affected her in any way in the court's issuance of the Final
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Judgment and Order of Foreclosure Sale.
Finally, Ms. Mitchell fails to brief her stated issue regarding a Motion to Alter or
Amend the final judgment. Accordingly, all of Ms. Mitchell's arguments are without
merit, and the trial court's judgment must be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Properly Denied Ms. Mitchell's Motions to Dismiss.
A.

BNYM Had Standing to Foreclose.

Ms. Mitchell complains that the court improperly denied her 1st Motion to
Dismiss after concluding that BNYM had standing to bring this foreclosure action. (Ini.
Br. 14-20.) In making this argument, and contrary to Rule 24, Ms. Mitchell generally fails
to cite to the record. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8); see also Van Den Eikhof v. Vista
School, 2012 UT App 125, ¶ 2, 278 P.3d 622 (requiring “'not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority'” (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998))). For this reason
alone, the Court need not consider this argument.
1.

Ms. Mitchell Was Estopped from Contesting BNYM's Standing.

If the Court considers this argument, denial of Ms. Mitchell's 1st Motion to
Dismiss should be upheld, as Ms. Mitchell is estopped from challenging BNYM's
standing by this Court's ruling in Mitchell I. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
requires proof of the following four (4) elements:
(i) [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must
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have been a party to . . . the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one
presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action
must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv)
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ¶ 35, 73 P.3d 325 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Issue preclusion “arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties . . .
from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first
suit.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Each of the four (4) required
elements is met in this case.5
First, Ms. Mitchell was a party to the prior adjudication, Mitchell I. See 2016 UT
App 88, ¶ 1. The first element is met.
Second, in Mitchell I, this Court noted that Ms. Mitchell argued that “MERS . . .
lacked authority to appoint BNYM as the successor beneficiary . . .” and Ms. Mitchell
“sought declaratory judgments . . . that [BNYM] may not foreclose the trust deed.” 2016
UT App 88, ¶¶ 4-5. Additionally, the Mitchell I complaint sought “clarification of the
'true ownership of the [d]ebt' and 'by extension the authority of [BNYM] to foreclose
upon the Property.” Id. ¶ 18. Indeed, Ms. Mitchell “alleged that because MERS and its
assignee BNYM lacked any beneficial ownership interest in the debt, MERS and BNYM
could not foreclose on the property.” Id. This Court rejected Ms. Mitchell's arguments
regarding the assignment, ownership of the debt, and BNYM's standing and authority to
5 On appeal, Ms. Mitchell only challenges the second element of collateral estoppel,
regarding whether the issue of standing in Mitchell I is identical to the standing challenge
below.
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foreclose the property. Id. ¶¶ 20 n.5, 22-23. This Court stated that “. . . the trust deed
expressly grants MERS the right to foreclose and sell the property.” Id. ¶ 20 n.5; see also
Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d
1194, 1202-05 (10th Cir. 2011) (determining that MERS retained its authority to
foreclose even after the trust deed was securitized because the trust deed “explicitly
granted Defendants the authority to foreclose”). The Mitchell I Court ultimately
concluded that “the district court did not err in concluding that 'MERS had, and BNYM
has, authority to commence foreclosure under the terms of the [trust deed].'” Mitchell I,
2016 UT App 88, ¶ 38 (alteration in original). These arguments made in Mitchell I mirror
those made by Ms. Mitchell in her 1st Motion to Dismiss. (See R. 101-105.) Thus, the
second element of collateral estoppel is met.
Third, these issues were completely, fully, and fairly litigated in Mitchell I. Ms.
Mitchell challenged BNYM's standing to foreclose by filing her complaint in Mitchell I
in January 2011. See generally Mitchell I, 2016 UT App 88. The majority of her claims
were dismissed by the district court, and the remainder were rejected when the court
ruled against her on summary judgment. Id. ¶¶ 7-11. She appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the district court's judgment. Id. ¶ 68. After her petition for
rehearing was denied by this Court, Ms. Mitchell petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for
certiorari, but her petition was denied. Mitchell v. ReconTrust, 387 P.3d 508 (table) (Utah
2016). Because these issues were completely, fully, and fairly litigated for more than five
(5) years, the third element of collateral estoppel is satisfied.
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Fourth, Mitchell I resulted in a final judgment on the merits. As stated supra, the
district court in Mitchell I disposed of Ms. Mitchell's claims via a motion to dismiss and a
summary judgment motion. The dismissal of her claims in Mitchell I, pursuant to a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, “. . . [is a] dismissal . . . on the merits and is accorded res judicata
effect.” See Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 29, 221 P.3d 194
(quoting Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Paul, 735 F. Supp. 375 (D. Utah 1990)).
Similarly, granting summary judgment to BNYM on Ms. Mitchell's remaining
claims in Mitchell I was a “final judgment, i.e., one which puts an end to a lawsuit by
declaring that the plaintiff is or is not entitled to recover the remedy sought.” Schoney v.
Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah 1993) (citing Calder Bros. Co. v.
Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926 n.4 (Utah 1982); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d
960, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Such a judgment is “. . . an absolute bar to a later action
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.” Id. (citing Salt Lake Citizens
Congress v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992); Jacobsen
v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985); Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d
873, 875 (Utah 1983)). Moreover, “[w]here parties have been afforded an opportunity to
be heard and to contest the issues, '[f]or the purposes of the doctrine of res judicata, a
judgment entered on a motion for summary judgment is just as binding as a judgment
entered after a trial of the facts.'” Massey v. Bd. of Trustees of Ogden Area Cmty. Action
Comm., Inc., 2004 UT App 27, ¶ 15 n. 5, 863 P.3d 120 (quoting 50 C.J.S. Judgment § 716
(1997)); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 518 n. 8 (10th Cir.
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1994) (grant of summary judgment may be a judgment on the merits for res judicata
purposes); Miller v. San Juan County, 2008 UT App 186, ¶ 12, 186 P.3d 965 (affirming
the trial court’s dismissal of an action due to the res judicata effect of a previous summary
judgment order).
Ms. Mitchell appealed, first to this Court, which affirmed the district court, and
later to the Utah Supreme Court, which denied her petition for certiorari. No further
appeal has been made and the time for so doing has expired. Thus, Mitchell I resulted in a
final judgment on the merits and the fourth element is met.
Because the four (4) required elements of issue preclusion are met, the court did
not err in denying Ms. Mitchell's 1st Motion to Dismiss.
2.

BNYM's Complaint Sufficiently Alleged Standing to Foreclose.

Even if Ms. Mitchell's standing argument was not barred by collateral estoppel, the
court did not err in denying Ms. Mitchell's 1st Motion to Dismiss because BNYM alleged
standing sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge. Ms. Mitchell argued that
BNYM had no standing because it did not own the debt and was “asserting this
foreclosure claim on behalf of some unidentified person or entity . . . .” (R. 103.)
However, Utah courts have rejected such arguments about debt ownership being a
required element of standing to foreclose. See, e.g., Cannon v. PNC Bank, No. 2:15-cv00131, 2016 WL 9779290, *8 (D. Utah Aug. 2016) (finding that successor beneficiary
may appoint a successor trustee and foreclose following borrower's default); Marty v.
MERS, 1:10-cv-00033, 2010 WL 4117196, *6 (D. Utah Oct. 19, 2010) (stating that the
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beneficiary's contractual right to foreclose, per the terms of the deed of trust, is unaffected
by any conveyance of the ownership of the debt). In a matter similar to this one, where a
loan servicer sought to enforce a note, submit a proof of claim, and challenge a debtor's
Chapter 13 eligibility, the bankruptcy court concluded,
Actual ownership [of the debt] is not dispositive in this
case . . . . [The loan servicer] is entitled to present a proof of
claim and challenge eligibility as servicer of a mortgage,
which status gives it a pecuniary interest in collecting
payments under the terms of the note and deed of trust.
In re Cannon, 521 B.R. 686, 692 (D. Utah, Oct. 23, 2014).
In Mitchell I, the district court and appellate court unequivocally rejected Ms.
Mitchell's arguments regarding MERS, BNYM, and the ownership of the Note. The trial
court concluded that “. . . MERS had, and BNYM has, authority to commence
foreclosure under the terms of tre [trust deed] and the Utah statutes.” Mitchell I, 2016 UT
App 88, ¶ 7 (alteration in original). While Ms. Mitchell attempts to emphasize the
distinction made by this Court in Mitchell I between MERS (and therefore its assignee
BNYM) qualifying as either a “statutory beneficiary” or a contractual beneficiary, as
contemplated in Burnett v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc, 706 F.3d 1231, 1237-38
(10th Cir. 2013), this is either a misapprehension or misstatement of the Mitchell I ruling.
Whether MERS actually qualified as a “statutory beneficiary,” or whether the district
court erred in determining MERS did qualify as a “statutory beneficiary,” was inapposite
to this Court's Mitchell I ruling: “We express no opinion on this point.” Mitchell I, 2016
UT App 88, ¶ 20 n.5. Instead, this Court determined that “. . . the trust deed expressly
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grants MERS the right to foreclose and sell the property.” Id. The Mitchell I court also
relied on Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC, 680 F.3d at 1202-05 in determining that
MERS retained its authority to foreclose even after the trust deed was securitized because
the trust deed “explicitly granted Defendants the authority to foreclose.” Mitchell I, 2016
UT App 88, ¶¶ 28-29. Ultimately, the Mitchell I court held that “the district court did not
err in concluding that 'MERS had, and BNYM has, authority to commence foreclosure
under the terms of the [trust deed].'” Id. ¶ 38.
Likewise, here, BNYM is not required to allege and prove actual ownership of the
debt in order to have standing to foreclose, as it inherited those same explicit contractual
rights independent of any rights afforded a “statutory beneficiary.” Both the Deed of
Trust (R. 15 (“The beneficiary of this [Deed of Trust] is MERS and the successors and
assigns of MERS.”)) and the Note (R. 30 ¶ 1 (“I understand that Lender may transfer this
Note.”)) contemplate transfers of interest. BNYM alleged that it was the current
beneficiary of the Deed of Trust. (R. 3.) The endorsement on the Note (R. 33) and the
Assignment of Deed of Trust (R. 35-36) grant BNYM an interest in the Note and Deed of
Trust, along with the standing and authority to foreclose if Ms. Mitchell failed to make
the required payments when due. With such standing, Utah Code section 57-1-23
specifically grants BNYM the right to foreclose judicially, as it states that “at the option
of the beneficiary, a trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the
foreclosure of mortgages on real property.” Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23. Because BNYM
adequately alleged that it was the beneficiary of the trust deed and because Utah law
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specifically authorizes a beneficiary to elect judicial foreclosure, the trial court did not err
in finding that BNYM had standing to foreclose and in denying Ms. Mitchell's 1st Motion
to Dismiss.
B.

BNYM Did Not Waive Its Judicial Foreclosure Claim.

Ms. Mitchell complains that the court improperly denied her 2nd Motion to
Dismiss after concluding that BNYM did not waive its judicial foreclosure claim by not
bringing it as a counterclaim in Mitchell I.6 (Ini. Br. 20-28.) Rule 13(a) provides that “[a]
pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—at the time of its service—the
pleader has against any opposing party, if the claim arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 13(a)
(1)(A). However, “[t]he pleader need not state the claim if[,] when the action was
commenced, the claim was the subject of another pending action.” Id. R. 13(a)(2)(A).
1.

Rule 13(a) Did Not Mandate a Judicial Foreclosure Claim When
BNYM Had Already Commenced a Non-judicial Foreclosure
Action.

When Ms. Mitchell filed suit against BNYM in January 2011 in Mitchell I, BNYM
had already commenced a non-judicial foreclosure action, as a Notice of Default was
recorded by the foreclosure trustee on August 17, 2010. Mitchell I, 2016 UT App 88, ¶ 3.
Ms. Mitchell acknowledges the existence of BNYM's non-judicial foreclosure
6 This is the second time Ms. Mitchell has attempted to present her compulsory
counterclaim argument on appeal. In December 2016, after the district court denied her
2nd Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Mitchell filed a Petition for Permission to File Interlocutory
Appeal, making the same arguments she now makes here. (R. 388-406.) This Court
denied Ms. Mitchell's petition. (R. 419.)
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proceedings and even admits that her Mitchell I complaint was filed in an attempt to halt
that foreclosure action. (Ini. Br. 20-21.) Yet Ms. Mitchell ignores the timing of these
actions and fails to analyze Rule 13 in the proper context—that is, a non-judicial
foreclosure action was actively being pursued at the very time she alleges BNYM was
required to file a judicial foreclosure counterclaim. (Ini. Br. 20-21.)
Rule 13(a) makes clear that BNYM “need not state the [foreclosure counter]claim
if[,] when the action commenced, the [foreclosure] claim was the subject of another
pending action.” Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a)(2)(A) (second alteration in original). To hold
otherwise would deprive BNYM of its choice of remedies, requiring it to endure a costly,
extensive judicial process instead of a less expensive, abbreviated non-judicial action. In
Douglas v. NCNB Texas Nat. Bank, 979 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1992), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained its reasoning for so holding with respect
to a Texas foreclosure:
[T]he mortgagor should not be permitted to destroy or impair
the mortgagee's contractual right to foreclosure under the
power of sale by the simple expedient of instituting a suit,
whether groundless or meritorious, thereby compelling the
mortgagee to abandon the extra-judicial foreclosure which he
had the right to elect, nullifying his election, and permitting
the mortgagor to control the option as to remedies.
Id. at 1130 (quoting Kaspar v. Keller, 466 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)).
Courts around the country concur, holding that judicial foreclosure is not a compulsory
counterclaim to a suit brought with the intent of halting a non-judicial foreclosure. See,
e.g., Erickson v. Ditech Fin., LLC, No. CV-14-08089-PCT-NVW, 2016 WL 4059607, *3
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(D. Ariz. July 29, 2016) (“[I]t cannot be concluded that, by seeking declaratory judgment
that [lender] was not the Note Holder or Beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, [borrower]
forced [lender] to elect judicial foreclosure or forever waive its right to do so.”); In re
Draffen, 731 S.E.2d 435, 438 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that lender is not required to
file a judicial foreclosure action as a compulsory counterclaim in a federal action and,
thus, a subsequent state judicial foreclosure action was not barred by Rule 13(a)); Chase
Mortgage Co.-West v. Bufalini, No. 25782, 2004 WL 2866978, *2 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec.
14, 2004) (unpublished) (judicial foreclosure is not a compulsory counterclaim); Umouyo
v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:16-CV-01576-RAJ, 2019 WL 383958, *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
30, 2019) (same); see also Nunnery v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 641 Fed. App'x 430,
434 (5th Cir. 2016) (following the Kaspar rule); Steptoe v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
464 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex. App. 2015) (same).
Ms. Mitchell asserts that, having already commenced a non-judicial foreclosure
action when the 2011 Mitchell I litigation was filed, BNYM “made its election of
remedies and waived any right to bring a judicial foreclosure.” (Ini. Br. 21.) In so doing,
Ms. Mitchell champions a view of the “election of remedies” doctrine that has long been
outdated. Cf. Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, ¶¶ 73-74, 361 P.3d 63 (stating that
the “advent of liberal pleading rules . . . has eliminated this harsh interpretation” of the
doctrine that hearkens back to the nineteenth and early twentieth century). The modern
view of the election of remedies doctrine, consistent with Utah's modern pleading rules,
is that when a party “must choose between alternative remedies for a single theory of
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liability, an election is not final until a judgment is fully satisfied.” Id. ¶¶ 71, 77.
Moreover, the mere fact that BNYM ultimately halted its non-judicial foreclosure
efforts, due to concerns the statute of limitations would expire before a trustee's sale
could be completed, and elected to proceed with a judicial foreclosure, is of no
consequence. Utah law, like the Texas statute at issue in Douglas, grants a lender the
option of foreclosing a property via judicial or non-judicial action:
The trustee . . . may exercise and cause the trust property to
be sold in the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-127 [non-judicial foreclosure] . . . ; or, at the option of the
beneficiary, a trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real
property [judicial foreclosure].
See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (emphasis added). Here, BNYM was specifically granted
the right, by Ms. Mitchell, when she signed the deed of trust, to proceed with its choice of
non-judicial or judicial foreclosure. (R. 23.) Having agreed to grant BNYM its choice of
remedies, Ms. Mitchell may not now argue otherwise. Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in denying Ms. Mitchell's 2nd Motion to Dismiss because judicial foreclosure was not
a compulsory counterclaim to the Mitchell I litigation complaint.
2.

No Error in Examining Other Courts' Rule 13(a)
Interpretations.

Without any support, Ms. Mitchell argues that the trial court could not seek
guidance from other courts' decisions interpreting Rule 13(a). (Ini. Br. 23.) However, Ms.
Mitchell's position is directly contrary to Utah law, which states that, because no Utah
court has squarely addressed this issue, this Court may “look to decisions under the
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federal rules for guidance.” 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 64, 99 P.3d
801; cf. Threadgill v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. E2016-02339-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL
3268957, *2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (acknowledging the lack of Tennessee precedent on
this same issue and looking to decisions of other state and federal courts for guidance).
Moreover, while Ms. Mitchell claims “there is plenty of law on point,” she wholly fails to
cite any Utah law on point. (R. 23-28.) Thus, it was completely appropriate for the trial
court to look to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
Rule 13(a) in Douglas for guidance.
In Douglas, the FDIC brought claims to recover amounts due on certain
promissory notes against two defendants, a drilling company and its owner. Douglas, 979
F.2d at 1129. The defendants alleged that any claims on the notes were compulsory
counterclaims that should have been brought in a prior action. Id. The Douglas court
analyzed the application of Rule 13(a)7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under
Texas law. Id. at 1130. The court speculated that the plaintiff's debt collection claims
“might very well” constitute compulsory counterclaims, but it ultimately did not reach
that issue. Id. Rather, in reliance on the precedent set forth in Kaspar v. Keller, 466
S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), the Douglas court concluded that Federal Rule 13(a)
was inapplicable because it “would abridge the lender's substantive rights and enlarge the
debtor's substantive rights.” Id. In so doing, the court emphasized that, under Texas law,
lenders have a substantive right to elect judicial or non-judicial foreclosure in the event of
7 Federal Rule 13(a) is substantially similar to Utah's Rule 13(a).
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default. Id. Accordingly, the court held that “it is appropriate . . . to follow the state's
practice of permitting a lender to refrain from filing a counterclaim on overdue notes and
to wait to pursue either a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure remedy. Id.
Ms. Mitchell makes much of the Douglas court's reference to the Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which provide that the federal rules “shall not abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right. Id. (Ini. Br. 24.) Ms. Mitchell further posits that because
Texas has a state rule of civil procedure that is substantially similar to the federal Rules
Enabling Act, and Utah does not, BNYM had no choice but to file a judicial foreclosure
counterclaim, notwithstanding the prior existence of its non-judicial foreclosure action.
(Ini. Br. 24-25.) However, this issue is not limited to Texas and its state law. “[A] number
of courts in other jurisdictions have [addressed the precise issue before us], and have
concluded that similar rules of procedure regarding compulsory counterclaims do not
bar” subsequent foreclosure proceedings. Threadgill, 2017 WL 3268957, *3 (citing
Maddox v. Ky. Fin. Co., 736 F.2d 380, 382-83 (6th Cir. 1984); Nunnery, 641 Fed. App'x at
433-34; Deschamps v. Treasure State Trailer Court, Ltd., 254 P.3d 566, 569 (Mont.
2011); Belote v. McLaughlin, 673 S.W.2d 27, 30-31 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); In re Draffen,
731 S.E.2d at 437).
Because Utah's statutory foreclosure scheme was based on California's foreclosure
laws, see, e.g., City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 235-36 (Utah 1991);
APS v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), courts may further find support
for this position in cases interpreting California law, such as FNBN-Rescon I LLC v.
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Citrus El Dorado LLC, No. SA CV 13-0474-DOC, 2015 WL 11416171 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2015). In FNBN-Rescon, the court reviewed the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff's
judicial foreclosure was a compulsory counterclaim that should have been brought in the
defendants' prior lawsuit alleging breach of contract, fraud, conspiracy, quiet title, and
declaratory relief, among other things. Id. *1. The court analyzed the Douglas ruling and
agreed with its reasoning, emphasizing the fact that “[l]ike in Texas, California law
authorizes both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure.” Id. *5. The FNBN-Rescon court
did not pin its decision to any state law rules enabling provision, but rather simply
concluded that:
If judicial foreclosure was a compulsory counterclaim in a
lawsuit like the [one before us], a defaulting borrower could
usurp a lender's statutory right of election of remedies by
simply suing first and forcing judicial foreclosure as a
counterclaim. Requiring [the defendant] to pursue judicial
foreclosure as a counterclaim in the [prior a]ction 'would
abridge [the defendant's] substantive rights and enlarge [the
plaintiff's] substantive rights.'
Id. (quoting Douglas, 979 F.2d at 1130). The FNBN-Rescon court then concluded that
“Plaintiff's judicial foreclosure claim was not a compulsory counterclaim in the [prior
a]ction.” Id. *6.
This Court too should follow the reasoning of courts in Texas (Douglas), Arizona
(Erickson), and California (FNBN-Rescon). Because Utah law grants lenders the option
of foreclosing a property via judicial or non-judicial action, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-123, judicial foreclosure is not a counterclaim in a prior action seeking to halt a non-
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judicial foreclosure action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Ms. Mitchell's
jurisdictional challenge based on Rule 13(a).
II.

The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed Ms. Mitchell's Counterclaim.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Accepted as True the Facts in Ms. Mitchell's
Counterclaims.

Ms. Mitchell asserts that the trial court, in reviewing BNYM's Motion to Dismiss
her counterclaims, failed to accept the alleged facts as true. (Ini. Br. 29-31.) Yet Ms.
Mitchell wholly fails to cite to the record or legal authority to support her argument. See
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(8); see also Van Den Eikhof, 2012 UT App 125, ¶ 2. Ms. Mitchell
fails to identify any specific and relevant facts in her counterclaims below that “directly
contradicted BNYM's unsupported factual assertions.” (Ini. Br. 30.) Without identifying
such relevant facts which she alleges were not properly accepted by the trial court, it
cannot be said that the trial court failed to consider or accept those facts. Moreover, the
trial court was not bound to accept as true Ms. Mitchell's conclusory allegations. See
Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206, ¶ 10, 285 P.3d 7 (“[W]e accept the plaintiff's
description of facts alleged in the complaint to be true, but we need no accept extrinsic
facts not pleaded nor need we accept legal conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded
facts.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, having failed to single out
any fact that was not properly accepted by the trial court, it cannot be said that the trial
court erred in granting BNYM's motion to dismiss the counterclaims.
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B.

Ms. Mitchell's Counterclaims Were Barred By Res Judicata.

Ms. Mitchell argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her counterclaims8
based on the doctrine of res judicata. (Ini. Br. 28.)
“The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct branches: claim preclusion and
issue preclusion.” Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 19, 16 P.3d
1214. “[C]laim preclusion corresponds to causes of action[;] issue preclusion corresponds
to the facts and issues underlying causes of action.” Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT
70, ¶ 31, 194 P.3d 956. “[B]oth branches of res judicata 'serve[] the important policy of
preventing previously litigated issues from being relitigated . . . .'” Macris, 2000 UT 93,
¶ 19 (citation omitted).
1.

Claim Preclusion

In Utah, claim preclusion has three requirements:
8 Specifically, Ms. Mitchell alleged twenty-three (23) counterclaims, titled as follows:
(1) Declaratory Judgment re Finality of Mitchell I; (2) Declaratory Judgment re Res
Judicata Effect of Mitchell I; (3) Declaratory Judgment re Mitchell I Rulings Being Void
as Violating Constitutional Rights; (4) Declaratory Judgment re Invalidity of Note and
Trust Deed; (5) Declaratory Judgment re Ownership of the Debt, Note and Trust Deed;
(6) Declaratory Judgment re Lack of Required Notice to Cure; (7) Declaratory Judgment
re Contractual Rights of BNYM Under the Note and Trust Deed; (8) Effect of BNYM's
Failed Attempt to Appoint ReconTrust; (9) Re ReconTrust's Duty to Require Proper
Substitution; (10) Re ReconTrust's Duty to Reject Appointment to Foreclose; (11) Re
ReconTrust's Duty to Be Independent; (12) Declaratory Judgment re Effect of
ReconTrust's Actions as an Unqualified [sic]; (13) Declaratory Judgment re Assignment
by MERS to BNYM; (14) Estoppel – Reformation; (15) Breach of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing; (16) Re Severance of Security from Debt; (17) Re Possible Satisfaction or
Reduction of Debt; (18) Quiet Titles [sic] re Real Property; (19) Quiet Titles [sic] re Trust
Deed and Note; (20) Damages Breach of Duty by ReconTrust as Prospective Successor
Trustee; (21) Damages Beach of Duty by ReconTrust as Successor Trustee; (22) Breach
of Contract; and (23) Civil Conspiracy and Class Action. (R. 564-606.)
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First, both cases must involve the same parties or their
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must
have been presented in the first suit or be one that could and
should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 29. “Claim preclusion is premised
on the principle that a controversy should be adjudicated only once.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “Claims or causes of action are the same as those
brought or that could have been brought in the first action if they arise from the same
operative facts, or in other words from the same transaction.” Id. ¶ 30. Thus, claim
preclusion “'. . . is thought to turn on the essential similarity of the underlying events
giving rise to the various legal claims.'” Id. (quoting Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
797 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Utah 1990)); see also Brunson v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2012 UT
App 222, ¶¶ 2, 5, 286 P.3d 934 (per curiam) (reasoning that where the first lawsuit raised
issues related to securitization and the second lawsuit raised claims of wrongful
foreclosure and both lawsuits were brought to prevent foreclosure of the same loan
involving the same property, the claims brought in both lawsuits were the same for res
judicata purposes).
Ms. Mitchell's counterclaims are barred because each of the three (3) elements of
claim preclusion are met. First, both Mitchell I and this current matter involve Ms.
Mitchell and BNYM as parties. (Ini. Br. 7-8; R. 740-41.)
Second, each of Ms. Mitchell's twenty-three (23) counterclaims—with the
exception of the first three (3) counterclaims, which purport to collaterally attack
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Mitchell I—was brought, or could have been brought, in Mitchell I. (R. 739, 754.) While
Ms. Mitchell attempts to assert that counterclaims 4, 6, 7, 14, 16, 19, and 23 were not
brought in Mitchell I, she fails to rebut the fact that each of these counterclaims could
have been brought in Mitchell I and were brought specifically to prevent foreclosure of
the same loan involving the same property. See Brunson, 2012 UT App 222, ¶¶ 2, 5.
Additionally, Ms. Mitchell presents no factual or legal authority to support her first three
(3) “collateral attack” counterclaims, nor does Ms. Mitchell acknowledge to the Court
that she already had the opportunity to “attack” the Mitchell I ruling on appeal, which
opportunity concluded when her petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court was
denied. (Ini. Br. 30-31.)
Third, Mitchell I resulted in a final judgment on the merits. (See infra Section
II.B.3.) Accordingly, the Court did not err in dismissing Ms. Mitchell's counterclaims as
they were barred by claim preclusion.
2.

Issue Preclusion

As stated previously (see supra Section I.A.1), the four (4) essential elements of
issue preclusion are:
(i) [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must
have been a party to . . . the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one
presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action
must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv)
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.
Snyder, 2003 UT 13, ¶ 35. Issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of facts and issues
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that were previously litigated. See id.
In Mitchell I, the Ms. Mitchell raised claims regarding the following issues:
•

The authority of MERS to appoint BNYM as the successor beneficiary.

•

The authority of MERS and BNYM to appoint a successor trustee.

•

The authority of ReconTrust to serve as foreclosure trustee.

•

The servicing of the loan and issues surrounding a sought-after loan modification.

•

The parties' respective rights under the Note and Deed of Trust.

•

The validity of the substitution of trustee and the notice of default.

•

The validity of the security instrument and secured nature of the loan.

•

The authority of BNYM to foreclose the Deed of Trust.

•

The respective interests in the Property.

See Mitchell I, 2016 UT App 88, ¶¶ 4-5.
Each of these issues was expressly settled in Mitchell I. Thus, even if Ms.
Mitchell's counterclaims are not barred by claim preclusion, they are barred by issue
preclusion, as all four (4) of its requirements are satisfied: Mitchell I resulted in a final
judgment (see infra Section II.B.3), these issues were fully litigated, and both BNYM and
Ms. Mitchell were parties. Cf. Snyder, 2003 UT 13, ¶ 35.
3.

Mitchell I Resulted in a Final Judgment on the Merits.

Ms. Mitchell argues, without any analysis or support in the record, that Mitchell I
did not result in a final judgment on the merits. (Ini. Br. 31-32.) Notwithstanding Ms.
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Mitchell's inadequate briefing on this point, the facts demonstrate that Mitchell I did
result in a final judgment on the merits.
In Mitchell I, the trial court dismissed nine of the Ms. Mitchell's eleven claims and
entered summary judgment against them on the remaining two claims. Mitchell I, 2016
UT App 88, ¶ 7. (R. 110.) Ms. Mitchell asked the district court to correct its order,
arguing that the court had not actually decided all their claims. (R. 629 n.3.) The court
disagreed and denied her motion. (R. 628-30.) Ms. Mitchell appealed (R. 273), but then
moved to dismiss her own appeal. (R. 633.) She argued it did not matter that the district
court said it was deciding all her claims—that because the district court had not expressly
addressed all her arguments, it had not actually resolved all outstanding controversies and
its judgment was not final. (Id.) Ms. Mitchell lost the motion. (Id.) The Utah Court of
Appeals further ruled that “[t]he district court has resolved all causes of action raised in
the litigation.” (Order, Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. N.A., No. 20140113-CA (Utah Ct. App.
Jan. 14, 2015); R. 633.) And ultimately, this Court affirmed. See Mitchell v. ReconTrust
Co. NA, 2016 UT App 88, 373 P.3d 189 (“Mitchell I”). (R. 110, 273.)
Ms. Mitchell moved for rehearing, again claiming the district court's judgment was
not final because it had not resolved all her claims. The petition for rehearing was denied.
Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. N.A., 2016 UT App 88, 373 P.3d 189, rehearing denied (Utah
Ct. App. Jun. 29, 2016). Ms. Mitchell raised the same argument again when petitioning
the Utah Supreme Court for certiorari. That petition was also denied. See Mitchell v.
ReconTrust, 397 P.3d 508 (table) (Utah 2016). (R. 373-75.)
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Meanwhile, in November 2016, the trial court in this judicial foreclosure matter
stayed the case due to the Mitchell I Court's prior exclusive jurisdiction over these issues.
(R. 367.) The trial court indicated that the stay would remain in place until a final, nonappealable order was achieved in Mitchell I. (R. 367.) Ms. Mitchell even acknowledged
that a final judgment in Mitchell I would be necessary before this matter could continue
(R. 380). Once Ms. Mitchell's appeals were exhausted, and the trial court determined
Mitchell I was final and no longer appealable as a result of the denial of Ms. Mitchell's
petition for certiorari and the order of remittitur, the trial court lifted the stay and allowed
this matter to proceed. (R. 369-76, 384.) Thus, Mitchell I resulted in a final judgment on
the merits.
C.

No Error in Dismissing Collateral Attack of Mitchell I.

Ms. Mitchell complains that the court erred in dismissing her counterclaims that
purported to collaterally attack Mitchell I. (Ini. Br. 34.) In so doing, Ms. Mitchell again
fails to cite to the record and relevant authority in any meaningful way. See UTAH R. APP.
P. 24(a)(8); see also Van Den Eikhof, 2012 UT App 125, ¶ 2. Ms. Mitchell also fails to
provide any analysis to support her collateral attack. (Ini. Br. 34.) For example, Ms.
Mitchell includes a lengthy block quote from a 1900 Utah Supreme Court case, see State
v. Bates, 61 P. 905, 906 (Utah 1900), but she provides no analysis as to how the case or its
ruling relates to this matter. (Ini. Br. 34.) Instead, Ms. Mitchell appears to have quoted the
case for her own conclusion that “a void judgment may be collaterally attacked at any
time, in any proceeding” (Ini. Br. 34), notwithstanding the fact that such a statement is
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not supported by the Bates quotation. See Bates, 61 P. at 906. Indeed, it appears Ms.
Mitchell simply concludes, with no supporting authority, that the various courts' rulings
in the Mitchell I proceedings constitute a “void judgment” that may be collaterally
attacked. (Ini. Br. 34.) Without any reasoned analysis or citation to legal authority or the
record, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in finding “no legal, factual, or logical
support for such claims and [for] declin[ing] to entertain them in this case.” (R. 754.)
Accordingly, for this inadequate pleading alone, this Court should reject Ms. Mitchell's
collateral attack argument.
III.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment.
A.

No Error in Application of the Summary Judgment Standard.

Ms. Mitchell uses sweeping conclusory assertions to claim that the trial court did
not apply the proper summary judgment standard, because she alleges “there was not
evidence in the record as to each and every element/fact BNYM had to prove.” (Ini. Br.
39.) However, the Rule 56 standard required BNYM, as the moving party, to show “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [BNYM] is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(a). In fact, the trial court specifically ruled that
“[BNYM] met its burden of establishing the undisputed facts and showing that judgment
should enter as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56(a) . . . .” (R. 1017.)
While summarily claiming that BNYM did not introduce evidence to support each
fact it had to prove, Ms. Mitchell fails to identify or marshal any evidence in the record
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that may have been used to support the trial court's summary judgment ruling.9 Indeed,
Ms. Mitchell ignores the trial court's undisputed fact findings that: Ms. Mitchell breached
the terms and conditions of the note and deed of trust, thereby defaulting on her loan
obligations, by failing to make the monthly payments when due; Ms. Mitchell has not
made a payment on her loan obligations since April 2010; BNYM accelerated the unpaid
balance of the debt and demanded payment; and, as of May 31, 2017, Ms. Mitchell owed
BNYM $1,343,034.81, plus interest, attorney fees, costs, taxes, and other fees. (R. 101721.) Having wholly failed to acknowledge and grant a “healthy dose of deference . . . to
[these] factual findings,” State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 41, 326 P.3d 645, Ms. Mitchell's
arguments necessarily fail. See id. ¶ 42 (“[A] party challenging a factual finding or
sufficiency of the evidence to support a [ruling] will almost certainly fail to carry its
burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal.”)
B.

BNYM's Claims Were Proven With Evidence.

Ms. Mitchell asserts that the elements of BNYM's breach of contract claim had no
evidentiary support. (Ini. Br. 41-46.) Breach of contract requires a showing of: (1) a
contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach by the other party, and
(4) damages. See Bair v. Axiom Design L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ¶ 14, 20 P.3d 388.
First, Ms. Mitchell argues that BNYM did not prove the existence of a contract
between the parties. (Ini. Br. 41.) But BNYM introduced evidence of such a contract in
the form of the deed of trust, assignment, and endorsed note. (R. 810-11.) Moreover, in
9 In a prior time, Ms. Mitchell's arguments would not be decided on the merits at all
due to her failure to marshal. See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 37, 326 P.3d 645.
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Mitchell I and again in her counterclaim, Ms. Mitchell asserted a cause of action for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see Mitchell I, 2016 UT App 88,
¶ 9; (R. 592), which duty is implied in contracts. See Mitchell I, 2016 UT App 88, ¶ 10.
Ms. Mitchell cannot now be heard to argue that no contract exists when she previously
admitted as much by filing a contract-based claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in Mitchell I and her counterclaim in this matter.
Second, Ms. Mitchell claims that BNYM did not prove that it fully performed its
contractual obligations. (Ini. Br. 42.) But BNYM introduced evidence that it (or its
predecessor-in-interest in the contract) disbursed the sum of $1,000,000 to or for the
benefit of Ms. Mitchell, which disbursement thereafter obligated Ms. Mitchell to make
timely monthly payments. (R. 810-11.)
Third, Ms. Mitchell asserts that BNYM did not prove that Ms. Mitchell breached
the contract. (Ini. Br. 43.) But BNYM introduced evidence that Ms. Mitchell did breach
the contract by failing to make the required monthly payments when due, which is
required by the terms of the note and deed of trust. (R. 811.)
Fourth, Ms. Mitchell alleges that BNYM did not prove that Ms. Mitchell actually
owed $1,343,034.81 in damages. (Ini. Br. 44.) But BNYM introduced admissible
evidence that Ms. Mitchell did owe that amount. (R. 812.)
Fifth, Ms. Mitchell claims that BNYM did not prove that it has the right to
foreclose judicially. (Ini. Br. 45-46.) But BNYM introduced evidence, in the form of the
deed of trust, that it had the right to foreclose. (R. 819-29.) Specifically, paragraph 22 of
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the deed of trust stated, “If the default is not cured . . . , Lender at its option may require
immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this [deed of trust] without further
demand and may invoke the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by
[a]pplicable [l]aw.” (R. 828.) See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (allowing judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure, at the option of the beneficiary).
BNYM proved each of the elements listed above with admissible evidence,
namely the Denmon Affidavit. (R. 808-841.) “[w]here the movant supports a motion for
summary judgment with affidavits or other sworn evidence, the nonmoving party may not
rely on bare allegations from the pleading to raise a dispute of fact.” Poteet v. White, 2006
UT 63, ¶ 7, 147 P.3d 439. If a motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavit, or
other admissible evidence, the nonmoving party must submit admissible evidence and
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Id. Ms. Mitchell did no such thing.
Instead, Ms. Mitchell proffered the Declarations of Paula Mitchell (R. 929) and
Wade Mitchell (R. 936-45) to support her opposition to BNYM's summary judgment
motion. (R. 901-28.) But those Declarations merely contained various evasive statements
and unsubstantiated opinions that the declarant “did not recall” and “d[id] not know if”
the statements made in the Denmon Affidavit were true. (See, e.g., R. 930 ¶ 2; 931 ¶¶ 8-9,
14; 933 ¶¶ 28-29; 943 ¶¶ 46-47.) The Mitchells' testimony, via their Declarations, reflects
a pattern of relying on vague statements in an unsuccessful effort to avoid summary
judgment, which lead the the Mitchell I district court to conclude: the Mitchells'
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statements “were unclear, less than certain, and imprecise.” Mitchell I, 2016 UT App 88,
¶ 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, none of the vague statements or other
opinions in the Declarations adequately controverted the evidence in the Denmon
Affidavit nor did they create a genuine issue of material fact. See Robertson v. Utah Fuel
Co., 889 P.2d 1382, 1388 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (“'Unsubstantiated opinions and
conclusions' are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” (citation
omitted)). Accordingly, because Ms. Mitchell failed to controvert BNYM's admissible
evidence in support of its claims, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in granting
BNYM's summary judgment motion.
C.

No Error in Admission of the Denmon Affidavit.

Ms. Mitchell claims the trial court erred in admitting the Denmon Affidavit
because she alleges Mr. Denmon was incompetent and/or lacked personal knowledge. (R.
39-40.) Rule 56 states that:
An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion
must be made on personal knowledge, must set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and must show that the
affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4). Ms. Mitchell argues that Mr. Denmon “clearly lacks any
personal knowledge” and his affidavit “fails to 'show that [he] is competent to testify on
the matters stated.'” (Ini. Br. 40 (alteration in original).) However, Ms. Mitchell's theory
for this argument—that BNYM's counsel drafted the affidavit for Mr. Denmon to sign
and that a deposition of Mr. Denmon might reveal that he is incompetent to testify or
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lacks personal knowledge (Ini. Br. 40)—is nothing but pure speculation. Theories,
speculation, or assertions of fact without an evidentiary basis are insufficient to create a
genuine fact issue and preclude the granting of summary judgment. Webster v. Sill, 675
P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). Contrary to Ms. Mitchell's conclusory assertions, the
Denmon Affidavit expressly states that Mr. Denmon is “familiar with the business records
maintained by” BYNM, including Ms. Mitchell's loan, and that he has “acquired personal
knowledge” via his examination of the business records related to Ms. Mitchell's loan. (R.
809 ¶¶ 2, 5.) Mr. Denmon also stated “under oath, on his own personal knowledge, . . .
that he is in all respect[s] authorized and competent to testify” regarding these matters.
(R. 812 ¶ 26.)
Ms. Mitchell provides nothing in return to rebut Mr. Denmon's assertions
regarding personal knowledge and competency to testify, nor did she move to strike the
Denmon Affidavit. But even if she had, district courts enjoy broad discretion when
deciding motions to strike summary judgment affidavits. Portfolio Recovery Associates,
LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App 255, ¶ 4, 314 P.3d 1069 (citing Murdock v. Springville
Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39 ¶ 25, 982 P.2d 65; see also A Good Brick Mason, Inc. v.
Spectrum Dev. Corp., 2010 UT App 145U, para. 2, 2010 WL 2244374 (mem.) (“The
district court is granted broad discretion to decide motions to strike summary judgment
affidavits.”)) Therefore, Ms. Mitchell must demonstrate an abuse of discretion, which
“'may be demonstrated by showing that the district court relied on an erroneous
conclusion of law or that there was no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.'”
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Portfolio, 2013 UT App 255, ¶ 4 (quoting Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC,
2009 UT 66, ¶ 32, 221 P.3d 256 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In a similar case where a borrower opposed summary judgment and sought to
strike summary judgment affidavits based on his belief that the affiants lacked personal
knowledge or a factual foundation for the averments in the affidavits, this Court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the affidavits and denying the
motion to strike. Portfolio, 2013 UT App 255, ¶ 5. This Court held, “[a]bsent an
indication that the averments are obviously outside the personal knowledge of the affiant
or otherwise inadmissible, the district court may properly accept the affidavit at face
value.” Id. (citing A Good Brick Mason, Inc., 2010 UT App 145U, para. 3 (“[O]ur role is
not to cross-examine the affidavit by conjecture; rather, we take it at face value . . . ”)).
Ms. Mitchell's brief fails to set forth any abuse of discretion by the district court
accepting the Denmon Affidavit at face value, and she has not demonstrated that any
statement in the Denmon Affidavit was obviously outside Mr. Denmon's personal
knowledge or otherwise inadmissible.
Ms. Mitchell also objects to the Denmon Affidavit on the grounds that Mr.
Denmon was not identified in BNYM's Rule 26 initial disclosures. (Ini. Br. 40-41.)
However, BNYM complied with its initial disclosure obligations by setting forth the
names and information, if known, of the individuals likely to have discoverable
information. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a). BNYM served its initial disclosures10 on Ms.
10 Notably, Ms. Mitchell did not comply with her Rule 26 obligation to serve initial
disclosures on BNYM. No such disclosures were ever made available to BNYM. See
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Mitchell on February 23, 2017. (R. 531-35.) BNYM disclosed that certain employees of
Shellpoint Mortgage, as the current loan servicer, may have discoverable information
supporting BNYM's claims, including information regarding the loan documents,
payment records, and payment history. (R. 532-33.) At the time the initial disclosures
were served, BNYM did not know which specific employee of Shellpoint Mortgage
would testify; therefore, BNYM complied with Rule 26(a). Moreover, not only did Ms.
Mitchell fail to make her own initial disclosures, but she failed to conduct any discovery
at all in this matter. (R. 959.) Additionally, once the Denmon Affidavit was filed in
support of BNYM's summary judgment motion, Ms. Mitchell made no effort to depose
Mr. Denmon or seek a deferral of the motion under Rule 56(d) to allow time to take
discovery. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(d). Therefore, any alleged failure by BNYM to
supplement its initial disclosures under Rule 26(d)(4) was harmless. See UTAH R. CIV. P.
26(d)(4) (allowing use of affidavit where failure to supplement disclosures was
harmless); see also UTAH R. CIV. P. 61 (providing no error in admitting evidence is
grounds for disturbing a judgment or order unless refusal is inconsistent with substantial
justice). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the Denmon Affidavit.
D.

Ms. Mitchell Had No to Valid Defense to Preclude Summary Judgment.

Without any support, Ms. Mitchell argues that the trial court could not enter
summary judgment for BNYM unless it was able to prove that all of her defenses were
invalid. (Ini. Br. 47.) That is, Ms. Mitchell would have BNYM be required to produce
generally Record (no certificate of service for Ms. Mitchell's Rule 26 initial diclosures).
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evidence to disprove each of the 17+ defenses that Ms. Mitchell included in her Answer.
(Ini. Br. 47 n.13.) As support for this claim, she cites Utah case law stating that “a
judgment can property be rendered against a defendant only if, on the undisputed facts,
the defendant has no valid defense.” Disabled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson, 340 P.2d 416,
417 (Utah 1959). Yet Ms. Mitchell cites no authority or precedent for her desire to place
the burden of proof on BNYM to disprove each of her defenses, instead of simply
proving its own judicial foreclosure claim. (Ini. Br. 47.) Indeed, what Ms. Mitchell fails
to acknowledge is that she, and not BNYM, would bear the burden of proving her
affirmative defenses at trial. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 18, 177 P.3d 600. This
too is one of Ms. Mitchell's well-worn strategies. In Mitchell I, she also argued that the
trial “court misallocated the burden on summary judgment,” contending that BNYM had
not met its initial burden and the Mitchells “therefore were not even under any obligation
to prove any factual dispute.” 2016 UT App 88, ¶ 49-50. This Court in Mitchell I wholly
rejected her argument, because “it does not account for the fact that [Ms. Mitchell] would
carry the burden of proof at trial.” See id. ¶¶ 49-51. Specifically, the Court opined
Because the Mitchells as the nonmoving party would carry
the burden of proof at trial, [BNYM], as the moving party,
met their burden on summary judgment by showing, by
reference to the evidence, that there [was] no genuine issue of
material fact. To successfully defend against [BNYM's]
motion, the Mitchells therefore had an obligation to set forth
specific facts showing that there [was] a genuine issue for
trial. The Mitchells have not demonstrated that the district
court misallocated the parties' burdens on summary judgment.
Id. (second and fourth alterations in original). This Court should conclude the same: First,
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that BNYM satisfied its burden on summary judgment by introducing evidence showing
there was no genuine issue of material fact and BNYM was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on its claims; and second, that Ms. Mitchell did not meet her burden in
proving facts to support their affirmative defenses and create a genuine issue of material
fact to preclude summary judgment. Because Ms. Mitchell failed to meet this burden,
summary judgment was appropriate.
IV.

All Claims Were Decided Against Ms. Mitchell.
A.

Case Is Ripe for Appeal.

Ms. Mitchell asserts that the orders on appeal are not final because, under Rule
58A, the trial court cannot prepare its own judgment and, under Rule 54, the trial court's
Final Judgment was not, in fact, final. (Ini. Br. 48.)
Rule 58A(c) provides guidance for “[t]he prevailing party or a party directed by
the court” in preparing a proposed judgment. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 58A(c). The purpose of
these provisions is, most commonly, to give the non-prevailing party an opportunity to
contest the proposed judgment, as prepared by the prevailing party, if it does not reflect
the ruling of the court, as announced from the bench. See id. R. 58A(c)(3) & (4)
(providing procedures for objecting to proposed judgment). Nowhere in Rule 58A does it
state that the court must delegate the preparation of a judgment to one of the parties. See
id. R. 58A. Nor does Rule 58A require the court to circulate its judgment for review by
the parties before being entered. See id. Therefore, it was within the trial court's discretion
to prepare the Final Judgment.
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Rule 54(a) defines “judgment” as “a decree or order that adjudicated all claims and
the rights and liabilities of all parties . . . .” UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(a). In entering its Final
Judgment, the trial court, having already rejected all claims brought by Ms. Mitchell,
specifically adjudicated all the claims brought by BNYM, ruling in favor of BNYM on its
breach of contract and judicial foreclosure claims and stating that “[j]udgment is
therefore entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Paula A. Mitchell for the
amount of $1,343,034.81, plus additional interest, costs, taxes, and other fees owing to
Plaintiff and incurred after May 31, 2017.” (R. 1029 ¶ 10.) It is illogical for Ms. Mitchell
to assume that the court's judgment could include, for example, costs that “continue to
accrue” (R. 1029 ¶ 9), such as the sheriff's costs attendant to the sheriff's sale which had
not yet occurred at the time the Final Judgment was entered. Yet this is Ms. Mitchell's
position as to why no final judgment exists. (Ini. Br. 51.)
Additionally, Ms. Mitchell contests the existence of a final judgment because the
amount of attorney fees awarded to BNYM had yet to be determined. (Ini. Br. 51-54.)
Indeed, in its Final Judgment, the trial court indicated that the amount of attorney fees
awarded to BNYM would be determined in accordance with Rule 73(a) following the
entry of judgment. (R. 1031 ¶ 18; 1160 ¶ 3.) Ms. Mitchell, relying on this Court's
precedent in McQuarrie v. McQuarrie, 2017 UT App 209, ¶ 4, 407 P.3d 1096, argues that
the Final Judgment cannot, therefore, be final because it contemplated additional actions
by the parties. See id. ¶¶ 4-5. Even, assuming arguendo, that Ms. Mitchell's point is welltaken, it is now moot. Subsequent to the entry of the Final Judgment, a motion and
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affidavit for attorney fees were filed (R. 1062-72, 1163-65, 1524-47), the motion was
fully briefed (R. 1224-42, 1246-50, 1428-42, 1446-51), and the court made a
determination of the reasonableness of BNYM's attorney fees and costs (R. 1611).
Therefore, because the issue of attorney fees has now been resolved, and no additional
claims remain outstanding, it is undisputed that a final judgment exists. Ms. Mitchell's
arguments to the contrary are moot.
B.

No Error In Issuing Order of Foreclosure Sale.

Ms. Mitchell objects to the trial court's entry of an Order of Foreclosure Sale
because she asserts, without any supporting authority, that an Order of Foreclosure Sale
may not issue in the absence of a final judgment. (Ini. Br. 54-56.) In particular, Ms.
Mitchell insists that the judgment must state “the amount due” in accordance with Utah's
judicial foreclosure statute, Utah Code sections 78B-6-901 et seq., and argues that the
Final Judgment did not do this, due to its failure to itemize the accruing interest, fees,
costs, and taxes. (Ini. Br. 55.) However, Ms. Mitchell's concerns are unfounded.
A court must “ascertain what sum of money, if any, is due and owing on the note
and [deed of trust] before the court can properly issue an order of sale . . . .” Stewart
Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 144 P.2d 276, 281 (Utah 1943). This is necessary so that the
beneficiary knows the total amount it is owed and the amount it is entitled to bid at the
sheriff's sale via credit bid. Cf. id. Here, the court properly ascertained the amount due
and owing, as the Final Judgment stated:
Judgment is therefore entered in favor of [BNYM] and
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against [Ms. Mitchell] for the amount of $1,343,034.81, plus
additional interest, costs, taxes, and other fees owing to
[BNYM] and incurred after May 31, 2017.
[BNYM] is entitled to judicially foreclose the Mitchell Trust
Deed and sell the Property to recover any unpaid obligations
owed to [BNYM] under the Mitchell Trust Deed and Note.
[BNYM] is entitled to an Order of Foreclosure Sale
order[ing] the Property foreclosed and sold by the Sheriff of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, according to the law and
practice of this court to satisfy the judgment set forth above as
due and owing.
(R. 1029, ¶¶ 10-12 (emphasis added).)
This Final Judgment, therefore, enabled the court to issue the Order of Foreclosure
Sale and authorized BNYM to enter a credit bid of up to $1,343,034.81 at the sheriff's
sale. (R. 1029 ¶¶ 9-12.) Ultimately, the Property was sold to BNYM at the sheriff's sale
for a sum of $1,275,000—some $68,000 less than the amount stated in the Final
Judgment. (R. 1623.) Thus, any claim by Ms. Mitchell that BNYM's attorney fees or any
other post-judgment costs needing to be stated and itemized in a written order prior to the
issuance of the Order of Foreclosure Sale is irrelevant, as the Property sold at auction to
BNYM for an amount less than the stated amount in the Final Judgment.
Further, in Utah, “the remedy of setting aside [a foreclosure] sale will be applied
only in cases which reach unjust extremes.” Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 20,
391 P.3d 196.11 A borrower seeking to set a sale aside must show “fraud or other unfair
11 Adamson involved a non-judicial trustee's sale, not a sheriff's sale after a
foreclosure judgment as in this case. The difference is inconsequential; the interests of
finality and clear title that motivated Adamson apply with equal force here. See Adamson,
2017 UT 2, ¶ 17 (“[W]hen . . . title to real property is at issue, the need for finality is at its
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dealing” or that “he suffered prejudice from some defect in the sale.” Id. ¶ 23; see also
Concepts Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 1987). “[A]
court may set aside a sheriff's sale where (1) a debtor's property is sold at a grossly
inadequate price and (2) there were irregularities during the sale that contributed to the
inadequacy of price or circumstances of unfairness during the redemption period caused
by the conduct of the party benefitted by the sale.” Pyper v. Bond, 2011 UT 45, ¶ 15, 258
P.3d 575. Ms. Mitchell has not alleged and cannot show any fraud or other unfair dealing
in the court's issuing of the Final Judgment, nor any inadequacy of price or circumstances
of unfairness with respect to the subsequent sheriff's sale. Indeed, Ms. Mitchell did not
introduce any evidence of efforts to pay a reasonable amount for the Property at auction
or to redeem the Property in the 180 days following sale. Thus, any claims by Ms.
Mitchell to reverse or vacate the foreclosure sale necessarily fail. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in issuing the Order of Foreclosure Sale after entry of the Final
Judgment.
C.

No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Motion to Alter or Amend.

As a seventh issue for appeal, Ms. Mitchell lists “VIII. [sic] Trial court erred by
not correcting its own legal errors raised in the Rule 59/52 motion.” (Ini. Br. 10.)
However, Ms. Mitchell admits that this issue was not preserved for appeal, stating that
there was “[n]o opportunity to do so . . . .” (Id.) More importantly, after stating this issue
in her Statement of Issues, Ms. Mitchell did not bother to actually brief the issue. (See Ini.
apex.” (citation omitted)).
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Br. 57 (no argument following discussion of sixth issue on appeal and prior to attorney
fees issue).) Indeed, Rule 59 is only mentioned on two (2) other occasions in Ms.
Mitchell's brief: once in the Summary of Argument and a second time in a passing
mention of “the Rule 59 Motion.” (Ini. Br. 13, 53.) Likewise, Rule 52 is only mentioned
once, in the Summary of Argument. (Ini. Br. 13.) Accordingly, this issue is insufficiently
briefed, see UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998),
and Ms. Mitchell's argument should be denied.
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES
The parties' written agreements allow for reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(R. 23 ¶ 22; 31-32 ¶ 7.) BNYM was awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs below.
(R. 1031 ¶ 18; 1611.) “[W]hen a party who received attorney fees below prevails on
appeal, 'the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.'” Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). If it is the prevailing party
on appeal, BNYM should be awarded its attorney fees incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Mitchell's arguments regarding standing and her myriad counterclaims
regarding BNYM's authority to foreclose were all previously decided in Mitchell I and
are barred by res judicata. Her further attempts to relitigate or otherwise attack Mitchell I
are groundless. BNYM's judicial foreclosure action was proper and its summary
judgment was adequately supported by evidence in the record. Ms. Mitchell's attempts to
manufacture error out of the trial court's judgment and post-judgment rulings are
50
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BENCH, Senior Judge:
11
Paula A. Mitchell and Wade Mitchell appeal from the
district court's orders dismissing several of their claims and
granting summary judgment on their remaining claims in favor
1. Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special assignment as
authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6).
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of ReconTrust Company NA, the Bank of New York Mellon
(BNYM), America's Wholesale Lender (AWL), BAC Home Loans
Servicing LP (BAC), and Armand J. Howell. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
12
Paula Mitchell obtained a $1 million loan from AWL in
2006. To secure this loan, she executed a trust deed in favor of
AWL on real property in Salt Lake County. The trust deed
defined AWL as "Lender" and designated Stewart Matheson as
the trustee. The trust deed provided that Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems Inc. (MERS) "is acting solely as nominee
for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns" and "is the
beneficiary under this Security Instrument." The trust deed also
indicated that Paula Mitchell
agree[d] that MERS holds only legal title to the
interests granted by Borrower in this Security
Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or
custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and
Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to
exercise any or all of those interests, including, but
not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the
Property.
13
On August 17, 2010, MERS recorded a document
assigning its beneficial interest under the trust deed to BNYM.
That same day, BNYM recorded a substitution of trustee in
which BNYM, as the current beneficiary, appointed ReconTrust
as successor trustee under the trust deed. Also on that day,
ReconTrust filed a notice of default and intent to sell the
property. According to the notice, Paula Mitchell had defaulted
on her loan obligation by failing to make payments since May
2010.
14
Attempting to prevent foreclosure, Paula and Wade
Mitchell filed a complaint in January 2011 against ReconTrust,
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BNYM, AWL, and BAC (collectively, Bank Defendants). The
Mitchells also named Howell as a defendant, alleging that he
was an attorney who "traditionally conducts foreclosure sales
for ReconTrust and is expected to conduct the sale [of the
Mitchells' property] unlawfully."2 The Mitchells raised claims
generally based on a theory that MERS, which was referred to as
the nominee of the lender and the beneficiary under the terms of
the trust deed, lacked authority to appoint BNYM as the
successor beneficiary and that BNYM thus lacked authority to
appoint ReconTrust as the successor trustee. The Mitchells also
alleged that ReconTrust was not authorized to serve as a trustee
under Utah's statutes. Further, they alleged that BAC, which was
servicing the loan and was purportedly acting as an agent of
BNYM, "directed [the Mitchells] to default in order to be able to
seek a modification because that would be the only way to
obtain a loan modification." Because they purportedly defaulted
at BAC's suggestion, the Mitchells alleged that the defendants
were estopped from enforcing the trust deed and note.
15
In terms of relief, the Mitchells sought declaratory
judgments clarifying the respective rights under the trust deed
and note, invalidating the substitution of trustee and notice of
default, declaring the debt unsecured and that the defendants
may not foreclose the trust deed, and declaring that the debt had
been satisfied via insurance or credit default swaps. The
2. Howell is mentioned only three more times in the complaint.
In the claim for punitive damages, the Mitchells alleged that
"Howell knows of the legal deficiencies in ReconTrust's efforts
to act as a foreclosing trustee, and that ReconTrust is not
qualified under the statute to serve as a foreclosing trustee, and
yet he turns a blind eye to such defects and knowingly conducts
unlawful sales for them." They also alleged that Howell and the
other defendants "colluded in their nationwide practices" and
claimed that punitive damages were necessary to "dissuade Mr.
Howell from continuing to conduct unlawful sales for
ReconTrust."
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Mitchells also sought a permanent injunction of any foreclosure
sale conducted by ReconTrust on behalf of BNYM, an order
quieting title to the subject property in their names, an award of
punitive damages, and an award of attorney fees incurred in
defending against an improper foreclosure.
16
Bank Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the
Mitchells failed to state any claims upon which relief could be
granted. In support of their motion, Bank Defendants indicated
that on October 6, 2011, ReconTrust had recorded a cancellation
of notice of default, thereby mooting the Mitchells' claims
challenging ReconTrust's authority to act as a trustee with power
of sale because ReconTrust would not be conducting any further
foreclosure proceedings on the Mitchells' property.
17
The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part
and dismissed nine of the Mitchells' eleven claims. The court
first determined that under the terms of the trust deed, "MERS
was the statutory beneficiary and, by contract, the agent of the
Lender and the Lender's successors." The court explained that
"MERS assigned its interest to BNYM and [BNYM] is now,
under the terms of the [trust deed] and the statute, the
beneficiary." The court then addressed each cause of action.
Regarding the Mitchells' first cause of action seeking a
declaration with respect to the true ownership of the debt, "and
by extension the authority of [the] defendants to foreclose," the
district court concluded that it stated "no genuine claim for
declaratory relief" because "MERS had, and BNYM has,
authority to commence foreclosure under the terms of the [trust
deed] and the Utah statutes." Because the tenth cause of action
was "a restatement of the [f]irst," the court dismissed the tenth
cause of action for the same reasons.
18
The court proceeded to dismiss the second and seventh
causes of action, which challenged the notice of default and
alleged a breach of duty by the trustee, as moot in light of the
cancellation of the notice of default. As for the fourth cause of
action, based on a theory that the ownership of the debt had
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been severed from the trust deed, the court dismissed it because
"[n]o fact is alleged suggesting that the [trust deed] has been
severed from the underlying obligation, nor is there any
allegation how, under Utah law, this might occur." The court
also dismissed the fifth cause of action, stating that "the claim
fails to allege any basis for concluding that payment by a third
party to the holder of the debt satisfies" the Mitchells'
obligations under the note and trust deed. The court dismissed
the sixth cause of action for quiet title. It reasoned that BNYM
was the beneficiary and that any securitization of the debt "does
not change the [trust deed's] terms . . . making BNYM now the
agent (nominee) for the current owner or owners of the debt."
Moreover, the Mitchells did not dispute that their title was
subject to the trust deed. Last, the court dismissed the eighth
cause of action for an injunction and the eleventh cause of action
for punitive damages because both were remedies rather than
stand-alone claims.
19
The district court denied Bank Defendants' motion to
dismiss with respect to two causes of action. Specifically, the
court concluded that the third cause of action, which appeared to
be based on theories of estoppel and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, possibly stated a claim
because "actions by the Lender or its agents encouraging [the
Mitchells] to default may constitute a modification of the
underlying agreement, a waiver of one or more of its terms, or
act to estop the current lender from asserting certain contractual
terms." The court also determined that the ninth cause of action
survived the motion to dismiss because it sought attorney fees
related to a breach of contract and therefore "if [the Mitchells']
estoppel[] theory establishes that the contract was modified by
[BAC's] conduct, a breath of contract may be proven."
Accordingly, the district court allowed the Mitchells to proceed
on their third and ninth causes of action.
110 Bank Defendants later moved for summary judgment on
the remaining two claims. The court granted this motion. It
reasoned that all possible legal theories for the third cause of
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action relied upon "the alleged misrepresentation that occurred
in March 2010 regarding a possible loan modification." The court
then concluded that the evidence showed, "[at] most," that the
Mitchells had a "subjective understanding that they had been
assured that a loan modification would occur." Thus, it was
"undisputed that there was never an agreement to modify
according to any certain terms, and there was certainly nothing
in writing." Given this undisputed fact, and noting that the third
cause of action was "unclear as to precisely its legal theory or the
relief sought," the court determined that "there can be no claim
that [BAC] is bound by a modified loan agreement as a matter of
law" and that a waiver claim likewise would fail. Similarly, the
court concluded that a claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing would fail because "there can be no
implied duty arising" under a nonexistent modification and "no
such duty can be implied out of the [Mitchells'] existing loan."
The court also concluded that any claim grounded in promissory
estoppel failed because, inter alia, the Mitchells could not
reasonably rely on such an indefinite promise and because the
record did not support actual reliance. Consequently, the court
dismissed the third cause of action. Because the ninth cause of
action depended on the success of the third cause of action, the
court dismissed the ninth cause of action as well. Then, upon
Bank Defendants' motion, the district court determined that the
Mitchells had failed to comply with discovery orders and
dismissed the complaint as a discovery sanction; the sanction
served as a separate and independent basis for dismissing the
Mitchells' claims.
111 After these orders were entered, Howell, who had not
joined Bank Defendants' motions, moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted Howell's motion, stating
that "the reasoning of [the rulings with regard to Bank
Defendants] applies with equal force to Howell and compels a
similar result." The court emphasized that the Mitchells had "not
pointed to an independent cause of action against Howell that
was not addressed in the prior rulings." The court further
explained that "the Complaint alleges that Howell was merely
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acting on behalf of ReconTrust and is devoid of any allegations
that Howell engaged in conduct that would somehow create
liability separate from the other Defendants." Accordingly, the
court granted summary judgment to Howell and thereby
disposed of all of the Mitchells' claims. The Mitchells appeal.3

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
112 The Mitchells contend that the district court erred in
dismissing nine of their claims. "A district court's ruling on . . . a
motion to dismiss . . . is a legal question which we review for
correctness." Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 UT App 232, 16, 263 P.3d 397.
113 The Mitchells next challenge a number of the district
court's rulings relating to evidence presented in connection with
summary judgment. In particular, they contend that the district
court erred in its rulings on motions to strike several affidavits.
They also contend that the district court erred in refusing to take
judicial notice of declarations from witnesses in a separate
action. "We review a district court's decision on a motion to
strike affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment for an abuse of discretion."
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App 255, 1[ 4,

3. The Mitchells moved this court for permission to file overlength briefs. Although we granted their motion to file an overlength opening brief, we denied their motion to file an overlength reply brief. The Mitchells nevertheless included, as they
explain, the "full reply brief they would have filed by attaching
[it] in the addendum" to their reply brief. This attachment
constitutes "a blatant attempt to skirt" this court's order and the
page limitations stated in rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See Aspenwood, LLC v. C.A.T., LLC, 2003 UT
App 28,1[ 46, 73 P.3d 947. Consequently, we have not considered
this addendum.
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314 P.3d 1069. Likewise, "[w]e review the [district] court's
judicial notice of prior adjudicated facts under Rule 201 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence for abuse of discretion." In re J.B., 2002
UT App 267, ¶ 14, 53 P.3d 958.
114 The Mitchells contend that the district court erred in
rendering summary judgment against them on their remaining
two claims. We review the district court's decision for
correctness.4 Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, 2011 UT App 232,
16.
115 Finally, the Mitchells contend that they are entitled to
attorney fees. "Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a
question of law . . . ." R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 1 16,
40 P.3d 1119.

ANALYSIS
I. Claims Dismissed Under Rule 12(b)(6)
116 On appeal, the Mitchells challenge the dismissal of several
claims. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a defendant to move to dismiss an action that the defendant
believes "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[A] rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss admits the facts alleged in the [complaint] but challenges
the [plaintiff's] right to relief based on those facts." Maese v.
4. The Mitchells also contend that the district court erred in
dismissing their claims as a discovery sanction. After
determining that the Mitchells had failed to comply with
discovery orders, the district court dismissed the complaint as a
discovery sanction but stated that this rationale served as an
alternative ground for dismissing the complaint. Because we
affirm the district court's dismissal of the Mitchells' claims on
the merits, see infra ¶9J 56, 60, we do not reach the alternative
basis for its decision.
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Davis County, 2012 UT App 48, 1 3, 273 P.3d 949 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a district court should
grant a motion to dismiss when, "assuming the truth of the
allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it
is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Hudgens v.
Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68, 114, 243 P.3d 1275 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating a motion to
dismiss, the district court may "consider documents that are
referred to in the complaint and [are] central to the plaintiff's
claim" and may also "take judicial notice of public records."
BMBT, LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64, 1 6, 322 P.3d 1172
(alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Our review of the district court's dismissal orders
requires us to "accept the plaintiff's description of facts alleged
in the complaint to be true, but we need not accept extrinsic facts
not pleaded[,] nor need we accept legal conclusions in
contradiction of the pleaded facts." Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT
App 206, 1 10, 285 P.3d 7 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
117 We will address the Mitchells' causes of action by
category based upon the district court's rationale for dismissal.
Thus, we consider the district court's dismissal orders relying on
its conclusions that Bank Defendants had authority to commence
foreclosure proceedings, that the cancellation of ReconTrust's
notice of default mooted several claims, that the trust deed had
not been severed from the debt, that the debt had not been
satisfied, that the Mitchells were not entitled to quiet title, and
that punitive damages were not appropriate.
A.

The Authority to Appoint a Successor Trustee and the
Authority to Foreclose

118 The Mitchells challenge the dismissal of their first and
tenth causes of action. The first cause of action sought
clarification of the "true ownership of the [d]ebt" and "by
extension the authority of [the] defendants to foreclose upon the
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Property." It alleged that because MERS and its assignee BNYM
lacked any beneficial ownership interest in the debt, MERS and
BNYM could not foreclose on the property. The tenth cause of
action similarly sought to block a non-judicial foreclosure on the
ground that MERS did not have "any beneficial interest in the
Property or the Trust Deed that could even possibly be assigned
to BNYM." The district court deemed the tenth cause of action to
be a "restatement" of the first. Then, after taking judicial notice
of the trust deed and the promissory note, the court ruled that
both causes of action failed because "MERS had, and BNYM has,
authority to commence foreclosure under the terms of the [trust
deed]."
¶19 The Mitchells argue that MERS and its assignee BNYM
lacked the authority to appoint ReconTrust as the successor
trustee for the purpose of foreclosing on the property. In
support, they contend that "[o]nly a statutorily defined
'Beneficiary' may initiate the non-judicial foreclosure of the trust
deed." The Mitchells further contend that MERS did not meet
the statutory definition of a "beneficiary" and that BNYM, as
MERS's assignee, therefore could not validly appoint ReconTrust
as successor trustee. Bank Defendants counter that MERS and its
assignee had the authority to foreclose and appoint a successor
trustee under the terms of the trust deed itself. We agree with
Bank Defendants.
120 Utah Code section 57-1-19(1) defines a "beneficiary"
under a trust deed as "the person named or otherwise
designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust
deed is given, or his successor in interest." Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-19(1) (LexisNexis 2010). However, even if the Mitchells
are correct that MERS does not meet this definition,5 the terms of

5. The district court ruled that MERS was a statutory beneficiary
as defined by section 57-1-19(1). The district court reasoned that
the statute defines "beneficiary" as "'the person named or
otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for whose
(continued...)
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the trust deed nevertheless gave MERS the authority to appoint
a successor trustee and foreclose on the property.
(1[21 Case law from this court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals indicates that a trust deed's plain language may give
MERS, as "nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and
assigns," the authority to appoint a successor trustee.
Specifically, this court has previously suggested that at least one
of the statutes governing conveyances does not "imply[] . . . or
somehow indicat[e] that the original parties to the Note and
Deed of Trust cannot validly contract at the outset 'to have
someone other than the beneficial owner of the debt act on
behalf of that owner to enforce rights granted in [the security
instrument]." Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 UT App 232, (1[ 13, 263 P.3d 397
(third alteration in original) (quoting Marty v. Mortgage Elec.
(...continued)
benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest"; that
MERS was named in the trust deed as the beneficiary; and that
MERS's status as nominee of the Lender was thus of no
consequence under the statutory definition. (Quoting Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-19.) The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion on a similar
question in Burnett v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc., 706 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013). On analogous facts, it
apparently concluded that MERS could not be "the person
named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for
whose benefit a trust deed is given," because MERS held "no
ownership right in the note." Id. at 1237. Based on Burnett, Bank
Defendants concede that the district court apparently erred. We
express no opinion on this point. But we agree with the district
court and the Tenth Circuit in Burnett that the statute is not
dispositive where, as here, the trust deed expressly grants MERS
the right to foreclose and sell the property and thus, by
implication, the right to appoint a successor trustee for that
purpose. Id.

20140113-CA

A011

11

2016 UT App 88

Mitchell v. ReconTrust Company

Registration Sys., No. 1:10-cv-00033-CW, 2010 WL 4117196, at *5
(D. Utah Oct. 19, 2010)). In other words, "[t]he plain language of
[a conveyancing] statute does nothing to prevent MERS from
acting as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and
assigns when permitted by the Deed of Trust." Id. Similarly, the
Tenth Circuit has noted that even when "MERS is not a
beneficiary as that term is defined in [Utah Code section]
57-1-19(1)[,] . . . MERS nonetheless [may have the] authority to
appoint [a successor trustee] and foreclose on [a] property"
under the plain language of the trust deed. See Burnett v.
Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1237 (10th Cir.
2013).
122 Consistent with this case law, we conclude that the terms
of the trust deed in this case explicitly gave MERS the right to
appoint a successor trustee regardless of whether MERS satisfied
the statutory definition of a beneficiary. The trust deed explained
with respect to substituting the trustee that "Lender, at its
option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a
successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder." But the
trust deed also stated,
Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds
only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower
in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to
comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for
Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has
the right: to exercise any or all of those interests,
including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose
and sell the Property; and to take any action
required of Lender including, but not limited to,
releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.
Because the trust deed granted MERS, as nominee for Lender
and its assigns, the right "to exercise any or all of those interests"
"granted by Borrower in this Security Interest" and the right "to
take any action required of Lender," the trust deed allowed
MERS to remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee on
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Lender's behalf. It also gave MERS the "right to foreclose and
sell the Property." See, e.g., Sincere v. BAC Home Loans Servicing,
LP, No. 3:11-cv-00038, 2011 WL 6888671, at *5 (W.D. Va. Dec. 30,
2011) (construing a similar trust deed and concluding that "the
plain terms of the deed of trust supplied MERS with the
authority to take any action required of the lender, including
foreclosing and selling the property in the event of a default as
well as appointing substitute trustees to do the same," and
noting that the borrower's signature on the trust deed "indicates
that he agreed MERS had the authority to take any action
required of the lender"); Ramirez-Alvarez v. Aurora Loan Servs.,
LLC, No. 01:09cv1306, 2010 WL 2934473, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 21,
2010) (interpreting similar language in a trust deed to mean that
the borrower "agreed that MERS, filling the dual roles of
beneficiary and nominee for the lender, had the right to foreclose
on the property and take any action required of the lender, such
as the appointment of substitute trustees"). Thus, we conclude
that the trust deed's terms, to which Paula Mitchell agreed,
provide MERS and its assignee BNYM the authority to appoint a
successor trustee. Consequently, BNYM could validly appoint
ReconTrust as successor trustee in accordance with the trust
deed's plain language.
123 The Mitchells' challenge to the dismissal of their first and
tenth causes of action depends upon their assertion that MERS
and its assignee BNYM lacked authority to foreclose. But as we
have concluded, the plain terms of the trust deed authorized
MERS, as Lender's nominee, "to foreclose and sell the Property."
Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the
Mitchells' first and tenth causes of action.
B.

The Claims Dismissed as Moot

124 The Mitchells argue that the district court erred in
dismissing the second and seventh causes of action as moot,
asserting that "the questions of what duties ReconTrust had, and
still has, to the Mitchells remain unanswered." The second cause
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of action challenged ReconTrust's qualifications as successor
trustee and its actions, including its notice of default. The
seventh cause of action alleged that ReconTrust breached its
duties as successor trustee by initiating a non-judicial foreclosure
sale without authority to do so. Thus, both causes of action
challenged ReconTrust's power as successor trustee to carry out
a non-judicial foreclosure sale. The district court determined that
these two claims were moot by virtue of the fact that ReconTrust
withdrew its notice of default and represented to the court that it
would not be conducting any further foreclosure proceedings on
the Mitchells' property.
125 "If the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of
the litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally refrain
from adjudicating it on the merits." Merhish v. H.A. Folsom
& Assocs., 646 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1982) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). "Once a controversy has become
moot, a trial court should enter an order of dismissal." Id. at 733.
126 The Mitchells acknowledge that ReconTrust withdrew the
notice of default but nevertheless argue that these causes of
action are not moot, because ReconTrust lacks the statutory
authority to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure sale. We first note
that this argument is contrary to their statement before the
district court that they voluntarily agreed to dismiss "their
present request for a declaratory judgment that ReconTrust lacks
the statutory authority to conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales
in Utah." In any event, the cancellation of the notice of default
and BNYM's continuing freedom to appoint a qualified trustee,
see supra ¶1 22-23, eliminated any dispute regarding whether
ReconTrust was authorized to foreclose on the Mitchells'
property. Further, because ReconTrust retracted its notice of
default and never sold the property, ReconTrust cannot be held
liable for breach of any duty based on an unauthorized
foreclosure. Because the requested relief in relation to the second
and seventh causes of action would not affect the rights of the
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parties, the district court properly dismissed these claims as
moot.6
C.

The Claim That Ownership of the Debt Was Severed from
the Trust Deed

127 The Mitchells contend that the district court erred in
dismissing the fourth cause of action. This cause of action
alleged that AWL transferred the ownership interest in the debt
to a mortgage-backed security. It further alleged that
"fractionalizing the ownership of the Debt by securitization . . .
effectively destroy[ed] the security for the Debt."' Thus, the
Mitchells sought "a judgment declaring that the Debt has . . .
become unsecured, and the Trust Deed may not be foreclosed."
On appeal, the Mitchells argue that "the Trust Deed has been
severed from the Debt . . . rendering the Debt unsecured, and
precluding foreclosure."
128 The premise underlying this argument and the Mitchells'
fourth cause of action was rejected by this court in Commonwealth
Property Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc., 2011 UT App 232, 263 P.3d 397. There, a debtor
argued that the lender and MERS, as the lender's nominee, "lost
their rights under the Deed of Trust when the Note was

6. Since this appeal was filed, BNYM recorded a substitution of
trustee appointing eTitle Insurance Agency as the successor
trustee. Taking judicial notice of this recorded document, see
Utah R. Evid. 201, we observe that it supports our conclusion
that it is no longer relevant whether ReconTrust was properly
appointed successor trustee in the first place or whether
ReconTrust was qualified under Utah law to act as a trustee.
7. "Securitization" is the "process of pooling loans and selling
them to investors on the open market." Commonwealth Prop.
Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d
1194, 1197 n.2 (10th Cir. 2011).
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securitized." Id. 1 11. This court disagreed, explaining that
"when a debt is transferred, the underlying security continues to
secure the debt." Id. 113 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-35
(LexisNexis 2010)); accord Burnett v. Mortgage Elec. Registration
Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2013); Commonwealth
Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680
F.3d 1194, 1202-05 (10th Cir. 2011) (determining that MERS
retained its authority to foreclose even after the debt secured by
a Utah trust deed was securitized, and concluding that "[e]ven
assuming Plaintiff is correct that securitization deprives
Defendants of their implicit power to foreclose as holders of the
trust deeds, the trust deeds explicitly granted Defendants the
authority to foreclose").
'1[29 The Mitchells have not persuaded us that their argument
is distinguishable from the one precluded by this court's
decision in Commonwealth Property Advocates. Any securitization
of the debt secured by the trust deed did not take away MERS's
power to foreclose under the trust deed's terms. See
Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, 2011 UT App 232, ¶1J 11-13. As a
consequence, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the
Mitchells' fourth cause of action.
D.

Satisfaction of the Debt

130 The Mitchells challenge the dismissal of their fifth cause
of action that sought a declaratory judgment regarding the
satisfaction of the debt. The Mitchells assert that the debt "has
been paid in whole, by means of insurance or some similar
instrument [e.g., a credit default swap], such that the true
owners of the Debt are no longer owed anything . . . , which
extinguishes the Debt and the trust deed."
¶31 The district court dismissed this cause of action on the
ground that "the claim fails to allege any basis for concluding
that payment by a third party to the holder of the debt satisfies
[the Mitchells'] obligations under the Note and [the trust deed]."
Beyond offering a conclusory statement, the Mitchells make no
effort on appeal to demonstrate error in the district court's
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reasoning. See Simmons Media Group, LLC v. Waykar, LLC, 2014
UT App 145, ¶ 37, 335 P.3d 885 (indicating that appellants do not
meet their burden to demonstrate district court error when they
fail to present reasoned analysis based on relevant legal
authority). Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of this claim.
E.

Quiet Title

132 The Mitchells contend that the district court prematurely
dismissed their sixth cause of action for quiet title. In so arguing,
they concede that the property was subject to the trust deed but
assert that the district court "never examined, let alone
determined, who, if anybody, actually has any valid, enforceable
claim against the Property based on the trust deed."
133 "A quiet title action 'is a suit brought to quiet an existing
title against an adverse or hostile claim of another and the effect
of a decree quieting title is not to vest title but rather is to perfect
an existing title as against other claimants.' Haynes Land
& Livestock Co. v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, LLC, 2010 UT App 112,
1 19, 233 P.3d 529 (quoting Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In re Malualani B.
Hoopiiaina Trust), 2006 UT 53, 1 26, 144 P.3d 1129). "To succeed
in an action to quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff must prevail on
the strength of his own claim to title and not on the weakness of
a defendant's title or even its total lack of title." Church v.
Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983).
134 We agree with Bank Defendants that, instead of showing
the strength of their own claim to title, the Mitchells "only attack
the alleged interest of [Bank Defendants] in the property." The
district court concluded that the Mitchells' theories attacking
Bank Defendants' rights vis-à-vis the trust deed were legally
incorrect. In light of this conclusion, and because the Mitchells
conceded that their title is subject to the trust deed, the district
court dismissed the Mitchells' quiet title action. In other words,
the district court did determine that Bank Defendants have a
"valid, enforceable claim against the Property based on the trust
deed." The Mitchells' effort on appeal falls short of
demonstrating error in the district court's analysis. Accordingly,
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we affirm the court's decision that the Mitchells did not state a
claim that would entitle them to quiet title.
F.

The Punitive Damages Claim

¶35 The Mitchells also challenge the district court's dismissal
of their eleventh cause of action seeking punitive damages.8 On
appeal, the Mitchells attempt to recast this cause of action as one
for civil conspiracy, stating, "Although admittedly mislabeled as
a request for punitive damages, the 11th [cause of action]
actually sets forth its own common law claim of civil
conspiracy . . . ."
136 "[T]o preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has
an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park,
Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 1 14, 48 P.3d 968. Issues that are not
raised before the district court "are usually deemed waived." 438
Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 151, 99 P.3d 801.
137 The Mitchells have not preserved this argument for
appeal. In opposing Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss, the
Mitchells did not address their eleventh cause of action.
Consequently, they did not present the district court with an
opportunity to rule on the same argument they now raise on
appeal, namely, that they sufficiently alleged a claim for civil
conspiracy. The Mitchells also have not argued that plain error
or exceptional circumstances would justify our review of this
issue. Because the Mitchells did not preserve their argument
challenging the district court's dismissal of their eleventh cause
of action, we affirm the district court's decision without reaching
its merits.
9[38 In short, the district court did not err in concluding that
"MERS had, and BNYM has, authority to commence foreclosure
8. The Mitchells do not specifically challenge the dismissal of
their eighth cause of action for an injunction. See supra 1 8.
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under the terms of the [trust deed]." Moreover, the Mitchells
have not demonstrated that the district court erred in granting
Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss all but the third and ninth
causes of actions.
II. Challenges to the Evidence on Summary Judgment
139 The Mitchells next challenge three of the district court's
rulings relating to evidence presented in connection with
summary judgment. Specifically, they assert that the district
court erred in denying their motion to strike a bank employee's
affidavit, in granting Bank Defendants' motion to strike the
Mitchells' affidavits, and in refusing to take judicial notice of
declarations made in a separate case. We reject these arguments.
A.

The Court's Refusal to Strike a Bank Employee's Affidavit

¶40 First, the Mitchells assert that the district court
improperly refused to strike an affidavit from a bank employee.
They argue that the affidavit was inadmissible because it
constituted hearsay and was not based on the employee's
personal knowledge.
141 District courts generally have "broad discretion to decide
motions to strike summary judgment affidavits." Portfolio
Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App 255, (1[ 4, 314 P.3d
1069 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To obtain
reversal, appellants must show not only district court error but
also "error that was substantial and prejudicial in the sense that
there is at least a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of the
error the result would have been different." Ross v. Epic Eng'g,
PC, 2013 UT App 136, (1[ 12, 307 P.3d 576 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
142 Here, the district court considered the affidavit at issue as
"relevant to the dispute" and "properly before the Court."
However, the district court stated that it had "decided the
motion for summary judgment without reference to the [bank
employee's] Affidavit." Because the bank employee's affidavit
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played no role in the district court's decision on summary
judgment, the Mitchells cannot show that they were prejudiced
by the district court's denial of their motion to strike.
Accordingly, we will not reverse the district court on this basis.
B.

The Court's Striking of the Mitchells' Affidavits

143 Second, the Mitchells assert that the district court erred in
striking their own affidavits. But as with their challenge to the
court's refusal to strike the bank employee's affidavit, the
Mitchells cannot show that they were prejudiced by the court's
decision to exclude their affidavits. See id. The Mitchells have not
been harmed, because the court specifically stated that "even
considering the affidavits, Defendants would still be entitled to
summary judgment." As a result, this argument also does not
present reason to reverse the district court.
C.

The Court's Refusal to Take Judicial Notice of Certain
Declarations

144 Third, the Mitchells argue that the district court erred in
not taking judicial notice of declarations that former employees
of Bank of America made in a separate case.9 According to the
Mitchells, the declarations contain admissions that Bank of
America "systematically tried to induce homeowners into
'default' in order to force them into foreclosure" and would be
offered to "demonstrat[e] that [the Mitchells would] likely be
able to present similar evidence at trial."
¶45 Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence governs judicial
notice of adjudicative facts. It provides that "[t]he court may
judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute
because it . . . is generally known . . . or . . . can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." Utah R. Evid. 201(b). The court "may

9. Bank of America is the successor-by-merger to BAC.
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take judicial notice on its own; or . . . must take judicial notice if a
party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary
information." Id. R. 201(c).
146 The Mitchells have not demonstrated that the district
court erred by refusing to take judicial notice of the former
employees' declarations. Appellants must support their
arguments on appeal with reasoned analysis based on relevant
legal authority. See Simmons Media Group, LLC v. Waykar, LLC,
2014 UT App 145, 137, 335 P.3d 885; see also Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). The Mitchells' argument is limited to a conclusory
statement that the district court violated rule 201(d) because the
rule "mandates [that] a court shall take judicial notice of
uncontroverted facts in situations such as this." However, the
Mitchells do not analyze whether the declarations contain
"adjudicative facts" and, as in the district court, the Mitchells
have not offered any authority that would allow the court to take
judicial notice of declarations filed in another action and then to
consider the substance of those declarations. Accordingly, this
claim of error fails.
III. Claims Dismissed on Summary Judgment
¶47 Next, the Mitchells challenge the district court's summary
judgment against them on their third cause of action.1° Summary
judgment is appropriate if, viewing "the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party," Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, (i[ 6, 177 P.3d 600
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), "there is no

10. Without additional analysis, the Mitchells state that they
challenge the district court's order with regard to the ninth cause
of action for "breach of contract." The district court dismissed
the ninth cause of action because it "depended on the success of
the Third Cause of Action." Because we affirm the dismissal of
the third cause of action, we do not address the ninth.
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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a).11
A.

Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank Defendants

148 The Mitchells first challenge the merits of the district
court's summary judgment in favor of Bank Defendants on the
third cause of action. Specifically, the Mitchells contend that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on their third
cause of action for "estoppel and breach of good faith and fair
dealing," which was based on their assertion that the defendants
had caused them to stop making their mortgage payments. At
the outset, the district court noted that the third cause of action
was "unclear as to precisely its legal theory or the relief sought"
but concluded that "all possible legal theories rely on the alleged
misrepresentation that occurred in March 2010 regarding a
possible loan modification." The court later determined that the
third cause of action could not survive summary judgment
under a theory of promissory estoppel or a theory of breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Mitchells raise
arguments on appeal related to both legal theories.
1.

Promissory Estoppel

149 The Mitchells' arguments related to the theory of
promissory estoppel appear directed at one element, namely,
that the "plaintiff acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance
on a promise made by the defendant." Youngblood v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, 1 16, 158 P.3d 1088 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). They then argue that the
court misallocated the burden on summary judgment. The
Mitchells further argue that the district court inappropriately

11. Although rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has
been amended since the time the district court granted summary
judgment in this case, those changes are not relevant to our
analysis.
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weighed the evidence against them in concluding that they
could not show the existence of a definite and certain promise to
support a promissory estoppel claim.
150 In particular, the Mitchells contend that the "court never
determined whether defendants met their initial burdens" and
that the Mitchells "therefore were not even under any obligation
to prove any factual dispute." Relying on Orvis v. Johnson, 2008
UT 2, 177 P.3d 600, they state that a movant must "'affirmatively
provide factual evidence establishing that there is no genuine
issue of material fact.'" (Quoting id. (1[ 16.) The Mitchells'
argument, however, does not account for the fact that they
would carry the burden of proof at trial on the third cause of
action. The same case cited by the Mitchells clarified that
[a] summary judgment movant, on an issue where
the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at
trial, may satisfy its burden on summary judgment
by showing, by reference to "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any," that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Orvis, 2008 UT 2, (1[ 18 (emphasis added) (quoting an earlier
version of rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). "Upon
such a showing, whether or not supported by additional
affirmative factual evidence, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party, who 'may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denial of the pleadings,' but 'must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (emphasis
omitted) (quoting an earlier version of rule 56).
151 Because the Mitchells as the nonmoving party would
carry the burden of proof at trial, Bank Defendants, as the
moving party, met their burden on summary judgment by
showing, by reference to the evidence, "that there [was] no
genuine issue of material fact." Id. To successfully defend against
Bank Defendants' motion, the Mitchells therefore had an
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obligation to "'set forth specific facts showing that there [was] a
genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting an earlier version of rule
56). The Mitchells have not demonstrated that the district court
misallocated the parties' burdens on summary judgment.
152 Likewise, the Mitchells have not demonstrated that the
district court inappropriately weighed the evidence. They assert
that the district court weighed the evidence because it did not
accept their allegation that BAC instructed them to miss
mortgage payments in order to obtain a loan modification. They
also focus on the district court's statements that the Mitchells'
testimony was "unclear," "less than certain," and "imprecise."
153 "Promissory estoppel involves a clear and definite
promise . . . ." Youngblood, 2007 UT 28, 1 19 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, a "party claiming estoppel must
present evidence showing that an offer or promise was made on
which the party based his or her reliance." Nunley v. Westates
Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, 1 36, 989 P.2d 1077. "Likewise,
the alleged promise must be reasonably certain and definite, and
a claimant's subjective understanding of the promissor's
statements cannot, without more, support a promissory estoppel
claim." Id.
154 The district court's decision rested on its conclusion that
"there is no evidence supporting a clear promise or
representation by [BAC] to unconditionally modify the loan."
Instead, the evidence, including the Mitchells' testimony,
indicated that BAC told the Mitchells that "once [they] missed
two payments, [they] could apply for a loan modification."
Because the evidence showed that the Mitchells, at most, had a
"subjective understanding that they had been assured that a loan
modification would occur," the district court determined as a
matter of law that the Mitchells "could not reasonably rely on a
promise that is so indefinite that it lacks —literally —any terms."
155 In this regard, the context of the district court's
statements —that the Mitchells were "unclear," "less than
certain," and "imprecise" —matters. The court stated that the

20140113-CA

A024

24

2016 UT App 88

Mitchell v. ReconTrust Company

Mitchells' testimony on the issue of whether BAC promised
them a loan modification was "less than certain," noting that
"[Wade] Mitchell testified that someone from [BAC] promised
them a loan modification, and so he and his wife 'expected' a
loan modification." And it was "unclear from [the Mitchells']
own testimony whether [BAC] actually promised them an
unconditional loan modification, or whether it simply agreed to
discuss the matter." The court also indicated that the Mitchells'
affidavits were "similarly imprecise" because Wade Mitchell
testified that "they were only promised the ability to apply for a
loan modification." Given this context and the court's task of
evaluating whether the Mitchells had provided specific facts
showing that BAC made a promise on certain terms, we are not
convinced that the court improperly weighed the evidence.
11[56 The Mitchells do not identify any evidence that the
district court failed to consider or any evidence that
unequivocally indicates that BAC, without condition, promised
to modify the loan on certain terms. The evidence, even
construed in the light most favorable to the Mitchells, does not
show that there was a genuine issue of material fact, because any
instruction given by BAC to the Mitchells does not meet the legal
standard for a definite and certain promise required for a
promissory estoppel claim. See id. As a consequence, the district
court did not err in concluding that no genuine issue of fact
existed and that Bank Defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on this theory.
2.

Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

1[57 The Mitchells also challenge the district court's summary
judgment decision on the third cause of action on the theory of a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. They
contend that the court misapplied the law and should have
concluded that "the allegations show defendants intentionally
rendered it difficult if not impossible for [Paula Mitchell] to
receive the fruits of her Loan by falsely inducing her into
'defaulting.'" They also make the contrary argument that their
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claims "are not based on the existing Loan" but instead are
"based on defendants' misconduct impairing the Loan by
fraudulently inducing a 'default' in order to profit from it."
158 "Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each
party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or
purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other
party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." Iota, LLC v.
Davco Mgmt. Co., 2012 UT App 218, 1 32, 284 P.3d 681 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). "[O]ne party may not
render it difficult or impossible for the other to continue
performance and then take advantage of the non-performance he
has caused." Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks). Some limitations on the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing exist:
the Covenant cannot be used (1) to create new or
independent rights or obligations to which the
parties have not agreed in the contract; (2) to
establish rights or duties inconsistent with the
express terms of the contract; or (3) to require a
party to exercise an express contractual right in a
manner detrimental to its own interests in order to
benefit the other party to the contract.
Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Utah Sch. & Inst. Trust Lands Admin., 2010 UT
App 284, 1 16, 243 P.3d 888 (citing Oakwood Vill. LLC v.
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 1 45, 104 P.3d 1226). Consistent
with these limitations, this court has recognized that "[d]eclining
to give up rights granted by a contract does not constitute a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Iota, 2012
UT App 218, 133.
159 Despite the Mitchells' statement that their claim is "not
based on the existing Loan," they do not appear to contend that
the implied duty arises out of any separate agreement to modify
the loan. Although vague, we understand the substance of the
Mitchells' argument to center on an implied duty arising out of
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the original loan agreement. The Mitchells theorize that Bank
Defendants breached the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing by inducing them to default with the information that
the Mitchells could obtain a loan modification only if they first
defaulted.
160 Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Mitchells and thus assuming that Bank Defendants told the
Mitchells that they could not even apply for a loan modification
unless they defaulted, Bank Defendants did not breath the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law.
The information regarding a possible loan modification did not
render it impossible for the Mitchells to continue making their
mortgage payments. Indeed, according to Wade Mitchell's
affidavit, the Mitchells' default was at least in part attributable to
the fact that "cash flow was getting tighter." Thus, Bank
Defendants' conduct did not impede the Mitchells from
performing their obligations under the contract or render it
impossible for them to perform. See id. 1[1[ 32-33. Furthermore,
the district court correctly concluded that "no such duty can be
implied out of [the Mitchells'] existing loan as a matter of law,"
because the Mitchells' position —that Bank Defendants could not
foreclose after their missed payments —would require Bank
Defendants to forgo rights granted by the original loan
agreement. See id. 133. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of the Mitchells' third cause of action based on
the theory of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.12

12. The Mitchells also suggest that the district court should have
accepted certain allegations in the complaint as true in its
consideration of the third cause of action. However, because the
Mitchells have not demonstrated that they preserved this
argument, we do not consider it. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)
(requiring the appellant's brief to contain "citation to the record
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court" or a
basis for addressing an unpreserved issue); 438 Main St. v. Easy
(continued...)
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B.

Summary Judgment in Favor of Howell

161 The Mitchells also challenge the district court's order
granting summary judgment to Howell, the attorney who on
occasion conducted trustee's sales on behalf of ReconTrust. They
attack the court's ruling on both procedural and substantive
grounds.
162 As for their procedural argument, the Mitchells contend
that Howell waived the defense of failure to state a claim by not
raising it sooner. In support, they rely on rule 12(h) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, "A party waives all
defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by
answer or reply . . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). "A defense of failure
to state a claim, however, falls under a procedural
exception . . . ." Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47,
1 14, 221 P.3d 194 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)). The rule specifies
that "the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted . . . may also be made by a later pleading . . . or by
motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the
merits." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). Accordingly, a "defense of failure
to state a claim . . . may be raised any time before the court or
jury determines the validity of a party's claim." Mack, 2009 UT
47, 1 14 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)). Because Howell raised the
defense by moving for summary judgment before the court
ruled on the merits of the claims against him, the Mitchells have
not shown that the district court erred in refusing to strike
Howell's motion on the ground that Howell had waived the
defense of failure to state a claim.
163 Regarding the merits, the Mitchells contend that the
district court erred in concluding that "Howell was entitled to
[the] same result as [the] co-defendants." The Mitchells

(...continued)
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 1 51, 99 P.3d 801 ("Issues that are not
raised at trial are usually deemed waived.").
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acknowledge the court's determination that they had "not
pointed to an independent cause of action against Howell that
was not addressed in the prior rulings." Nevertheless, they
contend that the court erred because "each 'cause of action' is
still a claim against Howell personally."
164 The Mitchells have failed to demonstrate that the district
court erred in concluding that "the reasoning of [the rulings with
regard to Bank Defendants] applies with equal force to Howell
and compels a similar result." They also have not addressed the
court's rationale that "the Complaint alleges that Howell was
merely acting on behalf of ReconTrust and is devoid of any
allegations that Howell engaged in conduct that would
somehow create liability separate from the other Defendants."
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Howell.
IV. Attorney Fees
165 Finally, the Mitchells contend that they are entitled to
attorney fees under a number of legal theories: contract, the
private attorney general doctrine, the common fund doctrine,
and the court's inherent authority. We conclude that an award of
attorney fees is not warranted here.
166 "As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only
to a prevailing party, and only when such an action is permitted
by either statute or contract." Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60,
1 32, 218 P.3d 598. At the appellate level, generally "when a
party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the
party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal."
Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Sols., Inc., 2010 UT App 9, 1 8, 223
P.3d 1141 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
167 The district court did not award any attorney fees to the
Mitchells. And on appeal, their request for attorney fees under
all theories is contingent upon their success before this court.
Because the Mitchells did not receive attorney fees below and
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have not prevailed on appeal, we decline to award them
attorney fees incurred on appeal. See id.

CONCLUSION
168 The Mitchells have not demonstrated that the district
court erred in dismissing several of their causes of action upon
Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Mitchells have also
failed to show that the district court erred in its evidentiary
rulings or in granting summary judgment to the defendants on
their remaining claims. Accordingly, we affirm.

VOROS, Judge (concurring):
169 I concur in the majority opinion. Alternatively, I believe
this appeal is inadequately briefed.
170 For example, perhaps the Mitchells' most sympathetic
claim is their claim for equitable estoppel. They assert that Bank
Defendants induced them to miss monthly payments on the note
and consequently should be estopped from foreclosing on the
house based on those missed monthly payments. But the
Mitchells' brief fails to cite any relevant legal authority, quote
testimony from the record, identify the elements of equitable
estoppel, or explain how a reasonable fact-finder could find each
of those legal elements. They instead rely on statements such as
the following: "It is believed a pattern of deliberate misconduct
will come to light through discovery, which misconduct has
resulted in thousands of similarly situated borrowers being
duped by defendants into 'defaulting,' so that they could hijack
their loans for defendants' own hidden profit scheme," and "No
one could possibly consider such systematic profiteering from
fraudulent statements fair or equitable."
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171 Similarly, the Mitchells describe at some length what they
call their "discovery disputes" in the trial court; the factual
background and procedural history of these issues comprise
seven pages of their brief. But those seven pages contain no
citations to the record on appeal. The briefing of these two points
typifies the Mitchells' principal brief.
172 An appellant's argument must contain "citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(9). "An issue is inadequately briefed when the
overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of
research and argument to the reviewing court." State v. Davie,
2011 UT App 380, 1 16, 264 P.3d 770 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). "An inadequately briefed claim is by
definition insufficient to discharge an appellant's burden to
demonstrate trial court error." Simmons Media Group, LLC v.
Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, 1 37, 335 P.3d 885. So while I
concur in the majority opinion, I would in the alternative reject
all the Mitchells' claims on appeal as "not adequately briefed,
researched, or presented." See State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, 134, 37
P.3d 1103.
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Rule 13. Counterclaim and crossclaim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaim.
(a)(1) A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—at the time of its service—the pleader has against
an opposing party if the claim:
(a)(1)(A) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim;
and
(a)(1)(B) does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
(a)(2) The pleader need not state the claim if:
(a)(2)(A) when the action was commenced, the claim was the subject of another pending action, or
(a)(2)(B) the opposing party sued on its claim by attachment or other process that did not establish personal
jurisdiction over the pleader on that claim, and the pleader does not assert any counterclaim under this rule.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim against an opposing party any claim that is not
compulsory.
(c) Relief sought in a counterclaim. A counterclaim need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing
party. It may request relief that exceeds in amount or differs in kind from the relief sought by the opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. The court may permit a party to file a supplemental pleading
asserting a counterclaim that matured or was acquired by the party after serving an earlier pleading.
(e) Crossclaim against coparty. A pleading may state as a crossclaim any claim by one party against a coparty if the
claim arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action or of a counterclaim, or if
the claim relates to any property that is the subject matter of the original action. The crossclaim may include a claim that
the coparty is or may be liable to the crossclaimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the
crossclaimant.
(f) Joining additional parties. Rules 19 and 20 govern the addition of a person as a party to a counterclaim or
crossclaim.
(g) Separate trials; separate judgments. If the court orders separate trials under Rule

, it may enter judgment on a

counterclaim or crossclaim under Rule 54(b) when it has jurisdiction to do so, even if the opposing party's claims have
been dismissed or otherwise resolved.
Effective November 1, 2016.

A032

Utah Code

57-1-23 Sale of trust property -- Power of trustee -- Foreclosure of trust deed.
The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the power of sale
by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold in the manner provided
in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an obligation for which the trust property is
conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a trust deed may be foreclosed in the
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. The power of sale may
be exercised by the trustee without express provision for it in the trust deed.
Amended by Chapter 236, 2001 General Session
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FILED
ThirdDISTRICT
Judicial COURT
District
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By:
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County
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, fka THE
BANK OF NEW YORK, as Trustee for the
Certificate Holders CWMBS Series 2006HYBS,
Plaintiff,

RULING AND ORDER
Case No. 160902472
Judge Todd Shaughnessy

vs.

PAULA MITCHELL, AMERICA FIRST FEDERAL
CREDIT UNION, PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, and JOHN
DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
Before the court is Defendant Paula Mitchell's motion to dismiss re: waived compulsory
counterclaim and in the alternative motion to dismiss re: prior exclusive jurisdiction.' Oral was

Also before the court is Plaintiff's objection to the reply memorandum filed by Mitchell.
The court agrees with Plaintiff that the reply memorandum is untimely, having been filed after a
deadline agreed to by counsel for the parties. Instead of filing the reply memorandum on that
date, Defendant filed a motion for a further extension of time. The same practice occurred earlier
in this case — Defendant negotiated an extension of a filing deadline and then, on that deadline,
filed a motion for a further extension rather than the agreed-upon memorandum. In that instance,
the court extended the deadline.
The court encourages — indeed requires — counsel to confer about matters such as
extensions of filing deadlines, expects that reasonable requests will be honored, and also expects
counsel to adhere to Standard 14 of the Standards of Professionalism and Responsibility. But
when an extension has been negotiated by counsel, that deadline governs and absent the most
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held November 16, 2016. Douglas R. Short represented Defendant, Brad G. DeHaan represented
Plaintiff The Bank of New York Mellon ("BNYM"), and Greg Howe appeared on behalf of American
First Federal Credit Union. Having considered the briefing and arguments of counsel, and for good
cause, the court now rules as follows.
On January 19, 2011, following commencement of non-judicial foreclosure proceedings by
BNYM, Mitchell filed suit in West Jordan, case no. 110400816 ("Mitchell 1"), seeking a judicial
determination that BNYM lacks any interest in the subject property and quieting title in favor of
Mitchell. The trial court granted BNYM's motion to dismiss most of the claims and later granted
summary judgment in its favor on the remaining claims. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed in
Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT App 88, 373 P.3d 189. Specifically, the court of appeals
upheld the district court's determination that BNYM, and others, have a "'valid, enforceable claim
against the Property based on the trust deed." Mitchell, 2016 UT App 88, ¶ 34 (quoting district
court opinion). The Court of Appeals prematurely issued an order of remittitur on August 16, 2016,
but recalled the remittitur the following day. Mitchell filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the Utah Supreme Court (case no. 20160635-SC); the supreme court has yet to rule on the

truly exceptional of circumstances, the court will not grant a further extension. Doing so is, in this
court's view, completely inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the Standards of Professionalism
and Civility, and has the untoward effect of encouraging gamesmanship. For that reason, the
objection to the reply memorandum is sustained and the court declines to consider it. The matter,
however, is academic this time because the court has read the reply memorandum and nothing in
it would cause the court to reach a result different than what is explained here.

A035

00361

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON vs PAULA MITCHELL

Page 3 of 8

160902472

petition. BNYM filed this action on April 15, 2016, seeking judicial foreclosure of the Property at
issue in Mitchell 1.2
Mitchell raises two grounds for dismissal: (1) BNYM was required to raise its judicial
foreclosure claim in Mitchell I; and (2) the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction prevents this
court from exerting jurisdiction over the same property, parties, and claims at issue in Mitchell I.
Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to state as a
counterclaim "any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the
opposing party's claim . . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a). Mitchell argues BNYM was required by Rule
13(a) to bring its claim for judicial foreclosure as a counterclaim in Mitchell I because it arises from
the same transaction or occurrence against the same parties. The issue raised is whether a judicial
foreclosure claim is a compulsory counterclaim that, if not timely asserted, is waived. No Utah
cases have addressed the issue; accordingly, the court "may look to decisions under the federal
rules for guidance" since the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are fashioned after the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 11 64, 99 P.3d 801. In Douglas v.
NCNB Texas Nat. Bank, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the interpretation of Texas state

2

BNYM also brought a breach of contract action against Mitchell, seeking payoff of the
balance due under the Note.
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courts, holding that judicial foreclosure is not a compulsory counterclaim. Douglas v. NCNB Texas
Nat. Bank, 979 F.2d 1128, 1130 (5th Cir. 1992). The court reasoned that:
[T]he mortgagor should not be permitted to destroy or impair the
morgagee's contractual right to foreclosure under the power of sale
by the simple expedient of instituting a suit, whether groundless or
meritorious, thereby compelling the mortgagee to abandon the
extra-judicial foreclosure when he had the right to elect, nullifying
his election, and permitting the mortgagor to control the option as
to remedies.
Id. (quoting Kaspar v. Keller, 466 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1971)). The purpose of this
rule is to prevent the borrower depriving the lender its choice of remedies, id., and has been
adopted by other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Erickson v. Ditech Financial, LLC, -- P.3d ---, 2016 WL
4059607 (D. Arizona 2016) ("[I]t cannot be concluded that, by seeking declaratory judgment that
[lender] was not the Note Holder or Beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, [borrower] forced [lender] to
elect judicial foreclosure or forever waived its right to do so."); Chase Mortg. Company-West v.
Bufalini, 2004 WL 2866978 (Haw. Ct. App. 2004) (unpublished) (judicial foreclosure is not a
compulsory counterclaim); In re Draffen, 731 S.E.2d 435, 438 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the
federal rules do not require lender to filed a foreclosure action as a compulsory counterclaim in a
federal action thus state action seeking judicial foreclosure not barred by Rule 13(a)); Ruby Valley
Nat. Bank v. Wells Fargo Delaware Trust Co., N.A., 317 P.3d 174 (Mont. 2014) (finding senior
lienholder was not obligated to assert a compulsory counterclaim for judicial foreclosure during a
foreclosure action by junior lienholder because he was not a necessary party to the prior action
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and rule 13 does not prohibit senior lienholder from later initiating a foreclosure action against the
subject property).
Like the Texas statute at issue Douglas, Utah law grants a lender the option of judicially or
non-judicially foreclosing on property. Utah Code § 57-1-23 (LexisNexis 2016) ("The trustee who is
qualified . . . may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold in the manner provided in
Sections 57-1-24 [non-judicial foreclosure] and 57-1-27 [judicial foreclosure] . . . ."). Reading Rule
13(a) in the manner requested by Mitchell would eliminate BNYM's ability to select non-judicial or
judicial foreclosure and would permit Mitchell (and all, similarly-situated borrowers) to control the
lender's foreclosure rights by simply filing a suit concerning the trust deed. Because the lender has
the option of selecting judicial or non-judicial foreclosure, and because the borrow is not entitled
to deprive the lender of its choice, the court concludes that a counterclaim for judicial foreclosure
is not compulsory and BNYM was not obligated to assert it as a counterclaim in Mitchell I.
Mitchell's motion to dismiss is denied.
Mitchell alternatively contends this action must be dismissed because there is not yet a
final, non-appealable order in Mitchell I, and the real property at issue, characterized by Mitchell
as the res of this judicial foreclosure proceeding, remains before the court in Mitchell I, so the
claims are barred by the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction. The doctrine of prior exclusive
jurisdiction appears to have been first recognized in Escalante Co. v. Kent, 7 P.2d 276 (Utah 1932).
There, a suit involving foreclosure on a mortgage was brought in Iron County and a later suit was
brought in Salt Lake County. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
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Where two actions between the same parties, on the same subject,
and to test the same rights, are brought in different courts having
concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction . . .
retains its jurisdiction and may dispose of the whole controversy,
and no court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere with its
action.
Escalante Co., 7 P.2d at 278; see also 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 255-57 (2016) (the court first acquiring
jurisdiction, particularly when court must have control of property to adjudicate the action, is
entitled to maintain it to the exclusion of other coordinate courts). The Supreme Court concluded
the Salt Lake County case could not proceed until the suit in Iron County had been resolved. This
rule rests upon "comity and the necessity of avoiding conflict in the execution of judgments by
independent courts, and is a necessary one because any other rule would unavoidably lead to
perpetual collision and be productive of most calamitous results." Id. Similarly, in Nielson v.
Schiller, plaintiff was restrained from proceeding with his foreclosure suit against defendant in a
second county because the first county's jurisdiction had already been invoked. Nielson, 66 P.2d
365, 367 (Utah 1937). In this situation, the Utah Supreme Court admonished that the secondplace court should have stayed its proceedings until termination of the case pending in the firstplace court. Id. at 368.
This case falls within the reach of the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule. Mitchell 1involves the
same parties, the same property, and the same general subject matter — BNYM's right to foreclose
on the property. The property is currently in the control of the Mitchell I court. BNYM argues
Mitchell I has been disposed, all claims have been dismissed or summary judgment granted in
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their favor by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, there is not yet a
final, non-appealable judgment, and that cannot occur until the Court of Appeals has remitted the
action. While Utah's appellate courts have never set out a comprehensive scope and purpose of
remittitur, it has opined the primary effect of remittitur "is to provide a clear indication that the
trial court has regained jurisdiction to take action consistent with the mandate." State v. Lora,
2005 UT 70, ill 13, 124 P.3d 243 (citing Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT
9,119, 89 P.3d 109). Similarly, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the Court
of Appeals not to issue the remittitur until "after expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ
of certiorari" and, if a petition for writ of certiorari is timely filed, that filing automatically stays
remittitur until the Supreme Court's disposition of the petition. Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(2). Thus,
while the petition is pending, no remittitur may issue, and jurisdiction remains with the appellate
courts.
Mitchell contends that the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule requires this court to dismiss this
case. The court disagrees. Dismissal is not the appropriate remedy in this situation, none of the
cases cited by Mitchell require or even suggest such action, and dismissal of this case could have
unanticipated and unintended collateral consequences. The Utah Supreme Court in Nielsen stated
that in these circumstances the second-place court should stay the proceeding pending resolution
of the first-place action. Staying the action pending the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as
opposed to dismissing it, is not only consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's cases on the
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subject, it is also the path most likely "to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination"
of the parties' dispute. Utah R. Civ. P. 1. Accordingly, Mitchell's motion to dismiss is denied.
Neither party has explicitly requested a stay, as an alternative to dismissal. At oral
argument, the court asked counsel about the issue, and neither party requested requested that
relief then. In Plaintiffs case, she disavowed that remedy, insisting that the court must dismiss the
case. The court is reluctant to grant a remedy that neither party has requested, but always retains
the inherent authority to do so. For that reason, and based on that inherent authority, the court
will stay further proceedings in this case until there is a final, non-appealable order in Mitchell 1. At
that point, either party may file a motion to lift the stay. And to ensure that neither party's rights
are adversely affected by the court's decision to grant a stay even though the parties did not
request it, the court will permit either party to file a motion to lift the stay should they believe
circumstances warrant.
This ruling and order is the order of the court and no additional order is required to be
prepared.

DATED: November 21, 2016.
THIRD JUDICIAL DIS

COURT

-c AT E
****

Judge Todd S
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

December 8, 2016

______________________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is plaintiff's motion to lift stay and submit for decision. The motion
is based on the Supreme Court's denial of defendant's petition for wreit of certiorari,
and the Utah Court of Appeals' remittitur dated December 7, 2016. Although defendant
objects to the motion as premature, and apparently envisions further briefing on the
subject, further briefing or argument is unnecessary. The conditions for lifting the
stay imposed by the court's November 21, 2016, order plainly have been satisfied and
the stay is lifted. And with that, the court hereby denies defendant's motion to
dismiss. No further order is required.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
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HILLARY R MCCORMACK hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

BLAKE D MILLER bmiller@joneswaldo.com
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______________________________
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 08, 2016
/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
03:25:29 PM
District Court Judge

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

December 8, 2016

______________________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is plaintiff's motion to lift stay and submit for decision. The motion
is based on the Supreme Court's denial of defendant's petition for wreit of certiorari,
and the Utah Court of Appeals' remittitur dated December 7, 2016. Although defendant
objects to the motion as premature, and apparently envisions further briefing on the
subject, further briefing or argument is unnecessary. The conditions for lifting the
stay imposed by the court's November 21, 2016, order plainly have been satisfied and
the stay is lifted. And with that, the court hereby denies defendant's motion to
dismiss. No further order is required.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
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Date: ____________________
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______________________________
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 2 2 2016
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
----ooOoo---PAULA MITCHELL,
Petitioner,

ORDER

v.

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
Respondent.

Case No. 20161026-CA

Before Judges Orme, Christiansen, and Mortensen.
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission to appeal from an
interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to appeal is denied.
DATED thisl/

day of December, 2016.

FOR THE COURT:

Gregory

A045
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 22, 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or was sent by electronic mail to be
delivered to:
BRAD G. DEHAAN
HILLARY R MCCORMACK
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
brad.dehaan@lundbergfirm.com
hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com
DOUGLAS R SHORT
ATTORNEY AT LAW
mail@consumerlawutah.com
BLAKE D. MILLER
CRAIG H HOWE
MILLER TOONE PC
bmiller@joneswaldo.com
chowe@joneswaldo.com
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: JULIE RIGBY AND CHERYL AIONO
chrisd@utcourts.gov
cheryla@utcourts.gov, julier@utcourts.gov

By

Ashley Dovidauskas
Judicial Assistant
Case No. 20161026
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 160902472
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 1 7 2017
SALT LAKE COUNTY

BY
0'61%4 Mk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, fka THE.

RULING AND ORDER

BANK OF NEW YORK, as Trustee for the
Certificate Holders CWMBS Series 2006HYBS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 160902472
Judge Todd Shaughnessy

vs.

PAULA MITCHELL, AMERICA FIRST FEDERAL
CREDIT UNION, PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, and JOHN
DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

Before the court is Defendant Paula Mitchell's motion to dismiss. The previously scheduled
hearing is cancelled and the request for oral argument is denied because the court finds that the
issue raised by the motion has been authoritatively decided. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(h) (LexisNexis 2016)
("The court must grant a request for a hearing on a motion . . . that would dispose of the action or
any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that . . . the issue has been authoritatively
decided."). Having considered the briefing, and for good cause, the court now rules as follows.
Defendant raises two grounds under Rule 12(b)(6) seeking to dismiss the claims against
her: (1) the claims are time barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) Plaintiff lacks standing to
bring this action. Defendant withdrew her statute of limitations defense after conceding there are
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"factual disputes at issue that will likely require discovery to resolve[,]" therefore the court does
not considered this argument as a basis for dismissing the current action. Defendant's second
argument maintains that Plaintiff lacks standing to seek judicial foreclosure because it lacks any
ownership interest in the Note and has no beneficial ownership interests in the trust deed such
that it may seek foreclosure under Utah Code section 57-1-23. Defendant argues it was assigned
MERS's beneficial interest in the trust (which includes the right to foreclose on the property) and,
therefore, has standing to pursue this action. Defendant asks this court to deny the motion on the
basis of collateral estoppel, since this issue was previously raised in Mitchell v. ReconTrust, 2016
UT App 88, 373 P.3d 189.
The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show that:
(i) [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have
been a party to . . .the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the
prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the
instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits."
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, 11 35, 73 P.3d 325. In Mitchell, Defendant alleged that
"because MERS and its assignee [Plaintiff] lacked any beneficial ownership interest in the debt,
MERS and [Plaintiff] could not foreclose on the property." Mitchell, 2016 UT App 88, 11 18. The
Court of Appeals concluded that, regardless of whether MERS satisfied the statutory definition of a
beneficiary, the trust deed's terms gave it, and its assignee Plaintiff, the authority to foreclose on
the property. Id. ¶¶ 20 n.5, 22-23. This same issue underpins Defendant's standing argument.
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Regardless of whether Plaintiff meets the statutory definition of "beneficiary" for purposes of
section 57-1-23, the trust deed gives it the authority to foreclose on the property.' The Mitchell
case involved the same parties, resulted in a final judgment on the merits,2 and was completely,
fully, and fairly litigated.

Having satisfied the elements of collateral estoppel, Plaintiff has

demonstrated it has standing to bring this action under Utah Code section 57-1-23 because it has
the right to foreclose and sell the property through the trust deed, irrespective of whether it
meets the statutory definition of "beneficiary." Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss is
denied.
This ruling and order is the order of the court and no additional order is required to be
prepared in this matter.

DATED: January 17, 2017.
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

F

G

1.

•:

Judge Todd Shaughness

•
SALT

This section provides that a judicial foreclosure may be sought by a "trustee who is
qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1)(a)(i) or (iv) . . . or, at the option of the beneficiary . . . in the
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property." Utah Code § 57-1-23
(LexisNexus 2016). "Beneficiary" is denied for purposes of this section in section 57-1-19, which
was directly at issue in Mitchell, 2016 UT App 88, 1120.
On December 2, 2016, the Utah Supreme Court denied Defendant's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari making the decision in Mitchell a final, non-appealable order.
2
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Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 8168)
Hillary R. McCormack (USB No. 11719)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES, PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 263-3400
brad,dehaan@Lundbergfirm.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parcel No. 28-22-203-047
L&A Case No. 14.64383.2/JAT
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON flea REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYB5,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 160902472

VS.

PAULA A. MITCHELL, AMERICA FIRST
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, PEPPERWOOD
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants

Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, plaintiff The Bank of New York
Mellon fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders CWMBS Series
2006-HYB5 ("BNYM"), by and through its counsel, hereby respectfully requests the Court take
judicial notice of the following:
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1.

The Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion entered on February 28, 2014, in Case No,

110400816, Third District Court, State of Utah, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A,
2.

The Order entered on January 14, 2015, in Case No. 20140113, Utah Court of

Appeals, State of Utah, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
3.

The Utah Court of Appeals decision in Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT

App 88, 373 P.3d 189, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
DATED this

day of March, 2017.
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES, PC

BrAd G. Dellaan
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

,

day of March, 2017, I caused a copy of the foregoing

instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, or via electronic service, to the following:
Douglas Short
2290 East 4500 South, Ste. 220
Holladay, Utah 84117
mail@consumerlawutah.com
Blake D. Miller
Craig FI. Howe
Jones Waldo
170 S. Main St., Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1644
chowe@joneswaldo.com
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bmillergoneswaldo.com
Pepperwood Homeowners Association
RIA Teerlink Property Services, LLC
2500 Pepperwood Dr.
Sandy, Utah 84092
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE :COUNTY
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
Paula A Mitchell and Wade Mitchell
Plaintiffs
Other Denying Plaintiff's Motion
Recontrust Company, NA,, a national
association; The Bank of New York
Mellon as Trustee for the Certificate
Holders CWMBS Series 2006-.HYB5;
Armand J, Howell, an individual;
America's Wholesale Lender, a corporation
or dlb/a of Countrywide Home Loans Inc.;
BAC Home Loans Servieing LP, a foreign
limited partnership and DOES, 1-1000

Case: 110400816
Judge Barry G Lawrence

Defendants

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Correct Misstatements, The
Parties briefed the issues' and the Court,has determined that a hearing on the motion is not
necessary.2 Having reviewed the record and considering the arguments of counsel, the Court now
issues the following Order.

The Court notes that on February 10, 2014, plaintiffs' counsel requested an additional
week to file his reply memorandum. Then, on February 18,2014, counsel again asked for an
additional week,. Then, on February 25, 2014, counsel asked for yet another week, or until. March
7, 2014 to file a reply, This is an improper and dilatory tactic that counsel has used in the past.. In
fact, in the .Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment dated September 20, 2013, at In, 2, the
Court stated that counsel's repeated use of this delay tactic was "improper, abusive and unfair."
Accordingly, it is concerning to the Court that counsel continues to employ this tactic.
2 A hearing is not necessary because Plaintiff's' motion is not a dispositive motion. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e) (only requiring the court to hold hearings on motions "that would dispose of
the action or any claim or defense in the action"). This is not a dispositive motion. The Court
previously dismissed all claims and. Plaintiffs' motion merely seeks to revive them.
I
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In a series of three rulings spanning nearly two years, the Court dismissed all of
Plaintiffs' claims against all Defendants, First, in a Memorandum Decision entered March 14,
2012, the Court dismissed "all claims except the Third Cause of Action to the extent it asserts
estoppel, and the Ninth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract," Next, in an Order Granting
Summary Judgment entered September 20, 2013, the Court dismissed the remaining claims
against all Defendants, except Armand Howell, Finally, in a Memorandum Decision and Order
entered January 3, 2014, the Court dismissed all claims against Howell. The last order was a final
order as it disposed of all claims against all parties and "ended the controversy between the
litigants," Loffrodo Ifok 2001 UT 97, 12 (citing Kennedy v, New Era Indus,, Inc., 600 P,2d
534, 536 (Utah 1979)). Plaintiffs now seek relief from these, three rulings in a motion entitled
"Motion to Correct Misstatements as to Status of the Case as to Scope of Court's Ruling,"
Rules of Civil Procedure and is the
The pending motion is not authorized by Elie;.
type of motion that was expressly.forbidden by the Utah Suprerne CoUrt in GWO:412, Prfre, 2006
UT 24, 135 P,3d 861 In Giltet4 the court ended. the "common practice' at
um attorneys to
file postjudgment.motiOns to reconsider and '4other similarly titled Motions.,"14, at 117, in doing
so, the court reasoned that "the form of arnotion does matter becauSe it directs the court and
litigants to the specific, and available, relief sought," Id. at ¶ 8; The -Court concluded that:
Nereafter, when a party seeks relief from a judgment 'it indo tarn to the rules to.
determine Whether relief exists, and if. so, .direct the coOrt to the specific relief
available, Patties can no. longer leave this task to the court by filing so-Galled
motions to reconsider and.relying upon district courts to construe the motions.
within the rules.
.Ill, at ¶ 8„
Here, although Plaintiffs:' motion includes a passing reference in.:a footnote to Rule 59,
Plaintiffs fail to explain why they are entitled to relief under that rule, Missing from Plaintiffs'
motion is any analysis of the grounds listed in Rule 59. In substance, Plaintiffs' motion merely
seeks reconsideration of the: Court's earlier rulings.. Because Plaintiffs' motion is not recognized
by the rules and fails to "direct the court to the speoific relief available," Id. at 7 8, the Court will
deny the motion.
Even if the. Court were to consider Plaintiffs' argument, the Court would not be
persuaded to reconsider its earlier rulings.' The Court's time prior rulings„ taken together,
dismissed all claims against all defendants. Plaintiffs have failed to identify a single claim that
was not disposed of by the earlier rulings, Rather, Plaintiffs have merely repackaged arguments
Plaintiffs argue that the Court's earlier rulings did not dismiss all of their claims and
that any characterization to the contrary by the Court is error, Plaintiffs contend that each "Cause
of Action" in their Complaint contained multiple "claims" and that the Court improperly
dismissed whole "Causes of Action" without considering each "claim."
3
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that have already been: considered and rejected by the. Court, The Court sees no reason to
reconsider its earlier rulings or to correct any "misstatements as to the status of the case,"
Based on the foregoing,. the Court hereby DENIES. Plaintiffs' Motion to. Correct
Misstatements, No .addWonalordpr is necessary,.
111
this
of. February, 201.4
Dated

Bari
Distria-

,0
r Judge

ki

3
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 110400616 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: ALLISON R BARGER 648 E 100 8 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
MAIL: JENNIFER M DAVENPORT 648 E 100 S SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
JEFFREY S RASMUSSEN 170 S MAIN ST STE 950 SALT LAKE CITY
MAIL
UT 84101
MAIL: DOUGLAS R SHORT 177 E FT UNION BLVD MIDVALE UT 84047
MAIL: CHANDLER P THOMPSON 170 S MAIN ST STE 950 SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84101
02/28/21014.

/S/ LISA. MUNK

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 02/28/14 10:06:50
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAN 1 4 2015

----oo0oo---PAULA A. MITCHELL
AND WADE MITCHELL,
ORDER
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No, 20140113-CA
v.

RECONTRUST COMPANY, ET AL,,
Defendants and Appellees.

This matter is before the court on Appellants' motion to dismiss their own appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, and Appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal based on
Appellants' failure to timely file their brief. The district court has resolved all causes of
action raised in the litigation. Further, the final order of the district court complied with
rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is
denied.
IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeal for failure
to timely file a brief is denied. Appellants shall file their brief within thirty (30) days of
the date of this order. However, because Appellants have already been granted two
extensions to file their brief, Appellants should not expect to be granted any further
extensions absent extraordinary circumstances beyond their control.
Dated this VA/5-day of January, 2015.
FOR THE COURT:

•
Stephen L. Roth, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 14, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or was sent by electronic mail to be
delivered to:
JENNIFER M. DAVENPORT
ALLISON R BARGER
MATHESON & HOWELL PC
jmdavenport@stoelhw.corn
abarger@mathesonhowell.com
DOUGLAS R SHORT
ATTORNEY AT LAW
mail@consumerlawutah.com
CHANDLER P. THOMPSON
JEFFREY SCOTT RASMUSSEN
AKERMAN LLP
chandler.thompson@akerman.corn
jeffrey.rasmussen@akerman.com

Dated this January 14, 2015.

By
Ju 1 al Assist nt
Case No. 20140113
District Court No, 110400816
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2016 UT App 88

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PAULA A. MITCHELL AND WADE MITCHELL,
Appellants,
v.

RECONTRUST COMPANY NA, THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
ARMAND J. HOWELL, AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER, AND BAC
HOME LOANS SERVICING LP,
Appellees,
Opinion
No. 20140113-CA
Filed April 28, 2016
Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable Barry G. Lawrence
No. 110400816
Douglas R. Short, Attorney for Appellants
Chandler P. Thompson and Robert H. Scott,
Attorneys for Appellees ReconTrust Company NA,
The Bank of New York Mellon, America's Wholesale
Lender, and BAC Home Loans Servicing LP
Armand J. Howell, Appellee Pro Se
SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.' JUDGE J. FREDERIC
VOROS JR. concurred, with opinion.
BENCH, Senior Judge:
¶1
Paula A. Mitchell and Wade Mitchell appeal from the
district court's orders dismissing several of their claims and
granting summary judgment on their remaining claims in favor
1. Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special assignment as
authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6).

A063

00636

Mitchell v. ReconTrust Company

of ReconTrust Company NA, the Bank of New York Mellon
(BNYM), America's Wholesale Lender (AWL), BAC Home Loans
Servicing LP (BAC), and Armand J. Howell. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
12
Paula Mitchell obtained a $1 million loan from AWL in
2006. To secure this loan, she executed a trust deed in favor of
AWL on real property in Salt Lake County. The trust deed
defined AWL as "Lender" and designated Stewart Matheson as
the trustee. The trust deed provided that Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems Inc. (MERS) "is acting solely as nominee
for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns" and "is the
beneficiary under this Security Instrument." The trust deed also
indicated that Paula Mitchell
agree[d] that MERS holds only legal title to the
interests granted by Borrower in this Security
Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or
custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and
Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to
exercise any or all of those interests, including, but
not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the
Property.
13
On August 17, 2010, MERS recorded a document
assigning its beneficial interest under the trust deed to BNYM.
That same day, BNYM recorded a substitution of trustee in
which BNYM, as the current beneficiary, appointed ReconTrust
as successor trustee under the trust deed. Also on that day,
Re6onTrust filed a notice of default and intent to sell the
property. According to the notice, Paula Mitchell had defaulted
on her loan obligation by failing to make payments since May
2010.
14
Attempting to prevent foreclosure, Paula and Wade
Mitchell filed a complaint in January 2011 against ReconTrust,
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BNYM, AWL, and BAC (collectively, Bank Defendants). The
Mitchells also named Howell as a defendant, alleging that he
was an attorney who "traditionally conducts foreclosure sales
for ReconTrust and is expected to conduct the sale {of the
Mitchells' property] unlawfully."2 The Mitchells raised claims
generally based on a theory that MERS, which was referred to as
the nominee of the lender and the beneficiary under the terms of
the trust deed, lacked authority to appoint BNYM as the
successor beneficiary and that BNYM thus lacked authority to
appoint ReconTrust as the successor trustee. The Mitchells also
alleged that ReconTrust was not authorized to serve as a trustee
under Utah's statutes. Further, they alleged that BAC, which was
servicing the loan and was purportedly acting as an agent of
BNYM, "directed [the Mitchells] to default in order to be able to
seek a modification because that would be the only way to
obtain a loan modification." Because they purportedly defaulted
at BAC's suggestion, the Mitchells alleged that the defendants
were estopped from enforcing the trust deed and note.
15
In terms of relief, the Mitchells sought declaratory
judgments clarifying the respective rights under the trust deed
and note, invalidating the substitution of trustee and notice of
default, declaring the debt unsecured and that the defendants
may not foreclose the trust deed, and declaring that the debt had
been satisfied via insurance or credit default swaps. The
2. Howell is mentioned only three more times in the complaint.
In the claim for punitive damages, the Mitchells alleged that
"Howell knows of the legal deficiencies in ReconTrust's efforts
to act as a foreclosing trustee, and that ReconTrust is not
qualified under the statute to serve as a foreclosing trustee, and
yet he turns a blind eye to such defects and knowingly conducts
unlawful sales for them." They also alleged that Howell and the
other defendants "colluded in their nationwide practices" and
claimed that punitive damages were necessary to "dissuade Mr.
Howell from continuing to conduct unlawful sales for
ReconTrust."

20140113-CA
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Mitchells also sought a permanent injunction of any foreclosure
sale conducted by ReconTrust on behalf of BNYM, an order
quieting title to the subject property in their names, an award of
punitive damages, and an award of attorney fees incurred in
defending against an improper foreclosure.
16
Bank Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the
Mitchells failed to state any claims upon which relief could be
granted. In support of their motion, Bank Defendants indicated
that on October 6, 2011, ReconTrust had recorded a cancellation
of notice of default, thereby mooting the Mitchells' claims
challenging ReconTrust's authority to act as a trustee with power
of sale because ReconTrust would not be conducting any further
foreclosure proceedings on the Mitchells' property.
117
The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part
and dismissed nine of the Mitchells' eleven claims. The court
first determined that under the terms of the trust deed, "MERS
was the statutory beneficiary and, by contract, the agent of the
Lender and the Lender's successors." The court explained that
"MERS assigned its interest to BNYM and [BNYM] is now,
under the terms of the [trust deed] and the statute, the
beneficiary." The court then addressed each cause of action,
Regarding the Mitchells' first cause of action seeking a
declaration with respect to the true ownership of the debt, "and
by extension the authority of [the] defendants to foreclose," the
district court concluded that it stated "no genuine claim for
declaratory relief" because "MERS had, and BNYM has,
authority to commence foreclosure under the terms of the [trust
deed] and the Utah statutes." Because the tenth cause of action
was "a restatement of the [f]irst," the court dismissed the tenth
cause of action for the same reasons.
18
The court proceeded to dismiss the second and seventh
causes of action, which challenged the notice of default and
alleged a breach of duty by the trustee, as moot in light of the
cancellation of the notice of default. As for the fourth cause of
action, based on a theory that the ownership of the debt had
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been severed from the trust deed, the court dismissed it because
"[n]o fact is alleged suggesting that the [trust deed] has been
severed from the underlying obligation, nor is there any
allegation how, under Utah law, this might occur." The court
also dismissed the fifth cause of action, stating that "the claim
fails to allege any basis for concluding that payment by a third
party to the holder of the debt satisfies" the Mitchells'
obligations under the note and trust deed, The court dismissed
the sixth cause of action for quiet title. It reasoned that BNYM
was the beneficiary and that any securitization of the debt "does
not change the [trust deed's] terms . . . making BNYM now the
agent (nominee) for the current owner or owners of the debt"
Moreover, the Mitchells did not dispute that their title was
subject to the trust deed. Last, the court dismissed the eighth
cause of action for an injunction and the eleventh cause of action
for punitive damages because both were remedies rather than
stand-alone claiins.
The district court denied Bank Defendants' motion to
19
dismiss with respect to two causes of action. Specifically, the
court concluded that the third cause of action, which appeared to
be based on theories of estoppel and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, possibly stated a claim
because "actions by the Lender or its agents encouraging [the
Mitchells] to default may constitute a modification of the
underlying agreement, a waiver of one or more of its terms, or
act to estop the current lender from asserting certain contractual
terms." The court also determined that the ninth cause of action
survived the motion to dismiss because it sought attorney fees
related to a breach of contract and therefore "if [the Mitchells']
estoppel[] theory establishes that the contract was modified by
[BAC's] conduct, a breach of contract may be proven."
Accordingly, the district court allowed the Mitchells to proceed
on their third and ninth causes of action.
1110 Bank Defendants later moved for summary judgment on
the remaining two claims. The court granted this motion. It
reasoned that all possible legal theories for the third cause of
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action relied upon "the alleged misrepresentation that occurred
in March 2010 regarding a possible loan modification." The court
then concluded that the evidence showed, "[at] most," that the
Mitchells had a "subjective understanding that they had been
assured that a loan modification would occur." Thus, it was
"undisputed that there was never an agreement to modify
according to any certain terms, and there was certainly nothing
in writing." Given this undisputed fact, and noting that the third
cause of action was "unclear as to precisely its legal theory or the
relief sought," the court determined that "there can be no claim
that [BAC] is bound by a modified loan agreement as a matter of
law" and that a waiver claim likewise would fail. Similarly, the
court concluded that a claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing would fail because "there can be no
implied duty arising" under a nonexistent modification and "no
such duty can be implied out of the [Mitchells'] existing loan."
The court also concluded that any claim gro-ended in promissory
estoppel failed because, inter alia, the Mitchells could not
reasonably rely on such an indefinite promise and because the
record did not support actual reliance. Consequently, the court
dismissed the third cause of action. Because the ninth cause of
action depended on the success of the third cause of action, the
court dismissed the ninth cause of action as well. Then, upon
Bank Defendants' motion, the district court determined that the
Mitchells had failed to comply with discovery orders and
dismissed the complaint as a discovery sanction; the sanction
served as a separate and independent basis for dismissing the
Mitchells'
¶11 After these orders were entered, Howell, who had not
joined Bank Defendants' motions, moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted Howell's motion, stating
that "the reasoning of [the rulings with regard to Bank
Defendants] applies with equal force to Howell and compels a
similar result." The court emphasized that the Mitchells had "not
pointed to an independent cause of action against Howell that
was not addressed in the prior rulings." The court further
explained that "the Complaint alleges that Howell was merely
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acting on behalf of ReconTrust and is devoid of any allegations
that Howell engaged in conduct that would somehow create
liability separate from the other Defendants." Accordingly, the
court granted summary judgment to Howell and thereby
disposed of all of the Mitchells' claims. The Mitchells appeal.3

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
112 The Mitchells contend that the district court erred in
dismissing nine of their claims. "A district court's ruling on . . . a
motion to dismiss . . . is a legal question which we review for
correctness." Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 UT App 232, 16, 263 P.3d 397.
113 The Mitchells next challenge a number of the district
court's rulings relating to evidence presented in connection with
summary judgment. In particular, .they contend that the district
court erred in its rulings on motions to strike several affidavits.
They also contend that the district court erred in refusing to take
judicial notice of declarations from witnesses in a separate
action. "We review a district court's decision on a motion to
strike affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment for an abuse of discretion."
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App 255, ¶ 4,

3. The Mitchells moved this court for permission to file overlength briefs. Although we granted their motion to file an over-.
length opening brief, we denied their motion to file an overlength reply brief. The Mitchells nevertheless included, as they
explain, the "full reply brief they would have filed by attaching
[it] in the addendum" to their reply brief. This attachment
constitutes "a blatant attempt to skirt" this court's order and the
page limitations stated in rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See Aspenwood, LLC v. C.A.T., LLC, 2003 UT
App 28, ¶ 46, 73 P.3d 947. Consequently, we have not considered
this addendum.
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314 P.3d 1069. Likewise, "[w]e review the [district] court's
judicial notice of prior adjudicated facts under Rule 201 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence for abuse of discretion." In re J.B., 2002
UT App 267, 114, 53 P.3d 958.
114 The Mitchells contend that the district court erred in
rendering summary judgment against them on their remaining
two claims. We review the district court's decision for
correctness.4 Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, 2011 UT App 232,
6.
115 Finally, the Mitchells contend that they are entitled to
attorney fees. "Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a
question of law . . . ." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 1 16,
40 P.3d 1119.

ANALYSIS
I. Claims Dismissed Under Rule 12(b)(6)
116 On appeal, the Mitchells challenge the dismissal of several
claims. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a defendant to move to dismiss an action that the defendant
believes "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[A] rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss admits the facts alleged in the [complaint] but challenges
the [plaintiff's] right to relief based on those facts." Maese v.
4. The Mitchells also contend that the district court erred in
dismissing their claims as a discovery sanction. After
determining that the Mitchells had failed to comply with
discovery orders, the district court dismissed the complaint as a
discovery sanction but stated that this rationale served as an
alternative ground for dismissing the complaint. Because we
affirm the district court's dismissal of the Mitchells' claims on
the merits, see infra ri[ 56, 60, we do not reach the alternative
basis for its decision.
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Davis County, 2012 UT App 48, 7 3, 273 P.3d 949 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a district court should
grant a motion to dismiss when, "assuming the truth of the
allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it
is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Hudgens v.
Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68, ¶ 14, 243 P.3d 1275 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating a motion to
dismiss, the district court may "consider documents that are
referred to in the complaint and [are] central to the plaintiff's
claim" and may also "take judicial notice of public records."
BMBT, LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64, II 6, 322 P.3d 1172
(alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Our review of the district court's dismissal orders
requires us to "accept the plaintiff's description of facts alleged
in the complaint to be true, but we need not accept extrinsic facts
not pleaded[,] nor need we accept legal conclusions in
contradiction of the pleaded facts." Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT
App 206, 7 10, 285 P.3d 7 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
717 We will address the Mitchells' causes of action by
category based upon the district court's rationale for dismissal.
Thus, we consider the district court's dismissal orders relying on
its conclusions that Bank Defendants had authority to commence
foreclosure proceedings, that the cancellation of ReconTrust's
notice of default mooted several claims, that the trust deed had
not been severed from the debt, that the debt had not been
satisfied, that the Mitchells were not entitled to quiet title, and
that punitive damages were not appropriate.
A,

The Authority to Appoint a Successor Trustee and the
Authority to Foreclose

718 The Mitchells challenge the dismissal of their first and
tenth causes of action. The first cause of action sought
clarification of the "true ownership of the [d]ebt" and "by
extension the authority of [the] defendants to foreclose upon the

20140113-CA

A071

9

2016 UT App 88

00644

Mitchell v. ReconTrust Company

Property." It alleged that because MERS and its assignee BNYM
lacked any beneficial ownership interest in the debt, MERS and
BNYM could not foreclose on the property. The tenth cause of
action similarly sought to block a non-judicial foreclosure on the
ground that MERS did not have "any beneficial interest in the
Property or the Trust Deed that could even possibly be assigned
to BNYM." The district court deemed the tenth cause of action to
be a "restatement" of the first. Then, after taking judicial notice
of the trust deed and the promissory note, the court ruled that
both causes of action failed because "MERS had, and BNYM has,
authority to commence foreclosure under the terms of the [trust
deed]."
119 The Mitchells argue that MERS and its assignee BNYM
lacked the authority to appoint ReconTrust as the successor
trustee for the purpose of foreclosing on the property. In
support, they contend that "[o]nly a statutorily defined
'Beneficiary' may initiate the non-judicial foreclosure of the trust
deed." The Mitchells further contend that MERS did not meet
the statutory definition of a "beneficiary" and that BNYM, as
MERS's assignee, therefore could not validly appoint ReconTrust
as successor trustee. Bank Defendants counter that MERS and its
assignee had the authority to foreclose and appoint a successor
trustee under the terms of the trust deed itself. We agree with
Bank Defendants.
120 Utah Code section 57449(1) defines a "beneficiary"
under a trust deed as "the person named or otherwise
designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust
deed is given, or his successor in interest." Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-19(1) (Lex:isNexis 2010). However, even if the Mitchells
are correct that MERS does not meet this definition,5 the terms of

5. The district court ruled that MERS was a statutory beneficiary
as defined by section 574-19(1). The district court reasoned that
the statute defines "beneficiary" as "'the person named or
otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for whose
(continued...)
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the trust deed nevertheless gave MERS the authority to appoint
a successor trustee and foreclose on the property.
121 Case law from this court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals indicates that a trust deed's plain language may give
MERS, as "nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and
assigns," the authority to appoint a successor trustee.
Specifically, this court has previously suggested that at least one
of the statutes governing conveyances does not "imply[} . . . or
somehow indicate] that the original parties to the Note and
Deed of Trust cannot validly contract at the outset `to have
someone other than the beneficial owner of the debt act on
behalf of that owner to enforce rights granted in [the security
instrument]." Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 UT App 232, IT 13, 263 P.3d 397
(third alteration in original) (quoting Marty v, Mortgage Elec.
(...continued)
benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest"; that
MERS was named in the trust deed as the beneficiary; and that
MERS's status as nominee of the Lender was thus of no
consequence under the statutory definition, (Quoting Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-19.) The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth CircUit reached a different conclusion on a similar
question in Burnett v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc., 706 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013). On analogous facts, it
apparently concluded that MERS could not be "the person
named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for
whose benefit a trust deed is given," because MERS held "no
ownership right in the note." Id. at 1237. Based on Burnett, Bank
Defendants concede that the district court apparently erred. We
express no opinion on this point. But we agree with the district
court and the Tenth Circuit in Burnett that the statute is not
dispositive where, as here, the trust deed expressly grants MERS
the right to foreclose and sell the property and thus, by
implication, the right to appoint a successor trustee for that
purpose. Id.
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Registration Sys., No. 1:10-cv-00033-CW, 2010 WL 4117196, at *5
(D. Utah Oct. 19, 2010)). In other words, "[t]he plain language of
[a conveyancing] statute does nothing to prevent MERS from
acting as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and
assigns when permitted by the Deed of Trust." Id. Similarly, the
Tenth Circuit has noted that even when "MERS is not a
beneficiary as that term is defined in [Utah Code section]
57-1-19(1)[,] . . . MERS nonetheless [may have the] authority to
appoint [a successor trustee] and foreclose on [a] property"
under the plain language of the trust deed. See Burnett v.
Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1237 (10th Cir.
2013).
122 Consistent with this case law, we conclude that the terms
of the trust deed in this case explicitly gave MERS the right to
appoint a successor trustee regardless of whether MERS satisfied
the statutory definition of a beneficiary. The trust deed explained
with respect to substituting the trustee that "Lender, at its
option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a
successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder." But the
trust deed also stated,
Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds
only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower
in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to
comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for
Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has
the right: to exercise any or all of those interests,
including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose
and sell the Property; and to take any action
required of Lender including, but not limited to,
releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.
Because the trust deed granted MERS, as nominee for Lender
and its assigns, the right "to exercise any or all of those interests"
"granted by Borrower in this Security Interest" and the right "to
take any action required of Lender," the trust deed allowed
MERS to remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee on
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Lender's behalf. It also gave MERS the "right to foreclose and
sell the Property." See, e.g., Sincere v. BAC Home Loans Servicing,
LP, No. 3:11-cv-00038, 2011 WL 6888671, at *5 (W.D. Va. Dec. 30,
2011) (construing a similar trust deed and concluding that "the
plain terms of the deed of trust supplied MERS with the
authority to take any action required of the lender, including
foreclosing and selling the property in the event of a default as
well as appointing substitute trustees to do the same," and
noting that the borrower's signature on the trust deed "indicates
that he agreed MERS had the authority to take any action
required of the lender"); Ramirez-Alvarez v. Aurora Loan Servs.,
LLC, No. 01:09cv1306, 2010 WL 2934473, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 21,
2010) (interpreting similar language in a trust deed to mean that
the borrower "agreed that MERS, filling the dual roles of
beneficiary and nominee for the lender, had the right to foreclose
on the property and take any action required of the lender, such
as the appointment of substitute trustees"). Thus, we conclude
that the trust deed's terms, to which Paula Mitchell agreed,
provide MERS and its assignee BNYM the authority to appoint a
successor trustee. Consequently, BNYM could validly appoint
ReconTrust as successor trustee in accordance with the trust
deed's plain language.
123 The Mitchells' challenge to the dismissal of their first and
tenth causes of action depends upon their assertion that MERS
and its assignee BNYIVI lacked authority to foreclose. But as we
have concluded, the plain terms of the trust deed authorized
MERS, as Lender's nominee, "to foreclose and sell the Property."
Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the
Mitchells' first and tenth causes of action.
B.

The Claims Dismissed as Moot

124 The Mitchells argue that the district court erred in
dismissing the second and seventh causes of action as moot,
asserting that "the questions of what duties ReconTrust had, and
still has, to the Mitchells remain unanswered." The second cause
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of action challenged ReconTrust's qualifications as successor
trustee and its actions, including its notice of default. The
seventh cause of action alleged that ReconTrust breached its
duties as successor trustee by initiating a non-judicial foreclosure
sale without authority to do so. Thus, both causes of action
challenged ReconTrust's power as successor trustee to carry out
a non-judicial foreclosure sale. The district court determined that
these two claims were moot by virtue of the fact that ReconTrust
withdrew its notice of default and represented to the court that it
would not be conducting any further foreclosure proceedings on
the Mitchells' property.
125 "If the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of
the litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally refrain
from adjudicating it on the merits." Merhish v. H.A. Folsom
& Assocs., 646 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1982) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). "Once a controversy has become
moot, a trial court should enter an order of dismissal." Id. at 733.
126 The Mitchells acknowledge that ReconTrust withdrew the
notice of default but nevertheless argue that these causes of
action are not moot, because ReconTrust lacks the statutory
authority to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure sale. We first note
that this argument is contrary to their statement before the
district court that they voluntarily agreed to dismiss "their
present request for a declaratory judgment that ReconTrust lacks
the statutory authority to conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales
in Utah," In any event, the cancellation of the notice of default
and BNYM's continuing freedom to appoint a qualified trustee,
22-23, eliminated any dispute regarding whether
see supra
ReconTrust was authorized to foreclose on the Mitchells'
property. Further, because ReconTrust retracted its notice of
default and never sold the property, ReconTrust cannot be held
liable for breach of any duty based on an unauthorized
foreclosure. Because the requested relief in relation to the second
and seventh causes of action would not affect the rights of the
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parties, the district court properly dismissed these claims as
moot.6
C.

The Claim That Ownership of the Debt Was Severed from
the Trust Deed

127 The Mitchells contend that the district court erred in
dismissing the fourth cause of action. This cause of action
alleged that AWL transferred the ownership interest in the debt
to a mortgage-backed security. It further alleged that
"fractionalizing the ownership of the Debt by securitization .
effectively destroy[edi the security for the Debt."7 Thus, the
Mitchells sought "a judgment declaring that the Debt has . . .
become unsecured, and the Trust Deed may not be foreclosed."
On appeal, the Mitchells argue that "the Trust Deed has been
severed from the Debt . . . rendering the Debt unsecured, and
precluding foreclosure,"
128 The premise underlying this argument and the Mitchells'
fourth cause of action was rejected by this court in Commonwealth
Property Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc., 2011 LIT App 232, 263 P.3d 397. There, a debtor
argued that the lender and MERS, as the lender's nominee, "lost
their rights under the Deed of Trust when the Note was

6. Since this appeal was filed, BNYM recorded a substitution of
trustee appointing eTitle Insurance Agency as the successor
trustee. Taking judicial notice of this recorded document, see
Utah R. Evid. 201, we observe that it supports our conclusion
that it is no longer relevant whether ReconTrust was properly
appointed successor trustee in the first place or whether
ReconTrust was qualified under Utah law to act as a trustee.
7. "Securitization" is the "process of pooling loans and selling
them to investors on the open market." Commonwealth Prop.
Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d
1194, 1197 n.2 (10th Cir. 2011).
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securitized." Id. 91 11. This court disagreed, explaining that
"when a debt is transferred, the underlying security continues to
secure the debt." Id. 1 13 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-35
(LexisNexis 2010)); accord Burnett v. Mortgage Elec. Registration
Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2013); Commonwealth
Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680
F.3d 1194, 1202-05 (10th Cir. 2011) (determining that MERS
retained its authority to foreclose even after the debt secured by
a Utah trust deed was securitized, and concluding that "[elven
assuming Plaintiff is correct that securitization deprives
Defendants of their implicit power to foreclose as holders of the
trust deeds, the trust deeds explicitly granted Defendants the
authority to foreclose").
129 The Mitchells have not persuaded us that their argument
is distinguishable from the one precluded by this court's
decision in Commonwealth Property Advocates. Any securitization
of the debt secured by the trust deed did not take away MERS's
power to foreclose under the trust deed's terms. See
Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, 2011 UT App 232, ¶91 11-13. As a
consequence, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the
Mitchells' fourth cause of action.
D.

Satisfaction of the Debt

130 The Mitchells challenge the dismissal of their fifth cause
of action that sought a declaratory judgment regarding the
satisfaction of the debt. The Mitchells assert that the debt "has
been paid in whole, by means of insurance or some similar
instrument [e.g., a credit default swap], such that the true
owners of the Debt are no longer owed anything . . . , which
extinguishes the Debt and the trust deed."
131 The district court dismissed this cause of action on the
ground that "the claim fails to allege any basis for concluding
that payment by a third party to the holder of the debt satisfies
[the Mitchells'] obligations under the Note and [the trust deed]."
Beyond offering a conclusory statement, the Mitchells make no
effort on appeal to demonstrate error in the district court's
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reasoning. See Simmons. Media Group, LLC v. Waykar, LLC, 2014
UT App 145,1 37, 335 P.3d 885 (indicating that appellants do not
meet their burden to demonstrate district court error when they
fail to present reasoned analysis based on relevant legal
authority). Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of this claim.
E.

Quiet Title

132 The Mitchells contend that the district court prematurely
dismissed their sixth cause of action for quiet title. In so arguing,
they concede that the property was subject to the trust deed but
assert that the district court "never examined, let alone
determined, who, if anybody, actually has any valid, enforceable
claim against the Property based on the trust deed."
133 "A quiet title action 'is a suit brought to quiet an existing
title against an adverse or hostile claim of another and the effect
of a decree quieting title is not to vest title but rather is to perfect
an existing title as against other claimants.'" Haynes Land
& Livestock Co. v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, LLC, 2010 UT App 112,
¶ 19, 233 P.3d 529 (quoting Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In re Malualani B.
Hoopiiaina Trust), 2006 UT 53, 26, 144 P.3d 1129). "To succeed
in an action to quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff must prevail on
the strength of his own claim to title and not on the weakness of
a defendant's title or even its total lack of title." Church v.
Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983).
¶34 We agree with Bank Defendants that, instead of showing
the strength of their own claim to title, the Mitchells "only attack
the alleged interest of {Bank Defendants} in the property." The
district court concluded that the Mitchells' theories attacking
Bank Defendants' rights vis-a-vis the trust deed were legally
incorrect. In light of this conclusion, and because the Mitchells
conceded that their title is subject to the trust deed, the district
court dismissed the Mitchells' quiet title action. In other words,
the district court did determine that Bank Defendants have a
"valid, enforceable claim against the Property based on the trust
deed." The Mitchells' effort on appeal falls short of
demonstrating error in the district court's analysis. Accordingly,
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we affirm the court's decision that the Mitchells did not state a
claim that would entitle them to quiet title.
F.

The Punitive Damages Claim

135 The Mitchells also challenge the district court's dismissal
of their eleventh cause of action seeking punitive damages.' On
appeal, the Mitchells attempt to recast this cause of action as one
for civil conspiracy, stating, "Although admittedly mislabeled as
a request for punitive damages, the 11th [cause of action]
actually sets forth its own common law claim of civil
conspiracy . . . ."
136 "Pio preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has
an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park,
Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 14, 48. P.3d 968.. Issues that are not
raised before the district court "are usually deemed waived." 438
Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 1 51, 99 P.3d 801.
137 The Mitchells have not preserved this argument for
appeal. In opposing Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss, the
Mitchells did not address their eleventh cause of action.
Consequently, they did not present the district court with an
opportunity to rule on the same argument they now raise on
appeal, namely, that they sufficiently alleged a claim for civil
conspiracy. The Mitchells also have not argued that plain error
or exceptional circumstances would justify our review of this
issue. Because the Mitchells did not preserve their argument
challenging the district court's dismissal of their eleventh cause
of action, we affirm the district court's decision without reaching
its merits.
138 In short, the district court did not err in concluding that
"MERS had, and BNYM has, authority to commence foreclosure
8. The Mitchells do not specifically challenge the dismissal of
their eighth cause of action for an injunction. See supra 91 8.
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under the terms of the [trust deed]." Moreover, the Mitchells
have not demonstrated that the district court erred in granting
Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss all but the third and ninth
causes of actions.
II. Challenges to the Evidence on Summary Judgment
139 The Mitchells next challenge three of the district court's
rulings relating to evidence presented in connection with
summary judgment. Specifically, they assert that the district
court erred in denying their motion to strike a bank employee's
affidavit, in granting Bank Defendants' motion to strike the
Mitchells' affidavits, and in refusing to take judicial notice of
declarations made in a separate case. We reject these arguments.
A.

The Court's Refusal to Strike a Bank Employee's Affidavit

140 First, the Mitchells assert that the district court
improperly refused to strike an affidavit from a bank employee.
They argue that the affidavit was inadmissible because it
constituted hearsay and was not based on the employee's
personal knowledge.
141 District courts generally have "broad discretion to decide
motions to strike summary judgment affidavits." Portfolio
Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App 255, 91 4, 314 P.3d
1069 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To obtain
reversal, appellants must show not only district court error but
also "error that was substantial and prejudicial in the sense that
there is at least a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of the
error the result would have been different." Ross v. Epic Eng.'s/
PC, 2013 UT App 136, `1[ 12, 307 P.3d 576 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
142 Here, the district court considered the affidavit at issue as
"relevant to the dispute" and "properly before the Court."
However, the district court stated that it had "decided the
motion for summary judgment without reference to the [bank
employee's] Affidavit." Because the bank employee's affidavit
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played no role in the district court's decision on summary
judgment, the Mitchells cannot show that they were prejudiced
by the district court's denial of their motion to strike.
Accordingly, we will not reverse the district court on this basis.
B.

The Court's Striking of the Mitchells' Affidavits

143 Second, the Mitchells assert that the district court erred in
striking their own affidavits. But as with their challenge to the
court's refusal to strike the bank employee's affidavit, the
Mitchelis cannot show that they were prejudiced by the court's
decision to exclude their affidavits. See id. The Mitchells have not
been harmed, because the court specifically stated that "even
considering the affidavits, Defendants would still be entitled to
summary judgment." As a result, this argument also does not
present reason to reverse the district court.
C.

The Court's Refusal to Take Judicial Notice of Certain
Declarations

144 Third, the Mitchells argue that the district court erred in
not taking judicial notice of declarations that former employees
of Bank of America made in a separate case.9 According to the
Mitchells, the declarations contain admissions that Bank of
America "systematically tried to induce homeowners into
'default' in order to force them into foreclosure" and would be
offered to "dernonstrat[e] that [the Mitchelis would] likely be
able to present similar evidence at trial."
145 Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence governs judicial
notice of adjudicative facts. It provides that "[t]he court may
judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute
because it . . . is generally known .. , or . . . can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." Utah R. Evid. 201(4 The court "may

9. Bank of America is the successor-by-merger• to BAC.
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take judicial notice on its own; or . . must take judicial notice if a
party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary
information." Id. R. 201(c).
146 The Mitchells have not demonstrated that the district
court erred by refusing to take judicial notice of the former
employees' declarations. Appellants must support their
arguments on appeal with reasoned analysis based on relevant
legal authority. See Simmons Media Group, LLC v. Waykar, LLC,
2014 UT App 145, ¶ 37, 335 P.3d 885; see also Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). The Mitchells' argument is limited to a conclusory
statement that the district court violated rule 201(d) because the
rule "mandates [that] a court shall take judicial notice of
uncontroverted facts in situations such as this." However, the
Mitchells do not analyze whether the declarations contain
"adjudicative facts" and, as in the district court, the Mitchells
have not offered any authority that would allow the court to take
judicial notice of declarations filed in another action and then to
consider the substance of those declarations. Accordingly, this
claim of error fails.
III. Claims Dismissed on Summary Judgment
147 Next, the Mitchells challenge the district court's summary
judgment against them on their third cause of action.1° Summary
judgment is appropriate if, viewing "the facts and all reasonable
inferences. drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party," Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), "there is no

10. Without additional analysis, the Mitchells state that they
challenge the district court's order with regard to the ninth cause
of action for "breach of contract." The district court dismissed
the ninth cause of action because it "depended on the success of
the Third Cause of Action." Because we affirm the dismissal of
the third cause of action, we do not address the ninth.
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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Utah R. Civ. P. 56(41'
A.

Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank Defendants

148 The Mitchells first challenge the merits of the district
court's summary judgment in favor of Bank Defendants on the
third cause of action. Specifically, the Mitchells contend that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on their third
cause of action for "estoppel and breach of good faith and fair
dealing," which was based on their assertion that the defendants
had caused them to stop making their mortgage payments. At
the outset, the district court noted that the third cause of action
was "unclear as to precisely its legal theory or the relief sought"
but concluded that "all possible legal theories rely on the alleged
misrepresentation that occurred in March 2010 regarding a
possible loan modification." The court later determined that the
third cause of action could not survive summary judgment
under a theory of promissory estoppel or a theory of breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Mitchells raise
arguments on appeal related to both legal theories.
1.

Promissory Estoppel

¶49 The Mitchells' arguments related to the theory of
promissory estoppel appear directed at one element, namely,
that the "plaintiff acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance
on a promise made by the defendant." Youngblood v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, 16, 158 P.3d 1088 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). They then argue that the
court misallocated the burden on summary judgment. The
Mitchells further argue that the district court inappropriately

11. Although rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has
been amended since the time the district court granted summary
judgment in this case, those changes are not relevant to our
analysis.
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weighed the evidence against them in concluding that they
could not show the existence of a definite and certain promise to
support a promissory estoppel claim.
150 In particular, the Mitchells contend that the "court never
determined whether defendants met their initial burdens" and
that the Mitchells "therefore were not even under any obligation
to prove any factual dispute." Relying on Orvis v. Johnson, 2008
UT 2, 177 P.3d 600, they state that a movant must "'affirmatively
provide factual evidence establishing that there is no genuine
issue of material fact." (Quoting id. ¶ 16.) The Mitchells'
argument, however, does not account for the fact that they
would carry the burden of proof at trial on the third cause of
action. The same case cited by the Mitchells clarified that
[a] summary judgment movant, on an issue where
the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at
trial, may satisfy its burden on summary judgment
by showing, by reference to "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any," that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 18 (emphasis added) (quoting an earlier
version of rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). "Upon
such a showing, whether or not supported by additional
affirmative factual evidence, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party, who 'may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denial of the pleadings,' but 'must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (emphasis
omitted) (quoting an earlier version of rule 56).
¶51 Because the Mitchells as the nonmoving party would
carry the burden of proof at trial, Bank Defendants, as the
moving party, met their burden on summary judgment by
showing, by reference to the evidence, "that there [was] no
genuine issue of material fact." Id. To successfully defend against
Bank Defendants' motion, the Mitchells therefore had an
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obligation to "'set forth specific facts showing that there [was] a
genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting an earlier version of rule
56). The Mitchells have not demonstrated that the district court
misallocated the par ties' burdens on summary judgment.
152 Likewise, the Mitchells have not demonstrated that the
district court inappropriately weighed the evidence. They assert
that the district court weighed the evidence because it did not
accept their allegation that BAC instructed them to miss
mortgage payments in order to obtain a loan modification. They
also focus on the district court's statements that the Mitchells'
testimony was "unclear," "less than certain," and "imprecise."
153 "Promissory estoppel involves a clear and definite
promise . . . ." Youngblood, 2007 UT 28, ¶ 19 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, a "party claiming estoppel must
present evidence showing that an offer or promise was made on
which the party based his or her reliance." Nunley v. Westates
Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, 1 36, 989 P.2d 1077. "Likewise,
the alleged promise must be reasonably certain and definite, and
a claimant's subjective understanding of the promissor's
statements cannot, without more, support a promissory estoppel
claim." Id.
154 The district court's decision rested on its conclusion that
"there is no evidence supporting a clear promise or
representation by [BAC] to unconditionally modify the loan."
Instead, the evidence, including the Mitchells' testimony,
indicated that BAC told the Mitchells that "once [they] missed
two payments, [they] could apply for a loan modification."
Because the evidence showed that the Mitchells, at most, had a
"subjective understanding that they had been assured that a loan
modification would occur," the district court determined as a
matter of law that the Mitchells "could not reasonably rely on a
promise that is so indefinite that it lacks —literally —any terms."
155 In this regard, the context of the district court's
statements —that the Mitchells were "unclear," "less than
certain," and "imprecise" —matters. The court stated that the
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Mitchells' testimony on the issue of whether BAC promised
them a loan modification was "less than certain," noting that
"[Wade] Mitchell testified that someone from [BAC] promised
them a loan modification, and so he and his wife 'expected' a
loan modification." And it was "unclear from [the Mitchells']
own testimony whether [BAC] actually promised them an
unconditional loan modification, or whether it simply agreed to
discuss the matter." The court also indicated that the Mitchells'
affidavits were "similarly imprecise" because Wade Mitchell
testified that "they were only promised the ability to apply for a
loan modification." Given this context and the court's task of
evaluating whether the Mitchells had provided specific facts
showing that BAC made a promise on certain terms, we are not
convinced that the court improperly weighed the evidence.
1[56 The Mitchells do not identify any evidence that the
district court failed to consider or any—evidence that
unequivocally indicates that BAC, without condition, promised
to modify the loan on certain terms. The evidence, even
construed in the light most favorable to the Mitchells, does not
show that there was a genuine issue of material fact, because any
instruction given by BAC to the Mitchells does not meet the legal
standard for a definite and certain promise required for a
promissory estoppel claim. See id. As a consequence, the district
court did not err in concluding that no genuine issue of fact
existed and that Bank Defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on this theory.
2.

Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

¶57 The Mitchells also challenge the district court's summary
judgment decision on the third cause of action on the theory of a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. They
contend that the court misapplied the law and should have
concluded that "the allegations show defendants intentionally
rendered it difficult if not impossible for [Paula Mitchell] to
receive the fruits of her Loan by falsely inducing her into
'defaulting.' They also make the contrary argument that their
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claims "are not based on the existing Loan" but instead are
"based on defendants' misconduct impairing the Loan by
fraudulently inducing a 'default' in order to profit from it."
158 "Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each
party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or
purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other
party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." Iota, LLC v,
Davco Mgmt. Co., 2012 UT App 218, 132, 284 P.3d 681 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). "[Olne party may not
render it difficult or impossible for the other to continue
performance and then take advantage of the non-performance he
has caused." Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks). Some limitations on the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing exist:
the Covenant, cannot be used (1) to create new or
independent rights or obligations to which the
parties have not agreed in the contract; (2) to
establish rights or duties inconsistent with the
express terms of the contract; or (3) to require a
party to exercise an express contractual right in a
manner detrimental to its own interests in order to
benefit the other party to the contract.
Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Utah Sch. & Inst. Trust Lands Admin., 2010 UT
App 284, 1 16, 243 P.3d 888 (citing Oakwood Vill, LLC v.
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 1 45, 104 P.3d 1226). Consistent
with these limitations, this court has recognized that "[d]eclining
to give up rights granted by a contract does not constitute a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Iota, 2012
UT App 218,1 33.
159 Despite the Mitchells' statement that their claim is "not
based on the existing Loan," they do not appear to contend that
the implied duty arises out of any separate agreement to modify
the loan. Although vague, we understand the substance of the
Mitchells' argument to center on an implied duty arising out of
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the original loan agreement. The Mitchells theorize that Bank
Defendants breached the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing by inducing them to default with the information that
the Mitchells could obtain a loan modification only if they first
defaulted.
160 Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Mitchells and thus assuming that Bank Defendants told the
Mitchells that they could not even apply for a loan modification
unless they defaulted, Bank Defendants did not breach the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law.
The information regarding a possible loan modification did not
render it impossible for the Mitchells to continue making their
mortgage payments. Indeed, according to Wade Mitchell's
affidavit, the Mitchells' default was at least in part attributable to
the fact that "cash flow was getting tighter." Thus, Bank
Defendants' conduct. did not impede the Mitchells from
performing their obligations under the contract or render it
impossible for them to perform. See id. TT 32-33. Furthermore,
the district court correctly concluded that "no such duty can be
implied out of [the Mitchells'] existing loan as a matter of law,"
because the Mitchells' position —that Bank Defendants could not
foreclose after their missed payments —would require Bank
Defendants to forgo rights granted by the original loan
agreement. See id. ¶ 33. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of the Mitchells' third cause of action based on
the theory of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing-12

12. The Mitchells also suggest that the district court should have
accepted certain allegations in the complaint as true in its
consideration of the third cause of action. However, because the
Mitchells have not demonstrated that they preserved this
argument, we do not consider it. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)
(requiring the appellant's brief to contain "citation to the record
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court" or a
basis for addressing an unpreserved issue); 438 Main St. v. Easy
(continued...)
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B.

Summary judgment in Favor of Howell

161 The Mitchells also challenge the district court's order
granting summary judgment to Howell, the attorney who on
occasion conducted trustee's sales on behalf of ReconTrust. They
attack the court's ruling on both procedural and substantive
grounds.
162 As for their procedural argument, the Mitchells contend
that Howell waived the defense of failure to state a claim by not
raising it sooner. In support, they rely on rule 12(h) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, "A party waives all
defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by
answer or reply . . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). "A defense of failure
to state a claim, however, falls under a procedural
exception . . ." Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47,
14, 221 P.3d 194 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)). The rule specifiesthat "the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted . . . may also be made by a later pleading . or by
motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the
merits." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). Accordingly, a "defense of failure
to state a claim . . . may be raised any time before the court or
jury determines the validity of a party's claim." Mack, 2009 UT
47, 1 14 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)). Because Howell raised the
defense by moving for summary judgment before the court
ruled on the merits of the claims against him, the Mitchells have
not shown that the district court erred in refusing to strike
Howell's motion on the ground that Howell had waived the
defense of failure to state a claim.
163 Regarding the merits, the Mitchells contend that the
district court erred in concluding that "Howell was entitled to
[the] same result as [the] co-defendants." The Mitchells

(...continued)
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 1( 51, 99 P.3d 801 ("Issues that are not
raised at trial are usually deemed waived.").
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acknowledge the court's determination that they had "not
pointed to an independent cause of action against Howell that
was not addressed in the prior rulings." Nevertheless, they
contend that the court erred because "each 'cause of action' is
still a claim against Howell personally."
164 The Mitchells have failed to demonstrate that the district
court erred in concluding that "the reasoning of [the rulings with
regard to Bank Defendants] applies with equal force to Howell
and compels a similar result." They also have not addressed the
court's rationale that "the Complaint alleges that Howell was
merely acting on behalf of ReconTrust and is devoid of any
allegations that Howell engaged in conduct that would
somehow create liability separate from the other Defendants."
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Howell.
IV. Attorney Fees
¶65 Finally, the Mitchells contend that they are entitled to
attorney fees under a number of legal theories: contract, the
private attorney general doctrine, the common fund doctrine,
and the court's inherent authority. We conclude that an award of
attorney fees is not warranted here.
166 "As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only
to a prevailing party, and only when such an action is permitted
by either statute or contract." Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60,
1 32, 218 P.3d 598. At the appellate level, generally "when a
party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the
party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal."
Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Sots., Inc., 2010 UT App 9, 1 8, 223
P.3d 1141 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
167 The district court did not award any attorney fees to the
Mitchells. And on appeal, their request for attorney fees under
all theories is contingent upon their success before this court.
Because the Mitchells did not receive attorney fees below and
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have not prevailed on appeal, we decline to award them
attorney fees incurred on appeal. See id.

CONCLUSION
168 The Mitchells have not demonstrated that the district
court erred in dismissing several of their causes of action upon
Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Mitchells have also
failed to show that the district court erred in its evidentiary
rulings or in granting summary judgment to the defendants on
their remaining claims. Accordingly, we affirm.

VOROS, Judge (concurring):
169 I concur in the majority opinion. Alternatively, I believe
this appeal is inadequately briefed.
170 For example, perhaps the Mitchells' most sympathetic
claim is their claim for equitable estoppel. They assert that Bank
Defendants induced them to miss monthly payments on the note
and consequently should be estopped from foreclosing on the
house based on those missed monthly payments. But the
Mitchells' brief fails to cite any relevant legal authority, quote
testimony from the record, identify the elements of equitable
estoppel, or explain how a reasonable fact-finder could find each
of those legal elements. They instead rely on statements such as
the following: "It is believed a pattern of deliberate misconduct
will come to light through discovery, which misconduct has
resulted in thousands of similarly situated borrowers being
duped by defendants into 'defaulting,' so that they could hijack
their loans for defendants' own hidden profit scheme," and "NO
one could possibly consider such systematic profiteering from
fraudulent statements fair or equitable."
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171 Similarly, the Mitchells describe at some length what they
call their "discovery disputes" in the trial court; the factual
background and procedural history of these issues comprise
seven pages of their brief. But those seven pages contain no
citations to the record on appeal. The briefing of these two points
typifies the Mitchells' principal brief.
172 An appellant's argument must contain "citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R,
App. P. 24(a)(9). "An issue is inadequately briefed when the
overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of
research and argument to the reviewing court." State v. Davie,
2011 UT App 380, ¶ 16, 264 P.3d 770 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). "An inadequately briefed claim is by
definition insufficient to discharge an appellant's burden to
demonstrate trial court error." Simmons Media Group, LLC v.
Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, 1 37, 335 P.3d 885. So while I
concur in the majority opinion, I would in the alternative reject
all the Mitchells' claims on appeal as "not adequately briefed,
researched, or presented," See State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, 34, 37
P.3d 1103.
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: March 30, 2017
/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
05:16:11 PM
District Court Judge

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

RULING AND ORDER

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: SHAUGHNESSY, TODD M

:

Date:

March 30, 2017

______________________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Counterclaim. The
motion is fully briefed. The court denies the request for oral argument on the ground
that the issues presented by the motion have been authoritatively decided and oral
argument would not assist the court in deciding the questions presented.
The motion to dismiss the First Amended Counterclaim is granted. All of the issues and
claims set forth in the First Amended Counterclaim were, or could have been, asserted
in the Mitchell I case, with the possible exception of the claims in which, according
to defendant, she seeks to collaterally attack the decisions by the Utah Court of
Appeals and Utah Supreme Court. Defendant apparently seeks to have this court declare
that the Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the
Mitchell I case. The court finds no legal, factual, or logical support for such claims
and declines to entertain them in this case.
No further order is required.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

BRAD G DEHAAN brad.dehaan@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

CRAIG H HOWE chowe@joneswaldo.com

EMAIL:

HILLARY R MCCORMACK hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

BLAKE D MILLER bmiller@joneswaldo.com
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Case No: 160902472 Date:

Mar 30, 2017

______________________________________________________________________________________
EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT mail@consumerlawutah.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT mail@consumerlawutah.com
03/30/2017

Date: ____________________

/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 8168)
Hillary R. McCormack (USB No. 11719)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES, PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 263-3400
brad.dehaan@Lundbergfirm.corn
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parcel No, 28-22-203-047
L&A Case No. 15.61512.1/JAT
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FICA AFFIDAVIT OF
ALVIN DENMON
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYB5,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 160902472

vs.

PAULA A. MI'T'CHELL, AMERICA FIRST
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, PEPPERWOOD Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
STATE OF

Te)--05
: SS.

COUNTY OF /
I, Alvin Denmon, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
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1,

I am employed as a

a4

.51

for

New Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, as servicing agent for plaintiff
The Bank of New York Mellon, fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders
CWMBS Series 2006-HYB5 ("Bank of New York").
2.

I am familiar with the business records maintained by Bank of New York and

New Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing for the purpose of servicing
mortgage loans, including specifically the mortgage loan for defendant Paula A. Mitchell
described in the Mitchell Trust Deed, Note, and Rider.
3.

These records (which include data compilations, electronically imaged

documents, and others) are made at or near the time by, or from information provided by,
persons with knowledge of the activity and transactions reflected in such records, and are kept in
the ordinary course of business activity conducted regularly by Bank of New York and New
Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint. Mortgage Servicing.
4.

It is the regular practice of Bank of New York's and New Penn Financial, LLC

d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing's business to make these records.
5.

In the course of making this affidavit, I have acquired personal knowledge of the

matters stated herein by examining these business records, including the business records fbr and
relating, to the mortgage loan given tch Paula A. Mitchell described in the Mitchell Trust Deed,,...
Nate and Rider.
te:;

0

6,

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell acquired an ownership interest in the Property by a

i-i,Speelal Warranty Deed executed on May 23, 2006 and recorded on May 24, 2006 in the Salt
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Lake County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 9733511. A copy of the Special Warranty Deed is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
7.

On May 23, 2006, defendant Paula A, Mitchell, as trustor, executed and delivered

a certain trust deed (the "Mitchell Trust Deed") to Stewart T, Matheson, as trustee, for the
benefit of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for America's Wholesale
Lender, it successors and assigns, to secure obligations under a certain promissory note executed
in conjunction therewith. A copy of the Mitchell Trust Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
8.

On May 24, 2006, the Mitchell Trust Deed was recorded in the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office as Entry No. 9733512.
9.

Ora May 23, 2006, in conjunction with the execution of the Mitchell Trust Deed,

defendant Paula A. Mitchell executed a promissory note ("Note") and Rider ("Rider") in the
amount of $1,000,000.00. A copy of the Note and Rider are attached hereto as Exhibit C.
10.

Plaintiff is the current beneficiary under the Mitchell Trust Deed by virtue of an

Assignment of Deed of Trust ("2010 Assignment") recorded on August 17, 2010 in the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 11012216. A copy of the 2010 Assignment is attached
hereto as Exhibit D.
11.

Plaintiff is the current holder of the Note and Rider,

' 12.

Pursuant to the terms „of the Mitchell Trust Deed, Note, and, Rider, plaintiff

DT

plaintiff's predecessors-in-interest, loaned, advanced and disbursed the sum of $1,000;000,00 to
or on behalf of, and to the benefit of, defendant Paula A. Mitchell.
13;
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The Note obligated defe:Vdatit Paula A. Mitchell to Make monthly prinbipfd-ind .‘ •

00810

interest payments to plaintiff or plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest, beginning July 1, 2006.
14.

The Note provides that the initial rate of interest agreed to be paid by defendant

Paula A. Mitchell is 6.500% per annum.
15.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell's obligations under the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust

Deed were secured by the Property.
16.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell breached the terms and conditions of the Note, Rider,

and Mitchell Trust Deed by failing to make the required monthly payments when due.
17.

Based upon defendant Paula A. Mitchell's failure to pay the monthly payments

under the terms of the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed, defendant Paula A. Mitchell is in
default.
18.

Because defendant Paula A. Mitchell was in default and breached the terms of the

Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed, plaintiff accelerated the entire unpaid balance as immediately
due and payable.
19.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell failed to cure the default under the terms of the Note,

Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed.
20.

The last payment made by defendant Paula A. Mitchell under the terms of the

Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed was. on April 21, 2010.
21.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell has not made a payment under. the tertmof the Note,

Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed sinee' April 21, 2010.
'22..

Defendant is dne?.and.-,owing for the monthly payment- under, the Mitchell :Trust

• Deed, Note and RidersinceMV4M10 through present' date:
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23.

The terms of the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed allow plaintiff to recover

its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with this matter.
24.

The terms of the Mitchell Trust Deed allow plaintiff to invoke the power of

foreclosure sale and any other remedies permitted by applicable law,
25.

As of May 31, 2017, the amount due and owing to plaintiff under the Note, Rider,

and Mitchell Trust Deed is $1,343,034.81, plus additional interest, attorney's fees, costs, taxes,
and other fees which will continue to accrue after May 31, 2017.
26.

The undersigned affiant makes these statements under oath, on his own personal

knowledge, and states that he is in all respect authorized and competent testify thereof in this or
any other court.

. • •.. •

;:• t •
•••0):41.-9,-;•. ;;;,_::..1, 1'7,:;'..r• •

A100

00812

2.4k

DATED this

day of August, 2017.

tiflAv
By:
Alvin Denmon, of New Penn Financial, LLC
d/b/a, Shelipoint Mortgage Servicing for The
Bank of New York Mellon FKA the Bank of
as
Trustee
for
the
New York,
Certificateholders of the CWMBS Inc., CHL
Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-HYBS,
Mortgage Pass Through CertiEcates, Series
2006-HYB5

STATE OF

T:

14
:Ss.

COUNTY OF

/4/ 90

$

)

Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me this

ev

I

day of August,

2017, by Alvin Denrnon, signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

Notary Pub!'
i

gg&;s,tS'ir42iazx'4:Ie.,gtaysset4,s.Ue.E9W'oitgt,aax,wsKias:
tAt11111%
1.• ref Iv, 4,
JOY WILSON
4 o'si.'"'"::‹A Notary

Slate of Texss
Comm, Expires 03-10.2020
c9,,,,,,,,')•0'V
Notary 10 130584260
,Augoeg.iro'ittikre
- ,stvtiFellmsnr-mr.mmispi, •
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I

„fir ,
certify that on the

0_154,04,4-r-

day of Au st, 2017, I caused a copy of the foregoing

instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, or via electronic service, to the following:
Douglas Short
2290 East 4500 South, Ste, 220
Holladay, Utah 84117
mail&onsuinerlawutah.com
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11M
9733511
512412000 4:48:00 PM $12.00
Book - 9298 Pg - 7353-7354
Gary W. Ott
Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT
MERIDIAN TITLE
BY: eCASH, DEPUTY - EF 2 P.

WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:
PAULA A. MITCHELL
3 SOUTH MISTYWOOD LANE
SANDY, UT. 84092

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
(Corporate)
TImbersmith Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Utah, with Its principal office at Sandy, Grantor, hereby CONVEYS
and WARRANTS against all claiming by, through or under it to
v-v

PAULA A. MITCHELL,
Grantee,
of SANDY, County of SALT LAKE, State of UT, for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable
consideration, the following tract of land In SALT LAKE, State of UT, to-wIt

Lot 804 B, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE 8B, according to the official plat
thereof on file and of record in the County Recorder's Office.

Subject'to easements, restrictions and lights of way appearing of record or enforceable in law and equity and
general properly taxes for the year 2006 and thereafter.
The Grantor hereby binds Itself to warrant and defend the title as against the acts of Grantor and no other,
subject to the matters above set forth.
The officer(s) who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly
authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the grantor at a lawful meeting duly
held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed by Its duly
authorized officer(s) this 23rd day of MAY, 2006
TIMBERSMITH INC.

By.
SHALER R. SMITH, VICE-PRESIDENT

BK 9298 PG 7353
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:es
)

On the ,,,22 tiiLday of MAY, 2006, personally appeared before me SHALER R. SMITH, who being by me
duly sworn, did say that ha is the VICE-PRESIDENT of TIMBERSMITH INC., a Corporation, and that the
foregoing Instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of
Directors, and the said SHALER R. SMITH acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same.

Public
M y Commission Expires: November 22 2006
Residing at: MIDVALE, UT

MICHELLE SORENSEN"
NOTARY PUBUC • SIAM of UTAH
US SOO 4.1110/11488 COM 411 313
MIDVALE UT 84047
lAYCOMMON LOKI tt,22.21p0

BK 9298 PG 7354
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EXHIBIT "B"
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t

After Recording Return To;
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC,
NO Sv-79 DOCUMENT PROCESSING
P.O.Box 10423
Van Nuys, CA 91410-0423

9733512
512412006 4:48:00 PM $36.00
Book . 9298 Pg - 7355-7369

Gary W. Ott
Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT
MERIDIAN TITLE
BY: °CASH, DEPUTY - Er is P.

6955 UNION PARK CENTER #400
MIDVALE,
UT 84047
ESpeco Above This Line For Recording Data] •

DEED OF TRUST

DEFINITIONS
Words used in multiple sections of this document arc defined below and other words are defined in Sections 3,
11, 13, 18, 20 and 21. Certain rules regarding the usage of words used in this document are also provided in
Section 16.
(A) "Security Instrument" means this document, which is dated MAY 23, 2006
with all Riders to this document.
at) "Borrower" is
PAULA A MITCHELL

, together

Borrower is the trustor under this Security Instrument.
(C) "Lender" is
AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER
Lender is s CORPORATION
Organized and existing under the laws of NEW YORK
Lender's address is
4500 Park Granada MSN# 8VE-314, Calabasas, CA 91302-16a3
(D) "Trustee" is
STEWART T . MATHESON, ATTORNEY AT LAW
640 EAST PIRST SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, WI' 84102

UTAH-Single Famlly-Fannie Moo/Froddle Mae UNIFORM INSTRUMENT WITH MERS
Peso I of 11
114 1 -CA(UT) (0005)
OHL (08t05)(d) VIVIP Mortgage Solutions, Irto. (800)52i-7291

Form 3045 1/01
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(E) "NIERS" is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc, MERS is a separate corporation that is acting
solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and ensigns, MERS is the.beneficiary under this
Security Instrument, MERS Is organized and existing under the laws of Delaware, and has an address and
telephone number of P,O, Box 2026, Flint, Ml 48501-2026, tel. (888) 679-MERS.
(P) "Note" means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated MAY 2 3 2 0 0 6
. The
Note states that Borrower owes Lender
ONZ MILLION and 00/100
) plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular
;Dollars (U.S. $ 1, 0 0 0 , 0 00 . 0 0
Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in full not later than JUNE 01, 20 3 6
(G-) "Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer of Rights in the
Property.'
(H) "Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late charges
due under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest,
(1) "Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument that are executed by Borrower. The following
Riders are to be executed by Borrower fehecic box as applieablej:
x

-

Adjustable Rate Rider
Balloon Rider
VA Rider

Condominium Rider
Planned Unit Development Rider
I Biweekly Payment Rider

Second Home Rider
1-4 Family Rider
Other(s) [specify]

(J) "Applicable Law" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations,
ordinances and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final,
non-appealable judicial opinions.
(K) "Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments" means all clues, fees, assessments and other
charges that are imposed on Borrower Or the Property by a condominium association, homeowners association
or similar organization.
(L) "Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check,
draft, or similar paper inetrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument,
computer, or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an
account. Such term includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller machine
transactions, transfers initiated by telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse transfers.
(M) "Reerow Items" means those items that are described in Section 3.
(N) "Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, •award of damages, or proceeds paid by
any third party (other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages described in Section 5) for: (i) damage
to, or destruction of, the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taking of all or any part of the Property; (iii)
conveyance In lieu of condemnation; or (iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the value and/or
condition of the Property.
(0) "Mortgage Insurance" means insurance protesting Lender against the nonpayment ef, or default on, the
Loan.
(P) "Periodic Payment" means the regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under the
Note, plus (ii) any amounts under Section 3 of this Security Instrument.
(Q) "RESPA" means the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. Section 2601. et seq.) and its
implementing regulation, Regulation X (24 C.F.R. Part 3500), as they might bo amended from time to time, or
any additional or successor legislation or regulation that. governs the same subject matter. As used in this
Security Instrument, "RESPA" refers to all requirements and restrictions that are imposed in regard to a
"federally related mortgage loan" even if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage loan"
under RESPA,
(R) ""Successor in Interest of Borrower" means any party that has taken title to the Property, whether or not
that party has assumed Borrower's obligations under the Note and/or this Security Instrument.
TRANSFER OP RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MHRS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors
and assigns) and the successors and assigns of NIERS. This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (1) the
repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance of
Borrower's covenants rind agreements under this Security Instrument and the Note, For this purpose. Borrower
irrevocably grants, conveys and warrants to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following described
property located in the
.Cenuemer
SALT LAKE
of
[Typo of Recording ittriEldictionl

(41211t $A(UT)

A108

we)

OHL (00/05}

[Name. ofilocording Jurisdiction]
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LOT 804 3-4, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE es, ACCORDING TO THM PLAT THEREOF AS
RECORDED IN THM oPyrcE OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER.

which currently has the address of
3 SOUTH MISTYWOOD LANE, SANDY
pummel
Utah 8 4 0 92-4 e 50 ("Property Address"):
EZIp Codel
TOGETBER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements,
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also
be covered by this Security Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the
"Property." Borrower understands and agrees that 1.IERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by
Borrower in this Security thstrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MARS (as nominee for
Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including,
,but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of Lender
including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the
right to grant, convey and warrant the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for
encumbrances of record. Borrower further warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property against
all claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances.of record.
THIS sscuRrry Ir.i‘ISTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform
covenants with limited variations by jurisdictien to constitute a uniform security instrument cevering real
property.
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows:
1. Payment of Principal, Interest, Escrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Lute Charges. Borrower
shall pay when duo the principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment
charges and late charges due lender the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for Escrow Items pursuant to
Section 3.. Payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument shall be made in U.S. currency.
However, if any check or other instrument received by Lender as payment under the Note or this Security
Instrument is returned to Lender unpaid, Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments due under
the Note and this Security Instrument be made in one or more of the following forms, as selected by Lender:
(a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's check or cashier's check, provided any
such cheek is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or
entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer.
Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at sub
other mention as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15. Lender
may return any payment or partial payment irthe payment or partial payments are Insufficient to bring the
Loan current. Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan current,
without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial payments in
the future, but Lender in not obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are accepted. If each
Periodic Payment is applied .as of its scheduled due date, then Lender need not Day interest 'on unapplied
funds. Lender may hold such unapplied fonds until Borrower makes payment to bring the Loan current. If
Borrower does not do so within a reasonable period of time, Lender shall either apply such funds or return
them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds will be applied to the outstanding principal balance under
the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or claim which Borrower might have now or in the future
against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument
or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this Sedulity Instrument.
2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except. as otherwise described in this Section 2, all payments
accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the fallowing order of priority; (a) interest duo under the
Note; (b) principal duo under the Note; (c) amounts due under Sectiou 3. Such payments shall be applied to
each Periodic Payment in the order in which it became due. Any remaining amounts shall be applied first to
late charges. second to any other amounts due under this Security Instrument, and then to reduce the principal
balance of the Note.
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If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for a delinquent erns c ayment w is me u es n
sufficient amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may bo applied to the delinquent payment and the
late charge. If more than one Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment received from
Borrower to the repayment of the Periodic Payments if, and to the extent that, each payment can be paid in
full. To the extent that any excess exists after the payment is applied to the full payment of one or more
Periodic Payments, such excess may be applied to any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments shall, bo
applied first to any prepayment charges and then as described in the Note.
Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principal due under the
Note shall not extend or postpone the due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments,
3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due under
the Note, until the Note is paid, in full, a sum (the "Funds") to provide for payment of amounts due for; (a)
taxes and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien or
encumbrance on the Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any; (a) premiums
for any and all insurance required by Lender under Section 5; and (d) Mortgage Insurance premiums, if any, or
tiny sums payable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage Insurance premiums in
accordance with the provisions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow Items." At origination or at any
time during the term of the Loan, Lender may require that Community Association Duos, Pees. and
Assessments, if any, be escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and assessments shall be an Escrow Item.
Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this Section. Borrower shall
pay Lender the Funds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives Borrower's obligation to pay the Funds for any
or all Escrow Items. Lender may waive Borrower's obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any or all Escrow
Items at any time. Any such waiver may only be in writing. In the event of such waiver, Borrower shall pay
directly, when and where payable, the amounts due for any Escrow Items for which payment of Funds has
been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires, shall furnish to Lender receipts evidending such payment
within such time period us Lender may require. Borrower's obligation to make such payments and to provide
receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to be a covenant and agreement contained' in this Security
Instrument, as the phrase "coaenant and agreement" is used in Section 9. If Borrower is obligated to pay
Escrow Items directly, pursuant to a waiver, and Borrower fails to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item,
Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9 and pay such amount and Borrower shall then be obligated
under Section 9 to repay to Lender any such amount. Lender may revoke the waiver as to any or all Escrow
Items at any time by a notice given in accordance with Section 15 and, upon such revocation, Borrower shall
pay to Lender all Funds, and in such amounts, that are then required under this Section 3.
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to apply the
Funds at the time specified under RESPA, and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can require
under RESPA. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds due en the basis of current data and reasonable
estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in uecerdarice with Applicable Law.
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality,
or entity (including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits arc so insured) or in any Federal Homo
Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items no later than the time specified under
RESPA. Lender shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually analyzing the escrow
account, or verifying the Escrow Items; unles,s Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and Applicable
Law permits Lender to make such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law
requires interest to be paid on the Funds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings
on the Funds. Borrower and Lender can agree in writing, however, that interest shall be paid on the Funds.
Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the Funds as required by RESPA.
If there Is a surplus of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall account to Borrower
for the excess funds in accordance with RESPA, If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, as defined
under RESPA, Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the
amount necessary to make up the shortage in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 12 monthly
payments, If there is a deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall notify
Borrower us required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make up the
deficiency in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 1.2 monthly payments.
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund to
Borrower any Funds held by Lender.
4. Charges; Limas. Borrower shell pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions attributable
to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, leasehold payments or ground rents on
the Property, if any, and Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any. To the extent that these
items tire Escrow Items, Borrower shall pay them in the manner provided in Section 3.
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless
Borrower: (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable toLender, but only so long as Borrower is performing such agreement; (b) corneae the lion in good faith by, or
defends against enforcement of the lien in, legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to.prevent the
enforcement of the lien while those proceedings are pending, but only until such proceedings are concluded;
or (c) secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender strboniivating the lien to this
Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien which can attain
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priority over this Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice Identifying the lien,
Y's
of the (tete on which that notice is given, Borrower shalt satisfy the lien or take one•or more of
actions set
forth above in this Section 4.
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for a real estate tax verification and/or reporting
service osed by Lender in connection with this Loan.
S. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the
Property insured against loss by. fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage," and any other
hazards including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. This
insurance shall be maintained in the amounts (including deductible levels) and for the periods that Lender
requires. What Lender requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during the term of the Loan.
The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's right to
disapprove Borrower's choice, which right shall not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may require Borrower
to pay, in connection with this Loan, either: (a) a one-time charge for flood zone determination, certification
and tracking services; or (le) n one-time charge for flood zone determination and certification services and
subsequent charges each time remappings or similar changes occur which reasonably might affect such
determination or certification. Borrower shall also be responsible for the payment of any fees imposed by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency in connection with the review of any flood zone deterrainatien
kesulting from an objection by Borrower.
If Borrower falls to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may obtain insurance
coverage, at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any particular
type or amount of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might not protect
Borrower, Borrower's equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk, hazard or
liability and might provide greater or lesser coverage than. was previously in, effect. Borrower ucknowledgee
that the cost of the insurance coverage so obtained might significantly exceed the post of insurance that
Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts disbursed by Lender tinder this Section 5 shall become additional
debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from
the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with suet] interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower
requesting payment.
All insurance policies required by Lender und renewals of such policies shall be subject to lender's right
to disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgagee
and/or as an additional loss payee. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewal certificates. It
Lender requires, Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiurres and renewal notices. If
Borrower obtains any form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to, or
destruction of, the Property, such policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and shall name Lender as
mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee.
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may
make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Bcirrower otherwise agree in
writing, any insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall be
applied to restoration or repair of the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and
Lender's security is not lessened. During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold
such insurance proceeds until Lender has had en opportunity to inspect such Property to erasure the work haN
been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender
may disburse proceeds for the repairs anti restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments
as the work is completed. Unless' an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be
paid on such insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on
such proceeds, Fees for public adjusters, or other third parties, retained by Borrower shall not be paid out of
the insurance proceeds and shall be the uoIe obligation of Borrower. If the restoration or repair is not
economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance proceeds shall be applied to the
sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to Borrower.
Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2,
If Borrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available insurance claim
and related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the insurance
cannier has offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate and settle the claim, The 30-day period will
begin when the notice is given. In either event, or if Lender acquires the Property under Section 22 or
otherwise, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any insurance preceede in ad amount
not to exceed the amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, and (b) any other of Borrower's
rights (other than the right to any refund of unearned premiums paid by Borrower) under ail insurance policies
covering the Property, Insofar as such rights are applicable to the coverage of the Property. Lender may use
the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the Property or to pay amounts unpaid under the Note pr thisSecurity Instrument, whether or not tben due.
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal residence
within 60 days after the execution of thin Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as
Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender otherwise
agrees in writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withhold, or unless extenuating circumstances exist
which are beyond Borrower's control.
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7. Preservation, Maintenance and protection of the Property; Iiispeetiotts. Borrower shell not
destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property.
Whether or not Borrower is residing in the Property, Borrower shall maintain the Property in order to prevent
the Property from deteriorating or decreasing In value clue to its condition. Unless it is determined pursuant to
Section 5 that repair or restoration is act economically feasible, Borrower shall prerriptly repair the Property if
damaged to avoid farther deterioration or damage, If insurance or condemnation proceeds are paid in
connection with damage to, or the taking of, the Property, Borrower shall be responsible for repairing or
restoring the Property only if Lender has released procered.s for such purposes, Lender may disburse proceeds
for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is
completed. If the insurance or condemnation proceeds are not sufficient to repair or restore the Property,
Borrower is not relieved of Borrower's obligation for the completion of such repair or restoration.
Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has
reasonable cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shall give
Borrower notice at the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause.
8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application process,
Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the dime don of Borrower or with- Borrower's knowledge or
consent gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender (or failed to
provide Lender with material information) in connection with the Loan. Material representations include, but
are not limited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property as Borrower's principal
residence.
9. Protection of Lender's Interest In the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument. If (a)
Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, (b) there is a
legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property and/or rights under this
Security Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture, for•
enforcement of a lien which may attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or
regulations), or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is
reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument,
including protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property.
Lender's actions can include, but are not limited to; (a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority
over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing in court; and (c) paying reasonable attorneys' fees to protect its
interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument, including its secured position in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not limited to, entering the Property to make
repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors and windows, drain water from pipes, eliminate building or
other coda violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities turned on or off, Although Lender may take
action under this Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not under any duty or obligation to do so. It
is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all actions authorized under this Section 9,
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 'shall become additional debt of Borrower secured
by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the data of disbursement
and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment.
If this Security Instrument is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease,
If Borrower acquires fee tide to the Property, the leasehold and the fee title shalt not merge unless Lender
agrees to the merger in writing.
10. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan,
Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the Mortgage Insurance In effect. If, for any reason, the
Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be available from the mortgage insurer that
previously provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments
toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage
substantially equivalent to the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the
cost to Borrower of the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer selected
by Lender. If substantially equivalent Mortgage Insurance coverage is not available. Borrower shall continue
to pay to Lender the amount of the separately designated payments that were due when the insurance coverage
ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept, use and retain these payments as a non-refundable loss reserve in
lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such loss reserve shall be non-refundable, notwithstanding the fact that the Loan
is ultimately paid in full, and sender shall net be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such
loss reserve, Lender can no longer require loss reserve payments if Mortgage Insurance coverage (in" the
amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided by an insurer selected by Lender again becomes
available, is obtained, and Lender requires separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage
Insurance, If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan and Borrower was
required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower
shall pay the premiums required to maintain Mortgage Insurance in effect, or to provide a non-refundable.loss
reserve, until Lender's requirement for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement
between Borrower and Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable
Law. Nothing in this Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Note.

-6A(1JT) (0005)

A112

cH1r {00105)
-.

Naito

of 11

eOrt11 3045 1101

00824

Mortgage Insurance reimburses Lender (or any entity that pure aces
ate or certain oases it may
incur if Borrower does not repay the Loan as agreed. Borrower is not a party to the Mortgage Insurance,
Mortgage insurers evaluate their total risde on all such insurance in force, from time to time, and may enter
into agreements with other parties that share or modify their risk, or reduce losses, Those agreements are on
terms and conditions that are satisfactory to the mortgage insurer and the other party (or parties) to these
agreements. These agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make paymentsusing any source of funds
that the mortgage insurer may have available (which may include funds obtained. from Mortgage Insurance
premiums),
As a result of these agreements, Lender, any purchaser of the Note, another insurer, any reinsurer, any
other entity, or any affiliate of any of the foregoing, may receive (directly or indirectly) amounts that derive
from (or might be characterized as) a portion of Borrower's payments for Mortgage Insurance, in exchange for
sharing or modifying the mortgage insurer's risk, or reducing losses, If such agreement provides that an
affiliate of Lender takes a share of the insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the premiums paid to the
insurer, the atrangement is often termed "captive reinsurance." Purthex:
(a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower bas agreed to pay for Mortgage
Insurance, or any other terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not increase the amount Borrower wilt
owe for Mortgage Insurance, and they will not entitle Borrower to any refund.
(b) Any such agreements will not affect the eights Borrower has - if any - with respect to the
Mortgage Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 or any other law. These rights may
include the right to receive certain disclosures, to request and obtain cancellation of the Mortgage
Insurance, to have the Mortgage Insurance terminated automatically, and/or to receive a refund of any
Mortgage Insurance premiums that were unearned at the time of such cancellation or termination.
11; Assigninent of Miscellaneous Proceeds; Forfeiture. All Ivlitscellaneyes Proceeds are hereby
assigned to and shall be paid to Lender.
If the Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of the
Prpperty, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. During such
repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceed until Lender has
had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction,
provided that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may pay for the repairs and restoration in
a single disbursement or in a series of progresa payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is
made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such Miseellatteous Proceeds, Lender shall
not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such Miscellaneous Proceeds. If the restoration or
repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall
be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any,
paid to Borrower. Such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2.
In the event of a total taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property, the Miscellaneous Proceeds
shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if
any, paid to Borrower.
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value
of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss In value is equal to or greater time
the amount of the sums.secured by this Security Instrument immediately before the partial taking, destruction,
or loss in value, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the sums secured by this Security
Instrument shall be reduced by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds multiplied by the following fraction:
(a) the total• amount of the sums secured immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value
divided by (b) the fair market value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss
iievalue. Any balance shall be paid to Borrower.
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value
of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is less than the amount of
the sums secured immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless Borrower and
Lender otherwise agree in writing, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this
Security Instrument whether or not the sums are then due.
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that-,the Opposing
Party (as defined in the next sentence) offers to make an award to settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to
respond to Lender within 30 clays after the date the notice is given, Lender is authorized to collect and apply
the Miscellaneous Proceeds either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured by this
Security Instrument, whether or not then due, "Opposing Party" 111C011S the third party that owes Borrower
Miscellaneous Proceeds or the party against whom Borrower has a right of notion in regard to Miscellaneous
Proceeds,
Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is begun that, in
Lender's judgment, could result in forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of Lender's interest
in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument. Borrower can cure such a default and, if acceleration
hail occurred, reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing the action or proceeding •to be dismissed with a
ruling that, in Lender's judgment, precludes forfeiture of-the Property or other material impairment of Lender's
interest in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument, The proceeds of any award or claim for
damages that are attributable to the impairment of Lender's interest in the Property are hereby assigned and
shall be paid to Lender.
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Ail Miscellaneous Proceeds that are not applied to restoration or repair of the Property shall be applied in
the order provided for in Section 2.
12. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for
payment or modification of amortization ef the sums secured by this Security Instillment granted by Lender to
Borrower or any Successor in Interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower or any
Successors in Interest of Borrower, Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against any
Successor in Interest of Borrower or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of
the gums secured by this Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower or any
Successors in Interest of Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy including,
without limitation, Lender's acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or Successors in Interest of
Borrower or in amounts less than the amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any
right or remedy.
13. Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers; Successors and Assigns Bound. Borrower covenants and
agrees that Borrower's obligations and liability shall be joint and several. However, any Borrower who
co-signs this Security Instrument but does not execute the Note (a "co-signer"): (a) is co-signing this Security
Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer's interest in the Property under the terms of this.
Security Instrument; (b) is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument; and
(c) agrees that Lender and any other Borrower can agree to extend, modify, forbear or make any
accommodations with regard to the terms of this Security Instrument or the Note without the co-signefe
consent,
Subject to the provisions of Section 18, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes Borrower's
obligations under this Security Instrument in writing, and Is approved by Lender, shall obtain all of Borrower's
rights and benefits under this Security Instrument. Borrower shall not be released from Borrower's obligations
and liability under this Security Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in writing. The covenants and
agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind (except as provided in Section 20) and benefit the successors
and assigns of Lender.
14. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connection with
Borroweee default, for the purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this
Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees. In
regard to any other fees, the absence of express authority in this Security Insteurnent to chargo a specific fee to
Borrower shall not be construed as a prohibition on the charging of such fee. Lender may not charge fees that
are expressly prohibited by this Security Instrument or by Applicable Law.
If the Loan is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, and that law is' fintilly interpreted so
that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the Loan exceed the
permitted limits, then: (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge
to the permitted limit; and (b) nny sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will
be refunded to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal owed, under the
Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower. If a refund reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as
a partial prepayment without any prepayment charge (whether or not a prepayment charge is provided for
under the Note). Borrower's acceptance of any such refund made by direct payment to Borrower will
constitute a waiver of any right of action Borrower might have arising out of such overcharge.
IS. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with this Security Instrument must
be in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to have
been given to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Borrower's notice
address If sent by other means. Notice to any one Borrower shall constitute notice to all Borrowers unless
Applicable Law expressly requires otherwise. The notice address shall be the Property Address unless
Borrower has designated a substitute .notice address' by notice to Lender. Borrower shall promptly notify
Lender of Borrowers change of address, If Lender specifies a procedure for reporting Borrower's chAalge of
address, then Borrower shall only report a change of address through that specified procedure. There may be
only one designated notice address under this Security Instrument at any one time. Any notice to Lender shall
be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to Lender's address stated herein unless Lender has
designated another address by notice te Borrower. Any notice in connection with this Security Instrument
shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually received by Lender, If any notice required by
this Security Instrument is also required under Applicable Law, the Applicable Law requirement will satisfy
the corresponding requirement under this Security Instrument.
16. Governing Law; Sevcrability; Rules of Construction. This Security Instrument shall be‘governed
by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and obligations
contained in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of Applicable Law.
Applicable Law might explicitly or Implicitly allow the parties to agree by contract or it might be silent, but
.such silence shall not be construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract, In the event that any
provision or clause of this Security Instrument or the Note conflicts with Applicable Law, such conflict shall
not affect other provisions of this Security Instrument or the Note which can be given effect without the
conflicting provision.
As used in this Security Instrument: (a) words of the masculine gender shall mean and include
corresponding neuter words or words of the feminine gender; (b) words in the singular shall mean arid include
the plural and vice versa; and (o) the word "may" gives sole discretion without any obligation to -take any
action.
4=:1 9 -0A(UT) (0005)
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17. Burrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given tine copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument.
1S. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower*. As used in this Section 18.,
"Interest in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to,
those beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow
agreement, the intent of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser.
If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (pr if Borrower is not
a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written
consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument.
However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law.
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall
provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15
within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these
sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security
Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower.
19, Borrower's Right to Reintinsto After Acceleration. If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower
shall have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time prior to the
earliest of: (a) five days before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of salts contained in this' Security
Instrument; (b) such other period as. Applicable Law might specify for the termination of Bornewer's.right to
reinstate; or (c) entry of a judgment enforcing this Security Instrument. Those conditions are that Borrower;
(a) pays Lender all sums which then would be duo under this Security Instrument and the Note as if no
acceleration had occurred; (b) mires any default of any other covenants or agreements; (c) pays all expenses
incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees,
property inspection and valuation fees, and other fees incurred for the purpose of protecting Lender's interest
in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument; and (d) takes such action as Lender may reasonably
require to assure that Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument, and
Borrower's obligation to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument, shall continue unchanged. Lender
may require that Borrower pay such reinstatement sums and expenses in one or more of the fallowing forms,
as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's cheek or cashier's
check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency,
instrumentality or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer. Upon reinstatement by Borrower, this Security
Instrument and obligations secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred.
However, this right to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration under Section /S.
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loon Servicer; Notice of Grievtuace. The Note or a partial interest in the
Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower.
A sale might result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects Periodic Payments
due under the Note and this Security Instrument and performs other mortgage loan servicing obligations under
the Note, this Security Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be one or more changes of the Loan
Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note. If there 15 a change of the Loan Servicer, Borrower will be given
written notice of the change which will state the name and address of the new Loan Servicer, the address to
which payments should be made and any other information RESPA requires in connection with a notice of
transfer of servicing. If the Note is sold and thereafter the Loan is serviced by a Loan Servicer other than the
purchaser of the Note, the mortgage loan servicing obligations to Borrower will remain with the Loan Servicer
Qr be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are not assumed by the Note purchaser unless otherwise
provided by the Note purchaser.
Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, join, or be joined to any judicial action (as either an
individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this Security
Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of,
this Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such notice given in
compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of welt alleged breach and afforded die other party hereto a
reasonable period after the giving of such notice to take corrective action. If Applicable•Law provides a time
period which must elapse before certain action can be taken, that time period will be deemed to ba reasonable
for purposes of this paragraph. The notice of acceleration and opportunity to cure given to Borrower pursuant
to Section 22 and the notice of acceleration given to Borrower pursuant to Section 15 shall be deemed to
satisfy the notice and opportunity to take corrective action provisions of this Section 20.
21. Hazardous Substances. As used in this section 21: (a) "Hazardous Substances" are those substances
defined as toxic or hazardous substances, pollutants, or wastes by Environmental Law and the following
substances: gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides and herbicides,
volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, .and radioactive materials; (b)
"Environmental Law" means federal laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate
to health, safety or environmental protection; (c) "Environmental Cleanup" includes any response action,
remedial action, or removal action, as defined in Environmental Law; and (d) sit "Environmental Condition"
means a condition that can cause, contribute to, or otherwise trigger an Environmental Cleanup.
Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any Hazardous
Substances, or threaten to release any Hazardous Substances, on or in the Property. Borrower shall not do, nor
allow anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property (a) that is in violation of any Environmental Law, (b)
which creates an Environmental Condition, or (c) which, due to the presence, use, or release of a Hazardous
Cla
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Substance, creates a condition that adversely affects the value of the Property, The preceding two sentences
shall not apply to the presence, use, or storage on the Property
small quantities of Hazardous Substances
that are generally recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to maintenance of the Property
(including, but not limited to, hazardous substances in consumer products).
Borrower shall promptly give Lender written notice of (a) any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit or
other action by any governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any
Hazardous Substance or Environmental Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge; (le) upy Environmental
Condition, including but not limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat elf release of any
Hazardous Substance, and (c) any condition caused by the.presence, use or release of a Hazardous Substance
which adversely affects the value of the Property. If Borrower learns, or is notified. by any governmental or
regulatory authority, or any private party, that any removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance
affectieg the Property is necessary, Borrower shall promptly take all necessary remedial actions in accordance
with Environmental Law. Nothing herein shall create any obligation on Leuder for an Environmental Cleanup.

of

NON-UNIFORIVI COVENAN'I'S. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following
Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not prior to
acceleration under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). Tito -notice shall speeiry: (a)
the default; (b) the action required to cure the defaults (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the
notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that ftdlure to cure the default
on or before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration or the sums secured by this
Security Instrument and sale of the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the right to
reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default
or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the default is not cured on or before the
date specified in the notice, Lender at its option may require hmuediutc payment in full or all sums
secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and. may invoke the power of sale and any
other remedies permitted by Applicable Law. Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in
pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, including, but nut limited to, reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs of title evidence.
If the power of sale is invoked, Trustee shall execute a written notice of the occurrence cif on event
of default and tar the election to cause the Property to be sold and shall record such notice in each county
in which any part of the Property is located. Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of such notice in the
manner prescribed by Applicable Law to Borrower and to the other persons prescribed by Applicable
Law. In the event Borrower does not cure the default within the period then prescribed by Applicable
Law, Trustee shall give public notice of the sale to the persons and in the manner prescribed by
Applicable Law. After the time required by Applicable Law, Trustee, without demand on Borrower,
sham sell the Property at public auction to the highest bidder at the time and place and under the terms
designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order Trustee determines (but eubject
to any statutory right of Borrower to direct the order in which the Property, if consisting of several
known lots or parcels, shall be sold). Trustee may In accordance with Applicable Law, postpone sale pf
all or any parcel of the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any previously
scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale.
Trustee shell deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Properly without any covenant
or warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shah be prbinli facie evidence of the
truth of the staterrlenils made therein. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order:
(a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable Trustee's and attorneys* fees; (b)
to all sums secured by this Security Instrument; and. (c) any excess to the person or persons legally
entitled to it or to the county clerk of the county in which the stile took place.
23. Reconveyanee. Upon payment of all Rums secured by this Security In,steurnent, Lender shall request
Trustee to reconvey the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt
secured by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty to the
person or persons legally entitled to k. Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs. Lender may
charge such person or persons a fee for reconveying the Property, but only if the fee is paid to a third patty
(such as the ',Trustee) foe services rendered and the charging of the fee is permitted under Applicable Law,
24. Substitute Trustee- Lender, at its option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a
successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder, Without conveyance of tho Property, tiro successor
trustee shall succeed to all the title, power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law.
25. Request [or Notices. Borrower requests that copies of the notices of -default and sale be sent to
Borrower's address which is the Property Address.
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BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this

Security Instrument and in any Rider executed by Borrower and recorded with it.

1?ii.UT.JA A. MITCHELL

/ 7 2 .th

(Seal)
-Borrower

(Seal)
-Borrower

(Seal)
-Borrower

(Seal)
-Borrower

-s7t 14-

STATE OF UTAH,
The foregoing instrument
--P3 -d+G
by

subscribed
_Thq/dtwas

County as:

and sworn, to and acknowledged before me this

4-

My Commission Eaphies: 51f3iel

Notary Public
Rastdtng at:
s

'

e_c

e4.

MARK G JARVIS

, Y PUBLIC ' **TATE of UTAH
eissimossurre 100
SALT LAKE C3TY, UT 04i07

COMM. EXP. 05/16/200B

VON1.1101.4.
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Prepared by: MARYANN MASUISUL

InterestOnlys" ADJUSTABLE RATE NOTE
(One-Year LIBOR Index (As Published in The Wall Street Journal) - Rate Caps)

THIS NOTE CONTAINS PROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR A CHANGE IN MY FIXED INTEREST RATE
TO AN ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE AND FOR CHANGES IN MY MONTHLY PAYMENT. THIS
NOTE LIMITS THE AMOUNT MY ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE CAN CHANGE AT ANY ONE
TIME AND THE MAXIMUM RATE I MUST PAY.

MAY 23,

2006

HALT LAKE
LCity]

(Data)
3

301.1T1-1

STYWOOD LANE,

SANDY,

UTA.1-1
[StatE3
UT

64092-4850

EProporty AddroA

1, BORROWER'S PROMISE TO PAY
In return for a loan that I have received, I promise to pay U.S. $ 1,000,000.00
plus interest, to the order of Lender. Lender is
AMERICA.' S

WHOLESALE

(this amount is called "Principal"),

LENDER

I will make all payments under this Note in the form of cash; check or money order.
I uederstand that Lender may transfer this Note. Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to
receive payments under this Note is called tee "Note Holder...
2. INTEREST
Interest will be charged on unpaid principal until the full amount of Principal has been paid. I will pay interest at a yearly
6 500
rate of
%. The interest rate I will pay may change in accordance with Section 4 of this Note.
The interest rate required by this Section 2 and Section 4 of this Note is the rate I will pay both before and after any default
described in Section 7(B) of this Note,
•
3. PAYMENTS
(A) Time and Place of Payments
I will make a payment on the first,
day of every month, beginning on
2006
JULY 01,
Before the First Principal and Interest Payment Due Date as described in Section 4 of this Note, my payment will consist only of
the interest due on the unpaid principal balance of this Note. Thereafter, I will pay principal and interest by making a payment
every month as provided below.
will make my monthly payments of principal and interest beginning on the First Principal and Interest Payment Due Date
as described in Section 4 of this Note. I will make these payments every month until I have paid all of the principal and interest
and any other charges described below that I may owe under this Note. Each monthly payment wilt be applied as of its
scheduled doe date, and if the payment includes both principal and interest, it will be applied to interest before Principal. If, on
, I still owe amounts under this Note, I will pay those amounts in full on that date, which is called
JUNE 01, 20.36
the "Maturity Date."
I will make my rnOttertly payments at
P.O. Box 20219,
Van Nuys, CA 9/4ie —0219
or at a different place if required by the Note Holder.
01) Amount of My Initial Monthly Payments
My monthly payment will be in the amount of U.S. $ 5, 4 1 6 . 67
before the Pixst Principal and Interest
Payment /aye Date, and thereafter will be in an amount sufficient to repay the principal and interest at the rate determined as
described in Section 4 of this Note in substantially equal Installments by the Maturity Date. The Note Holder will Batley me
prior to the date of change in monthly payment,
(C) Monthly Payment Changes
Changes in my monthly payment will reflect changes in the unpaid principal of my loan and in the interest rate that I must
pay. The Note Holder will determine my new interest rate and the changed amount of my monthly payment in accordance with
Section 4 or 5 of this Note.
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4. ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE A.ND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES
(A) Change Dates
The initial Bxed interest rate I will pay will ohange to an adjustable interest rate on the girst
day of
JUNE, 2011
, and the adjustable interest rate I will pay may change on that day every 12th month thereafter. The
date on which my initial fixed interest rate changes to an adjustable Interest rate, and each date on which my adjustable interest
rate could change, is called a "Change Date."
(B) The Index
Beginning with the fiat Change Date., my adjustable interest rate will be based on an Index. The "Index" is the average of
interbank offered rates for one-year U.S. dollar-denominated deposits in the London market (LIBOR), as published in The Wall
Street .1024773Ul, The most recent Index figure available as of the date 45 days before each Change Date is called the "Current
lodex."
If the Index is no longer available, the Note Holder will choose a new index that is based upon comparable information.
The Note Holder will give me notice of this choice.
(C) Calculation of Changes
Before each, Change Date, the Note Holder will calculate my new interest rate by adding
percentage points (
woe & oNe.—QtekteTER
2.250 %) to the Current Index. The Note Holder will then
round the result of this addition to the nearest one
of one percentage poiet (0.125%). Subject to the limits stated in
Section 4(D) below, this rounded amount will be my new interest rate until the next Change Date,
The Note Holder will then► determine the amount of the. monthly payment that would be sufficient to repay the unpaid
principal that I am expected to owe at the Change Date in full on the Maturity Date at my new interest rate in substantially equal
payments. The result of this calculation will be the new amount of my monthly payment.
CD) Limits on Interest Rate Changes
The interest rate I am required to pay at the first Change Date will not be greater than
11.500 % or less than
2.2 50 to, Thereafter, my adjustable interest rate will never be increased or decreased on any single Change Date by more
than two percentage points from the rate of interest I have been paying for the preceding 12 months. My interest rate will never
be greater thee
11.500 %.
(E) Effective Date of Changes
My new interest rate will become effective on each Change Date. I will pay the amount of my new monthly payment
beginning on the first monthly payment date after the Change Date until the amount of any monthly payment changes again.
(F) Notice of Changes
Before the effective date of any change in my interest Kate and/or monthly payment., the Note Holder will deliver or mail to
me a notice of such change, The notice will include Information required by law to be given to the and also the title and
telephone number of a person who will answer any queetioe I may have regarding the notice.
(G) Date of First Principal and Interest Payment
The date of my first payment consisting of both principal and interest on this Note (the "Ara Principal and Interest
Payment Due Date") shall be the first monthly payment date after the first Change Date.
5. BORROWER'S RIGHT TO PREPAY
I have the right to make payments of Principal at any time before they are due. A payment of Principal only is known as a
"PrePaYenent," When I make a Prepayment; I will tell the Note Holder in writing that I am doing so. I may not designate a
payment as a Prepayment if I have not made all the monthly payments due under this Note.
I may make a full Prepayment or partial Prepayments without paying any Prepayment charge. The Note Holder will use
my Prepayments to reduce the amount of Principal that I owe under this Note. However, the Note Holder may apply my
Prepayment to the accrued and unpaid interest on the Prepayment amount before applying my Prepayment to reduce the
Principal amount of the Note. If I make a partial Prepayment, there will be no changes in the due date of my monthly payments
unless the Note Holder agrees in writing to those changes. If the partial Prepayment is made during the period when my monthly
payments consist only of interest, the amount of the monthly payment will decrease for the remainder of the term when my
payments consist of only interest. If the partial Prepayment is made during the period when ray payments consist of principal
and Interest, my partial Prepayment may reduce the amount of rey monthly payments after the first Change Dale following my
partial Prepayment. However, any reduction due to my partial Prepayment may be offset by an interest race increase.
6. LOAN CHARGES
If a law, which applies to this loan and which sets maximum loan charges, is finally interpreted so that the interest or other
loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with this loan exceed the permitted limits, then: (a) any such loan charge
shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the pen:tatted limit; and (b) any sums already reflected from
me that exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to me. The Note Holder may choose to make this refund by reducing the
Principal I owe under this Note or by making a direct payment to me. If a refund reduces Principal, the reduction will be treated
as a partial Prepayment.
7. BORROWER'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED
(A) Late Charges for Overdue Payments
If the Note Holder has not received the full amount of any monthly payment by the end of F IFrEEN
calendar
days after the date it is due, I will pay a late charge to the Note Holder. The amount of the charge will be
5.000 % of only
overdue payment of interest, during the period when my payment is interest only, and of principal and interest. thereafter. I will
pay this late charge promptly but only once on each late payment.
Os) Default
If I do not pay the fall amount of each monthly payment on the date it is due, I will be in default.
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(C) Notice of Default
If I am In default, the Note Holder may send me a written notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue amount by a
certain date, the Note Holder may require urn to pay immediately the rill amount of Principal that has not been paid and all the
interest that I owe on that amount. That date must be at least 30 days after the date on which the notice is mailed to me or
delivered by other messes.
CD) No Waiver By Note Holder
Even if, at a time when I sin In default, the Note Holder does not require Me to pay immediately in full as described above,
the Note Holder will still have the right to do so if I am in default at a later time.
(H) Payment of Note Holder's Costs and Ferpeeses
If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediately in full as described above, the Note Holder will have the right to be
paid back by me for all of its costs and expenses in enforcing this Note to the extent not prohibited by applicable law. Those
expenses include, for example, reasonable attorneys' fees.
8. GIVING OF NOTICES
Unless applicable law requires a different method, any notice that must be given to tae under this Note will be given by
delivering is or by mailing it by first class mail to me at the Property Address above or at a different address if I give the Note
Holder a notice of my different address.
Unless the Note Holder requires a different method, any notice that must be given to the Note Holder under this Note will
be given by mailing it by ant clans mail to the Note Holder at the address stated in Section 3(A) above or at a different address
if I am given a notice of that different address.
9. OBLIGATIONS Ok' MRSONS UNDER THIS NOTE
If more than one person signs this Note, each person is fully and personally obligated to keep all of the promises made in
this Note, including the promise to pay the full amount owed. Any person who is a guarantor. sure*, or endorser of this Note is
also obligated to do these things. Any person who takes over these obligations, including the obligations of a guteetreor, surety
or endorser of this Note, is also obligated to keep all of the promises made in this Note. Tice Note Holder may enforce its rights
under this Note against each person individually or against all of us together. 'This means that any one of us may be required to
pay all of the amounts owed under this Note.
10. WAIVERS
I and any other person who has obligations under this Note waive the rights of Presentment anti Notice of Dishonor.
"Presentment's means the right to require the Note Holder to demand payment of amounts due. "Notice of Dishonor" means the
right to require the Note Holder to give notice to other persons that amounts due have not been paid.
11. UNINORIVI SECURED NOTE
This Note is a uniform instrument with limited variations in some Jurisdictions. /11 addition to the protections given to the
Note Holder under this Note, a Moe tgage, Deed of Trust, or Security Deed (the "Security Instrument"), dated the same date as
this Note, protects the Note Holder et= possible losses that might result if I do not keep the promises that I make in this Note.
That Security Instrument describes how and under what conditions I may be required to make immediate payment in full of all
amounts I owe under this Note. Sonic of those conditioos read as follows:
(A) Until say initial fixed interest rate changes to an adjustable interest rate under the terms stated in Section 4 above,
Uniform Covenant 18 of the Security Instrument shall mad as follows:
Transfer of the 13Koperty or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. Ae used in this Section 18, "interest in the
Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, those beneficial
interests transferred in a bond for dead, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent of
which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser.
If all or any part of the Property or any interest in it is sold or transferred (or if Borrower is not a natural person
and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transfereed) without Lender-se prior written consent, Lender may, at its
option, require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by Okla Security Instrument. However, this option shall
not be exercised by Lender if exercise la's prohibited by federal law.
If Lender exercises this option. Lender shall give Borrower notice of. acceleration. The notice shall provide a
period of not less than 30 days from the dale the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within which Borrower
must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay those sums prior to the expiration of
this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand
on Borrower.
(B) When my initial fixed interest rate changes to an adjustable interest rate under the terms stated in Section 4 above,
Uniform Covenant 18 of the Security Instrtunent described in Section 11(A) above shall then cease to be in effect, and Uniform
Covenant 18 of the Security Instrument shall instead read as follows:
Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18, "Interest in the
Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, those beneficial
ituerests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent of
which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser.
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If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if Borrower is not a
natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold Of transferred) without Lender's prior wrluen consent.
Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sutns secured by this Security Instrument. However, this option
shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise Is prohibited by Applicable Law. Lender also shall not exorcise this
option it (a) Borrower causes to be submitted to Lender information required by Lender to evaluate the intended
transferee as if a new loan were being made to the transferee; and (b) Lender' reasonably determines that Lender's
security will not be impaired by the loan assumption and that the risk of a breach of any covenant or agreement in
this Security instrument is acceptable to Lender.
in the extent permitted by Applicable Law, Lender may charge a reasonable fee as a condition to Lender's
consent to the loan assumption. Leader may also require the transferee to 41g-ii an assumption agreement that Is
acceptable to Lender and that obligates the transferee to keep all the promises and agreements made in the Note and
in this Security instreinent. Borrower will continue to be obligated under the Note and this Security Instrument
unless Lender releases Borrower in writing.
If Lender exercises the option to require immediate payment in full, Lender shall give Borrower notice of
acceleration. The notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 clus from the date the notice is given in accordance
with Section 15 within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to
pay these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security
Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower.

WITNESS THE

HAND(S) AND SEAL(S) OF THE LTNI)MISIGNEED.

MITCHELL

(Seal)
.Borrower

(Seal)
-13orrowar

(Seal)
-Borrower

(Seal)
-Borrower

(Sign Original Only!
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Of . s• N''

4 04/NO

•

CONV
MULTISTATE Interest Only ADJUSTABLE RATE NOTE - ONE YEAR LIBOR INDEX
Page 4 of 4
20805-XX (MOS)

A122

00834

[Space Above This Line For Recording Dan)

FIXED/ADUSTAI3LE RATE RIDER
(LIBOR One-Year Index (As Published In The Wall Street Journal) - Rate Caps)
After Recording Return To:
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.
MS SV—79 DOCUMENT PROCESSING
P.O.Box 10423

Van tquya, CA 91410-0423

Prepared By;
MARYANN MASU/SUI
AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER

6955 UNION PARK CENTER #400
ZIXDVALE

UT 84047

THIS FIXED/ADZUSTABLE RATE RIDER Is made this aVE.NTY—VIXRD
day of
2 006
, and is incorporated into and shall be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage,
Deed of Trust, or Security Deed (the "Security Instrument") of the same date given by the undersigned
("Borrower") to secure Borrower's Axed/Adjustable Rate Note (the "Note") to

N.Y,
2

AMERICAsS WHOLESALE LENDER

("Lender") of the same date and covering the property described in the Security Instrument and located at;
3

SOUTH MISTYWOOD LANE, SANDY, UT 04092-4850
iProPerly Address]

CONY
• MULTISTATE FIXEVAWUSTABLE RATE RIDER - WSJ Qn;e-Year LIBOR- Single Family INTEREST ONLY
2L179:340t(04/02}(e)
Page 9 of 4

A123

00835

THE NOTE PROVIDES FOR A CHANGE IN BORROWER'S FIXED INTEREST RATE
TO AN ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE. THE NOTE LIMITS THE AMOUNT
BORROWER'S ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE CAN CHANGE AT ANY ONE TIME
AND THE MAXIMUM RATE BORROWER MUST PAY.
ADDITIONAL COVENANTS. In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the Security
Instrument, Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
A. ADJUSTABLE RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES
The Note provides for an initial fixed interest rate of
6.500 %. The Note also provides for a
change in the initial fixed rate to an adjustable interest rate, as follows:
4. ADJUSTABLE INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES
(A) Change Dates
The initial fixed interest rate I will pay will change to an adjustable interest rate on the
first
day of JUNE, 2011
, and the adjustable interest rate I will pay may change
on that day every 12th month thereafter. The date on which my initial fixed interest rate changes to an
adjustable interest rate, and each date on which my adjustable interest rate could change, is called a "Change
Date."
(B) The Index
Beginning with the first Change Date, my adjustable interest rate will be based on an Index. The "Index"
is the average of interbank offered rates for one year U.S. dollar-denominated deposits in the London market
("LIBOR"), as published in the The Wail'Street Journal.. The most recent Index figure available as of the date
45 days before each Change Date is called the "Current Index."
If the Index is no longer available, the Note Holder will choose a new index that is based upon
comparable information. The Note Holder will give me notice of this Choice,
(C) Calculation of Changes
Before each Change Date, the Note Holder will calculate my new interest rate by adding
TWO & ONE —QUARTER
percentage points (
2 .250 %) to the Current Index. The Note
Holder will then round the result of this addition to the nearest one-eighth of one percentage point (0.125%).
Subject to the limits stated in Section 4(D) below, this rounded amount will be my new interest rate until the
next Change Date,
The Note Holder will then determine the amount of the monthly payment that would be sufficient to
repay the unpaid principal that I am expected to owe at the Change Date in full on the Maturity Date at my
new interest rate in substantially equal payments. The result of this calculation will bo the now amount of my
monthly payment.
(D) Limits on Interest Rate Changes
The interest rate I am required to pay at the first Change Data will not be greater than 11.500 % or
2.250
To. Thereafter, my adjustable interest rate will never be increased or decreased on any
less than
single Change Date by more than two percentage points from the rate of interest I have been paying for the
preceding 12 months, My interest rate will never be greater than 1 a.. 5 0 0 %.
(E) Effective Date of Change
My new interest rate will become effective on each Change Date. I will pay the amount of my new
monthly payment beginning on the first monthly payment date after the Change Date until the amount of my
monthly payment changes again.
(F') Notice of Changes
The Note Holder will deliver or mail to me a notice of any changes in my initial fixed interest rate to an
adjustable interest rate and of any changes in my adjustable interest rate before the effective date of any
change. The notice will include the amount of my monthly payment, any information required by law to be
given to me and also the title and telephone number of a person who will answer any question I may have
regarding the notice.
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B. TRANSFER OF TILE PROPERTY OR A BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN BORROWER
1, Until Borrower's initial fixed interest rate changes to an adjustable interest rate under the terms stated
in Section A above, Uniform Covenant 18 of the Security Instrument shall read as follows:
Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18,
"Interest in the Property' means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not
limited to,, those beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, eentraet for deed, installment
sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent of whit* is the transfer of title by Borrower at a
future date to a purchaser.
If an or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if
Borrower is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without
Lender's prior written consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured
by this Security Instrument. However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise
is prohibited by Applicable Law.
If Lender exorcises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice
shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with
Section 15 within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If
Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any
remedies permitted by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower.
2, When Borrower's initial fixed interest rate changes to an adjustable interest rate under the
terms stated in Section A above, Uniform Covenant 18, of the Security Instrument described in
Section le1 above shall then cease to be in effect, and the previsions of Uniform Covenant 18 of the
Security Instrument shall be amended to read as follows:
Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18,
"Interest in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not
limited to, those beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment
sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a
future date to a purchaser.
if all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if
Borrower is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without
Lender's prior written consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured
by this Security Instrument. However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise
is prohibited by Applicable Law. Lender also shall not exercise this option if: (a) Borrower causes
to be submitted to Lender information required by Lender to evaluate the intended transferee as if a
new loan were being made to the transferee; and. (b) Lender reasonably determines that Lender's
security will not be impaired by the loan assumption and that the risk of a breach of any covenant or
agreement in this Security Instrument is acceptable to Lender.
To the extent permitted by Applicable Law, Lender may charge a reasonable fee as a
condition to Lender's coneent to the loan assumption. Lender also may require the trartsferee to sign
ao assumption agreement that is acceptable to Lender and that obligates the transferee to keep all
the promises and agreements made in the Note and in this Security Instrument, Borrower will
continue to be obligated under the Note and this Security Instrument unless Lender releases
Borrower in writing.
If Lender exercises the option to require immediate payment in full, Lender shall give
Borrower notice of acceleration. The-notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the
date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within which Borrower must pay all sums
secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the expiration of
this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security Instrument without further
notice or demand on Borrower.
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BY STONING BELOW, Borrower accepts and. agrcos to the terms and covenants contained in this
Pixed/Adjustable Rate Rider.

4)
ttit.a.
4..
PAULA A. MXTCHBLL

sh

r ?J

Le)

(Seal)
- Borrower

(Seal)
- Borrower

(Seal)
- Borrower

(Seal)
- Borrower
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'Gary W. Ott

RECORDING REQUESTED BY;
RECONTRU ST COMPANY, N.A,
2380 Perfoimatige Dr, TX2.984-0407
Richftrdam, TX 75082

Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT
LSI TITLE CO

eGASH, DEPUTY • EF 2 P.

WREN RECORDED MAIL DOCUMENT
TAX STATEMENT TO;
BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LF
400 COUNTRYWIDE WAY SV-35
SIM] VALLEY, CA 9300

SPACE ABOVE Tins LINE Mk RECORDER S

CORPORATION ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST/IVIORTGAGE
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY GRANTS, ASSIGNS AND TRANSFER TO:
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FICA THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE
CERTEFICATEHOLDERS CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYB$
ALL BENEFICIAL INTEREST UNDER THAT CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST DATED 05/23/2006, EXECUTED
BY: PAULA A MITCHELL, TRUSTOR: TO STEWART T. MATHESON, ATTORNEY AT IAW, AS TRUSTEE
AND RECORDED AS INSTRUMENT NO, 9733512 ON 05/241205,1N BOOK 9293, PAGE 7355 OF OFFICIAL
RECORDS IN THE COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
THE LAND AFFECTED BY THIS ASSIGNMENT IS LOCATED IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE STATE OF
UTAH AND IS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
LOT 804 E, AMENDED mrpatwooD PHASE 8B, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOF AS RECORDED
IN THE OFFICE OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER.
TOGETIIER WITH THE NOTE OR NOTES THEREIN DESCRIBED OR REFERRED TO, THE MONEY DUE
AND TO BECOME DUE THEREON WITH INTEREST, AND ALL RIGHTS ACCRUED OR TO ACCRUE
UNDER SAC) DEED OF TRUST/MORTGAGE,

Dated:

F 13

,20ib

By: MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC.
(.76,
BY: °amok Boom

Paso 1 of 2

Assistant aviary —

Fortri VrAisgoi (04,1,S)

BFI 8849 PG 8601
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STATE OF .... T
COUNTY OF _li

.. _ )
m p

.

6. 1 1

a vt! - . (..._ Or' SC-0 'Q.—. , personally apporoi
ownerasoomt_osiittlri_i__, known to me (or proved to tne on the oath of

On

2 (3 10

befor me

or

through IN CA, . ) to be the person whose Herne is wbscribed to the foregoing instrumenit and
aoknowlexiged to me that ..orca xecuted this sarne for the purposes and consideration therein vxprimcci,
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL

Pogo of 2

-----

r

Notary Pubiiq'l Signature

eedkriCONVE L gRISME

MY COMMISS(O EXPIllEt

Nioniary4 2011

•

Form firibsgn
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

MINUTES

:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL

Et al,

Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472 LM

:

Judge:

TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

November 6, 2017

______________________________________________________________________________________
Clerk:

kristit

No Parties Present
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): BRAD G DEHAAN
Defendant's Attorney(s): DOUGLAS R SHORT
Audio
Tape Number:

N42

Tape Count: 428-515

______________________________________________________________________________________

HEARING

This case comes before the Court at the date and time set for oral argument on the
pending Motion for Summary Judgment.
4:29 PM

Mr. Dehaan presents argument for the Motion for Summary Judgment.

4:45 PM

Mr. Short presents argument in opposition.

5:03 PM

Mr. Dehaan presents reply argument.

Based on the information presented, the Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment
and gives the basis for this ruling.

Mr. Dehaan to prepare an appropriate Order for

Summary Judgment to be submitted to the Court, with objections from Mr. Short noted for
the record.

A130
Printed: 08/28/18 08:59:41

00987
Page 1 of 1

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: November 27, 2017
/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
02:39:28 PM
District Court Judge

Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 8168)
Hillary R. McCormack (USB No. 11719)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES, PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 263-3400
litigationdept@lundbergfirm.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parcel No. 28-22-203-047
L&A Case No. 14.64383.2/JAT
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON fka
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYB5,

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 160902472

vs.

Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy

PAULA A. MITCHELL; PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION; AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants
This matter came before the court for hearing plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on November 6, 2017. Brad G. DeHaan appeared as counsel for plaintiff, and Douglas R. Short
appeared as counsel for defendant Paula A. Mitchell. Having carefully reviewed the record and
the pleadings on file herein, considering the arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing,

1
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it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

2.

Plaintiff met its burden of establishing the undisputed facts and showing that

judgment should enter as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3.

The court incorporates by this reference the Ruling and Order entered in this case

on January 17, 2017, regarding, among other things, plaintiff’s standing to bring this action.
4.

Based upon plaintiff having provided sufficient evidence pursuant to the findings

and decision in Mitchell I, as set forth in plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and the
Affidavit of Alvin Denmon, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any of the
following material facts:
a.

This action involves the real property with a purported address of 3 South

Mistywood Lane, Sandy, Salt Lake County, Utah 84092 (“Property”), more particularly
described as:
Lot 804 B, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE 8B, according to the plat
thereof as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and
all easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property.

Parcel No. 28-22-203-047-0000.

2
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b.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell acquired an ownership interest in the

Property by a Special Warranty Deed executed on May 23, 2006 and recorded on May 24, 2006
in the Salt Lake County Recorder’s Office as Entry No. 9733511.
c.

On May 23, 2006, defendant Paula A. Mitchell, as trustor, executed and

delivered a certain trust deed (the “Mitchell Trust Deed”) to Stewart T. Matheson, as trustee, for
the benefit of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for America’s
Wholesale Lender, it successors and assigns, to secure obligations under a certain promissory
note executed in conjunction therewith.
d.

On May 24, 2006, the Mitchell Trust Deed was recorded in the Salt Lake

County Recorder’s Office as Entry No. 9733512.
e.

On May 23, 2006, in conjunction with the execution of the Mitchell Trust

Deed, defendant Paula A. Mitchell executed a promissory note (“Note”), with a mortgage rider
(“Rider”), in the amount of $1,000,000.00.
f.

Plaintiff is the current beneficiary under the Mitchell Trust Deed by virtue

of an Assignment of Deed of Trust (“2010 Assignment”) recorded on August 17, 2010 in the Salt
Lake County Recorder’s Office as Entry No. 11012216.
g.

Plaintiff is the current holder of the Note and Rider.

3
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h.

Pursuant to the terms of the Mitchell Trust Deed, Note, and Rider, plaintiff

or plaintiff’s predecessors-in-interest, loaned, advanced and disbursed the sum of $1,000,000.00
to or on behalf of, and to the benefit of, defendant Paula A. Mitchell.
i.

The Note obligated defendant Paula A. Mitchell to make monthly

principal and interest payments to plaintiff or plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest, beginning July
1, 2006.
j.

The Note provides that the initial rate of interest agreed to be paid by

defendant Paula A. Mitchell is 6.500% per annum.
k.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell’s obligations under the Note, Rider, and

Mitchell Trust Deed were secured by the Property.
l.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell breached the terms and conditions of the

Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed by failing to make the required monthly payments when
due.
m.

Based upon defendant Paula A. Mitchell’s failure to pay the monthly

payments under the terms of the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed, defendant Paula A.
Mitchell is in default.
n.

Because defendant Paula A. Mitchell was in default and breached the

terms of the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed, plaintiff accelerated the entire unpaid balance
as immediately due and payable.
5.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell failed to properly controvert or provide a written
4
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response to the following material facts, as required by Rules 56(a)(4) and 56(a)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the following material facts are therefore deemed admitted:
a.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell failed to cure the default under the terms of

the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed.
b.

The last payment made by defendant Paula A. Mitchell under the terms of

the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed was on April 21, 2010.
c.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell has not made a payment under the terms of

the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed since April 21, 2010.
d.

Defendant has not paid any of the monthly payments due and owing under

the Mitchell Trust Deed, Note and Rider since May 1, 2010.
e.

The terms of the Note and Mitchell Trust Deed allow plaintiff to recover

its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with this matter.
f.

The terms of the Mitchell Trust Deed allow plaintiff to invoke the power

of foreclosure sale and any other remedies permitted by applicable law.
g.

As of May 31, 2017, the amount due and owing to plaintiff under the

Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed is $1,343,034.81, plus additional interest, attorney’s fees,
costs, taxes, and other fees which will continue to accrue after May 31, 2017.
6.

The Affidavit of Alvin Denmon used to support plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is made on personal knowledge, sets forth facts that are admissible in evidence, and
shows that Mr. Alvin Denmon is competent to testify on the matters stated therein.
5
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7.

Plaintiff complied with its obligations regarding its initial disclosures pursuant to

Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
8.

Based on the above, judgment should enter in favor of plaintiff and against

defendant Paula A. Mitchell for the amount of $1,343,034.81, plus additional interest, costs,
taxes, and other fees owing to plaintiff incurred after May 31, 2017.
9.

Plaintiff is entitled to judicially foreclose the Mitchell Trust Deed and sell the

Property to recover any unpaid obligations owed to plaintiff under the Mitchell Trust Deed and
Note.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to an Order of Foreclosure Sale ordering the Property

foreclosed and sold by the sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah according to the law and
practice of this Court to satisfy the judgment set forth above as due and owing to plaintiff.
11.

Plaintiff or any other party to this action may become a purchaser at any

foreclosure sale, and that following the sale, the sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, is
ordered to execute and deliver a certificate of sale as required by law; and that upon expiration
of the period of redemption as described by law, the Sheriff is ordered to execute and deliver a
Sheriff’s Deed to the purchaser of the Property; and that the purchaser of the Property be let into
possession of the Property upon production of the Sheriff’s Deed.
12.

Upon any judicially-ordered sale of the Property in this court action and

expiration of the period of redemption, surplus proceeds, if any, beyond plaintiff's lien, costs, and
costs of sale, shall be deposited and interplead in a new court action pursuant to Utah Code
6
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§ 78B-6-904 or § 59-1-29, with notice to all parties in this action, so that all those who claim any
interest in the Property may assert their claims to such excess proceeds and their respective
priorities in such new proceeding.
13.

Upon the expiration of the period of redemption applicable to judicial foreclosure

sales, that the defendants and all persons claiming by, through, or under them, or any of them, be
forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, claim, interest and equity of redemption in and to
the Property and each and every part thereof, and that plaintiff have deficiency judgment against
defendant Paula A. Mitchell, if applicable, for the full amount of any sums which may remain
owing to plaintiff under the obligation evidenced by the Mitchell Trust Deed and Note after due
and proper application of the proceeds of the sale of the Property as hereinabove stated.
14.

The clerk of the court is hereby ordered, authorized and directed to issue an

Order of Foreclosure Sale effectuating this Final Order and Judgment.
15.

All other parties to the case are in default and entry of a judgment of priority in

favor of Plaintiff is therefore appropriate.
16.

Pursuant to the terms of the parties’ written agreements, Plaintiff is awarded its

attorney fees and costs incurred in this action in an amount to be determined upon the filing of
plaintiff’s Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs.
17.

The court has considered and overrules all objections to the form of this order and

the accompanying judgment, whether those objections are specifically referred to herein or not.
Many of those objections have been the subject of prior written and oral rulings by this court and
7
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by the Utah Court of Appeals, all of which are incorporated herein.

**END OF DOCUMENT**
**Electronically signed by the Judge in the top-right corner of the first page.**
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rq 7, D'STRICT COURT
Judicial District

NOV 2 7 2017
c-1 Lake
Putt'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON fka THE

FINAL JUDGMENT

BANK OF NEW YORK, as trustee for THE
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWMBS SERIES 2006HYBS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 160902472
Judge Todd Shaughnessy

vs.

PAULA A. MITCHELL;PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rules 55, 56, 57, and 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, and for good
cause appearing, judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants as
follows:
1.

This action involves the real property with a purported street address of 3 South

Mistywood Lane, Sandy, Salt Lake County, Utah 84092 (the "Property"), more particularly
described as:
Lot 804 B, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE 8B, according to the plat
thereof as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the
property, and all easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or
hereafter a part of the property.

A139

01027

rk

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON fka THE BANK OF NEW YORK, as trustee for THE
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Parcel No. 28-22-203-047-0000.
2.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell acquired an ownership interest in the Property by a

Special Warranty Deed executed on May 23, 2006, and recorded on May 24, 2006, in the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 9733511.
3.

On May 23, 2006, Defendant Paula A. Mitchell, as trustor, executed and delivered a

certain trust deed (the "Mitchell Trust Deed") to Stewart T. Matheson, as trustee, for the benefit
of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for America's Wholesale Lender, its
successors and assigns, to secure obligations under a certain promissory note executed in
conjunction therewith.
4.

On May 24, 2006, the Mitchell Trust Deed was recorded in the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office as Entry No. 9733512.
5.

On May 23, 2006, in conjunction with the execution of the Mitchell Trust Deed,

defendant Paula Mitchell executed a promissory note ("Note"), with a mortgage rider ("Rider"), in
the amount of $1,000,000.00.
6.

Plaintiff is the current beneficiary of the Mitchell Trust Deed by virtue of an

Assignment of Trust Deed ("2010 Assignment") recorded on August 17, 2010, in the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 11012216.
7.

Plaintiff is the current holder of the Note and Rider.

8.

Defendant Paula Mitchell is in breach of the terms of the Note, Rider, and Mitchell

Trust Deed by, among other things, failing to pay amounts when due. By virtue of this, the Note,
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Rider, and Trust Deed are in default and Plaintiff has accelerated the entire unpaid balance as
immediately due and payable.
9.

As of May 31, 2017, the amount due and owing to Plaintiff under the Note, Rider,

and Trust Deed is $1,343,034.81, plus additional interest, attorneys' fees, costs, taxes, and other
fees which continue to accrue after May 31, 2017.
10.

Judgment is therefore entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Paula A.

Mitchell for the amount of $1,343,034.81, plus additional interest, costs, taxes, and other fees
owing to Plaintiff and incurred after May 31, 2017.
11.

Plaintiff is entitled to judicially foreclose the Mitchell Trust Deed and sell the

Property to recover any unpaid obligations owed to Plaintiff under the Mitchell Trust Deed and
Note.
12.

Plaintiff is entitled to an Order of Foreclosure Sale order the Property foreclosed

and sold by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, according to the law and practice of this
court to satisfy the judgment set forth above as due and owing.
13.

Plaintiff or any other party to this action may become a purchaser at any

foreclosure sale, and following the sale the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, is ordered to
execute and deliver a certificate of sale as required by law; and upon expiration of the period of
redemption as described by law, the Sheriff is ordered to execute and deliver a Sheriff's Deed to
the purchaser of the Property; and the purchaser of the Property shall be let into possession of the
Property upon production of the Sheriffs Deed.
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14.

Upon any judicially-ordered sale of the Property in this court action and expiration

of the period of redemption, surplus proceeds, if any, beyond Plaintiff's lien, costs, and costs of
sale, shall be deposited and interpled in a new court action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6904 or §59-1-29, with notice to all parties in this action, so that all those who claim any interest in
the Property may assert their claims to such excess proceeds and their respective priorities in such
new proceeding.
15.

Upon the expiration of the period of redemption applicable to judicial foreclosure

sales, the defendants and all persons claiming by, through, or under them, or any of them, be
forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, claim, interest and equity of redemption in and to
the Property and each and every part thereof, and that Plaintiff have deficiency judgment against
Defendant Paula Mitchell, if applicable, for the full amount of any sums that may remain owing to
Plaintiff under the obligation evidenced by the Mitchell Trust Deed and Note after due and proper
application of the proceeds of the sale of the Property as hereinabove stated.
16.

The Clerk of the Court is hereby authorized, ordered, and directed to issue an Order

of Foreclosure Sale effecting this Final Judgment.
17.

All other defendants in this matter have been served with process and are in

default of the claims asserted against them. Specifically, Plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that
the Mitchell Trust Deed is prior in time and right to claims by the Pepperwood Homeowner's
Association.
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THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON fka THE BANK OF NEW YORK, as trustee for THE
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYB5 vs PAULA A. MITCHELL;PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION
160902472
18.

Page 5 of 5

Pursuant to the terms of the parties' written agreements, and as allowed by Rule

73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff is awarded is reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs incurred in this matter in an amount to be determined upon timely filing of a motion and
supporting affidavit of attorneys' fees and costs.
All claims against all parties have been resolved and this is a final judgment.

DATED: November 27, 2017.
THIRD JUDICI

•

URT

; fir,►.
1..N
• y !.g, 7A

Judge Tod
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.

MANUAL EMAIL:

BRAD G DEHAAN brad.dehaan@lundbergfirm.com

MANUAL EMAIL:

CRAIG H HOWE chowe@joneswaldo.com

MANUAL EMAIL:

HILLARY R MCCORMACK hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com

MANUAL EMAIL:

BLAKE D MILLER bmiller@joneswaldo.com

MANUAL EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com

11/27/2017

/s/ KRISTI THORNLEY

Date:

Deputy Court Clerk

Printed:
11/27/17 15:24:02
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 12, 2017
/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
05:31:03 PM
District Court Judge

Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 8168)
Hillary McCormack (USB No. 11719)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
(801) 263-3400
(801) 263-6513 (fax)
LitigationDept@Lundbergfirm.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parcel No. 28-22-203-047
L&A Case No. 14.64383.2
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, fka
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYB5,

ORDER OF FORECLOSURE SALE

Case No. 160902472
Plaintiff,
Judge: Todd M. Shaughnessy
v.
PAULA A. MITCHELL; PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION; AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

TO THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
On the 27th day of November, the above named plaintiff obtained an Order Granting
Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake Department, of Salt Lake
County, Utah against the defendants, which Order was entered on the same day.
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01076
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The Order provides that the Property described in the Order be sold at a public auction.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded and required to proceed to give notice of
such sale and to sell the Property described in said Final Order and distribute the proceeds of said
sale as directed in said Final Order and to make and file your report of such sale with the Clerk of
the Court within 60 days of the date of your receipt hereof, and to do all things according to the
terms and requirements of said Final Order and the provisions of the statues of the State of Utah.
**END OF DOCUMENT**
** Electronically signed by the Judge in the top-right corner of the first page.**
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

RULING AND ORDER

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

January 18, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is the Combined Rule 59 and 52 Motions to Alter or Amend Final
Judgment (Motion to Alter or Amend), filed by Defendant Paula Mitchell (Mitchell). The
motion is fully briefed and has been submitted for decision. Mitchell requests oral
argument. Rule 7(h) does not contemplate oral argument on all motions; the present
motion is not dispositive. Oral argument is discretionary. And for the reasons
explained below, oral argument would not materially assist the court in deciding the
Motion to Alter or Amend.
1.

The majority of Mitchell's Motion to Alter or Amend consists of re-arguing issues

that have already been presented to and ruled on by the court, including on motions
other than the summary judgment motion that fully resolved the issues in the case. To
the extent Mitchell disagrees with the court's rulings, her remedy is to file an appeal
not to serially re-argue those issues with this court.
2.

The balance of the issues and arguments raised in the Motion to Alter or Amend,

other than item 3 below, are being raised for the first time. The court respectfully
declines to consider, after the entry of judgment in the case, issues and arguments
that could and should have been raised earlier.
3.

Finally, the final judgment entered in this case was not entered sua sponte or

otherwise improperly. As was discussed at the hearing, and as was reflected in the
proposed papers filed by BONY, the court's ruling on the summary judgment motion,
combined with earlier rulings in the case, fully resolved all claims of all parties.
The recent amendments to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58, and Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4, contemplate parties preparing, or courts if parties do not, a judgment
that unambiguosly conveys to all involved the conclusion of the litigation in the trial
court. The purpose is to ensure all parties understand the deadline for filing a notice
of appeal. That is all this court did by preparing and entering the Final Judgment in
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Case No: 160902472 Date:

Jan 18, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
this case; make clear when notices of appeal were due. And with respect to the issue of
attorneys' fees, those same amendments contemplate that the amount and reasonableness
of attorneys' fees will be determined in proceedings following entry of judgment.
No further order on the Motion to Alter or Amend is required.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

BRAD G DEHAAN brad.dehaan@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

CRAIG H HOWE chowe@joneswaldo.com

EMAIL:

HILLARY R MCCORMACK hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

BLAKE D MILLER bmiller@joneswaldo.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
01/18/2018

Date: ____________________

/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: January 18, 2018
/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
03:14:20 PM
District Court Judge

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

RULING AND ORDER

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

January 18, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is the Combined Rule 59 and 52 Motions to Alter or Amend Final
Judgment (Motion to Alter or Amend), filed by Defendant Paula Mitchell (Mitchell). The
motion is fully briefed and has been submitted for decision. Mitchell requests oral
argument. Rule 7(h) does not contemplate oral argument on all motions; the present
motion is not dispositive. Oral argument is discretionary. And for the reasons
explained below, oral argument would not materially assist the court in deciding the
Motion to Alter or Amend.
1.

The majority of Mitchell's Motion to Alter or Amend consists of re-arguing issues

that have already been presented to and ruled on by the court, including on motions
other than the summary judgment motion that fully resolved the issues in the case. To
the extent Mitchell disagrees with the court's rulings, her remedy is to file an appeal
not to serially re-argue those issues with this court.
2.

The balance of the issues and arguments raised in the Motion to Alter or Amend,

other than item 3 below, are being raised for the first time. The court respectfully
declines to consider, after the entry of judgment in the case, issues and arguments
that could and should have been raised earlier.
3.

Finally, the final judgment entered in this case was not entered sua sponte or

otherwise improperly. As was discussed at the hearing, and as was reflected in the
proposed papers filed by BONY, the court's ruling on the summary judgment motion,
combined with earlier rulings in the case, fully resolved all claims of all parties.
The recent amendments to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58, and Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4, contemplate parties preparing, or courts if parties do not, a judgment
that unambiguosly conveys to all involved the conclusion of the litigation in the trial
court. The purpose is to ensure all parties understand the deadline for filing a notice
of appeal. That is all this court did by preparing and entering the Final Judgment in
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Case No: 160902472 Date:

Jan 18, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
this case; make clear when notices of appeal were due. And with respect to the issue of
attorneys' fees, those same amendments contemplate that the amount and reasonableness
of attorneys' fees will be determined in proceedings following entry of judgment.
No further order on the Motion to Alter or Amend is required.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

BRAD G DEHAAN brad.dehaan@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

CRAIG H HOWE chowe@joneswaldo.com

EMAIL:

HILLARY R MCCORMACK hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

BLAKE D MILLER bmiller@joneswaldo.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
01/18/2018

Date: ____________________

/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: March 14, 2018
At the direction of:
03:50:08 PM
/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
District Court Judge
by
/s/ Mandy Acevedo
District Court Clerk
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

MINUTES

:

PENDING MOTIONS

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL

Et al,

Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472 LM

:

Judge:

TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

March 13, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
Clerk:

mandya

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): BRAD G DEHAAN
Defendant's Attorney(s): DOUGLAS R SHORT
Audio
Tape Number:

W39

Tape Count: 4:07-5:35

______________________________________________________________________________________

HEARING

This case comes before the court on the motion for determination of reasonableness of
award of attorneys fees and the Rule 64E motion.

Court first addresses the attorney

fee issue.
4:08 PM Mr. Dehaan presents argument on the motion for determination of reasonableness
of attorney fees.
4:19 PM Mr. Short presents argument.
4:31 PM Mr. Dehaan presents rebuttal argument.
4:35 PM Court makes findings as stated on the record.

The court finds that counsel

made good faith effort to comply with the orders.
4:41 PM Court addresses the Rule 64E motion. Mr. Short presents argument.
5:06 PM Mr. Dehaan presents argument.
5:16 PM Mr. Short presents rebuttal argument.
5:23 PM Court makes findings as stated on the record.
The parties may obtain a transcript of this ruling if they wish to appeal.
Court discusses briefing schedules.
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Case No: 160902472 Date:

Mar 13, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________

This order will be the order of the court and no further order shall be necessary.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

RULING AND ORDER

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

March 14, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff's motion to determine reasonable amount of fees and Defendant's motion filed
pursuant to Rule 64E(d)(1) were heard by the court on March 13, 2018.
With respect to the attorneys' fees motion, the court found the hourly rate to be
reasonable and set up a procedure to determine the reasonableness of the hours spent.
Those findings and order were made orally on the record.
The court denied the motion purportedly filed under Rule 64E(d)(1) and explained on the
record the reasons for that ruling.
No further order is necessary.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

BRAD G DEHAAN brad.dehaan@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
03/16/2018

Date: ____________________

/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: March 16, 2018
/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
10:09:38 AM
District Court Judge

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

RULING AND ORDER

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

March 14, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff's motion to determine reasonable amount of fees and Defendant's motion filed
pursuant to Rule 64E(d)(1) were heard by the court on March 13, 2018.
With respect to the attorneys' fees motion, the court found the hourly rate to be
reasonable and set up a procedure to determine the reasonableness of the hours spent.
Those findings and order were made orally on the record.
The court denied the motion purportedly filed under Rule 64E(d)(1) and explained on the
record the reasons for that ruling.
No further order is necessary.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

BRAD G DEHAAN brad.dehaan@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
03/16/2018

Date: ____________________

/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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RETURN

REAL ESTATE - ORDER OF SALE
In the District Court
STATE OF UTAH
) ss. SHERIFF'S OFFICE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
I hereby certify and return that I received the attached Order of Sale and Decree of
Foreclosure on the
I posted written Notice particularly describing said property for Twenty-one days in three
public places of the Precinct where the same is situated, on the property and in the County
Courthouse at the place of sale. I published a copy of the notice once a week for four (4)
successive weeks preceding said sale in the Intermountain Commercial Record, a newspaper of
general circulation published in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, proof of such publication
being attached.
On the 13th of February 2018, at 12:00 o'clock noon of said day I did attend and offered
for sale at public auction the property as described and sold the same to The Bank of New York
Mellon, fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of the CWMBS Inc,
CHL Mortgage pass Through Trust 2006-HYB5, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series
2006-HYB5, for the sum of $1,275,000 lawful money of the United States, said purchaser being
the highest bidder.
I have given to said purchaser, a Certificate of Sale and have caused a duplicate
Certificate to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of Utah.
I herewith return said Order of Sale to court without further service by me, with judgment
satisfied as follows, to-wit:
Principal
$1,343,034.81
....$1,343,604.74
Total Judgment
$1,275,000.00
Bid

Sheriffs fees
Deficiency

$548.50
$68,607.74

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, February 14, 2018
ROSIE RIVERA, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
By
Police 0 icer
Docket No. 17-16331
Civil No. 160902472
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NOTICE OF REAL ESTATE SALE
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah:
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, fka
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
FOR THE CERTICATEHOLDERS
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYB5,
Plaintiff;
vs.
PAULA A. MITCHELL; PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION; AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendant,

ORDER
DISTRICT COURT
CIVIL #160902472

To be sold at Sheriffs Sale at the County Courthouse, 450 S State, in the Third District
Court Building, 1st floor, in the City and County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, on the 13th of
February 2018, at 12 o'clock noon of said day, all right, title and interest of said Paula A.
Mitchell, in and to that certain piece or parcel of real property situated in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, described as follows to-wit:
Lot 804 B, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE 8B
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements,
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property.

Purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States of America.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, January 11, 2018
ROSIE RIVERA, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
By
Officer

Brad DeHaan
- Attorney
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
801-263-3400
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Docket No. 17-16331
Date of First Publication: January 19, 2018
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Utah Legal Publishing

The Record
Invoice

111 E 5600 S #202
Murray, UT 84107
Phone: (801) 972-5642
Fax:

(801) 972-4457

URL:

www.slcrecord.com

Court Services Division
3365 S 900 W
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84119

Acct. #:

01100100

Phone: #:

(385)468-9758

Post Date:

01/19/2018

Due Date:

02/18/2018

Invoice #:

300001306

PO #:

00001859

Text

Start

Stop

#17-16331 Mitchell

01/19/2018

02/09/2018

Ins. Amount Prepaid
4

324.00

0.00

Due')
324.00

Thank You for Business

Please return a copy with payment

A157

Total Due

324.00
6
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- Affidavit
of Publication
STATE OF UTAH 1
SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 1
Jan Bradley, being duly
sworn, says: That she is the
Manager of the The
Intermountain Commercial
Record, a newspaper of
general circulation printed and
published each Tuesday,
Wednesday and Friday in Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County,
Utah; that the publication, a
copy of which is attached
hereto, was published in the
said newspaper on the
following dates:
January 19, 2018, January
26, 2018, February 02, 2018,
February 09, 2018

That said newspaper was
regularly issued and
circulated on those dates and
that said notice was published
on utahlegals.com, on the
same day as the first
newspaper publication and
the notice remained on
utahlegals.com for at least 30
d

NOTICE OF
REAL_ ESTATF SAI..E SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah:
ORDER
DISTRICT COURT
CIVIL #160902472
TliF RANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, fka THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE
CFRTICATTHOLDERS
CWMBS SERIFS 200641YBS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PAULA A. MITCHFLI..; PEPPERWOOD HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION; AND JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendant,
To be sold at Sheriffs Sale at the County Courthouse, 430 S State, in the Third District Court Building, 1st floor,
in the City and County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, on the 13th of February 2018, at 12 o'clock noon of said day,
all right, title and interest of said Paula A. Mitchell, in and to that certain piece or parcel of real property situated
in Salt I ake County, State of Utah, described as follows to wit:
I.ot 804 B, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE 88
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, appurtenances,
and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property.
Purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States of America.
DATED at Salt lake City, Utah, January 11, 2018
ROSIE RIVERA, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
By /s/
Police Officer
Docket No. 17-16331
Brad DeHaan
Attorney
I UNDf3F.RG & ASSOCIATES
801.263.3400
Date of first publication January 19, 2018 - 02 09-2.018
(02/23/18)

Mar ger
Subscribed o and sworn to
me this 9t ay of February
2018.

Mark Fultz
Notary Public
Salt Lake County, Utah
My commission expires:
May 18, 2019

MARK FULTZ
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE OF UTAH
My Comm. Exp. 05/18/2019

Commission # 682975
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The Order of the Court is stated below: 4 ,•,;
Dated: December 12, 2017
/s/ TODDtM
05:31:03 PM
DistricWO

ESSY
e$
141-6'1 -N‘"st.
Irt,.....
g.

Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 8168)
Hillary McCormack (USB No. 11719)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
(801) 263-3400
(801) 263-6513 (fax)
LitigationDept@Lundbergfirm.com
Attorneysfor Plaintiff
Parcel No. 28-22-203-047
L&A Case No. 14.64383.2
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, fka
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYBS,

ORDER OF FORECLOSURE SALE

Case No. 160902472
Plaintiff,
Judge: Todd M. Shaughnessy
v.
PAULA A. MITCHELL; PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION; AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

TO THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
On the 27th day of November, the above named plaintiff obtained an Order Granting
Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake Department, of Salt Lake
County, Utah against the defendants, which Order was entered on the same day.

December A161
12, 2017 05:31 PM
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The Order provides that the Property described in the Order be sold at a public auction.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded and required to proceed to give notice of
such sale and to sell the Property described in said Final Order and distribute the proceeds of said
sale as directed in said Final Order and to make and file your report of such sale with the Clerk of
the Court within 60 days of the date of your receipt hereof, and to do all things according to the
terms and requirements of said Final Order and the provisions of the statues of the State of Utah.
**END OF DOCUMENT**
** Electronically signed by the Judge in the top-right corner of the first page.**
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12, 2017 05:31 PM
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Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 8168)
Hillary McCormack (USB No. 11719)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
(801) 263-3400
(801) 263-6513 (fax)
LitigationDept@Lundbergfirm.com
Attorneysfor Plaintiff
Parcel No. 28-22-203-047
L&A Case No. 14.64383.2
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, fka
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYBS,

PRAECIPE

Case No. 160902472
Plaintiff,
Judge: Todd M. Shaughnessy
v.
PAULA A. MITCHELL; PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION; AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

TO THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
Pursuant to the attached Order of Foreclosure Sale, you are respectfully instructed to give
notice and sell at public auction all of the right, title, and interest of the Defendants in this action in
real property located at 3 South Mistywood Lane, Sandy, UT 84092 (the "Property"), more
particularly described as:

1

A165
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\
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Lot 804 B, AMENDED PEPERWOOD PHASE 8B, according to the plat thereof as
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
Parcel No. 28-22-203-047
You are also requested to notify the Plaintiff, by and through its counsel, of the date of
the sale thirty (30) days prior to the date of the sale

DATED this H

day of December, 2017

LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES

Br..• G. DeHaan
Attorney for Plaintiff

2
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: November 27, 2017
/5/ TODr*MFfi
02:39:28 PM
DistrictO

4/iESSY
e/z

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE MIRD
DISTRICT COURT, SA
KE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.

F

DATE:
DE

Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 8168)
Hillary R. McCormack (USB No. 11719)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES, PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 263-3400
litigationdept@lundbergfirm.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

TY,

U

•

S °1 iT 111.C1. 4
4
K
. 1.0.6)

12682228
12/18/2017 4:28:00 PM $24.00
Book - 10630 Pg - 8775-8782
ADAM GARDINER
Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT
eTITLE INSURANCE AGENCY
BY: eCASH, DEPUTY - EF 8 P.

Parcel No. 28-22-203-047
L&A Case No. 14.64383.2/JAT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON fka
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYB5,

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 160902472

vs.

Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy

PAULA A. MITCHELL; PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION; AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants
This matter came before the court for hearing plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
on November 6, 2017. Brad G. DeHaan appeared as counsel for plaintiff, and Douglas R. Short
appeared as counsel for defendant Paula A. Mitchell. Having carefully reviewed the record and
the pleadings on file herein, considering the arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing,
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it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

2.

Plaintiff met its burden of establishing the undisputed facts and showing that

judgment should enter as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3.

The court incorporates by this reference the Ruling and Order entered in this case

on January 17, 2017, regarding, among other things, plaintiff's standing to bring this action.
4.

Based upon plaintiff having provided sufficient evidence pursuant to the findings

and decision in Mitchell I, as set forth in plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the
Affidavit of Alvin Denmon, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any of the
following material facts:
a.

This action involves the real property with a purported address of 3 South

Mistywood Lane, Sandy, Salt Lake County, Utah 84092 ("Property"), more particularly
described as:
Lot 804 B, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE 8B, according to the plat
thereof as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and
all easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property.

Parcel No. 28-22-203-047-0000.
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b.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell acquired an ownership interest in the

Property by a Special Warranty Deed executed on May 23, 2006 and recorded on May 24, 2006
in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 9733511.
c.

On May 23, 2006, defendant Paula A. Mitchell, as trustor, executed and

delivered a certain trust deed (the "Mitchell Trust Deed") to Stewart T. Matheson, as trustee, for
the benefit of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for America's
Wholesale Lender, it successors and assigns, to secure obligations under a certain promissory
note executed in conjunction therewith.
d.

On May 24, 2006, the Mitchell Trust Deed was recorded in the Salt Lake

County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 9733512.
e.

On May 23, 2006, in conjunction with the execution of the Mitchell Trust

Deed, defendant Paula A. Mitchell executed a promissory note ("Note"), with a mortgage rider
("Rider"), in the amount of $1,000,000.00.
f.

Plaintiff is the current beneficiary under the Mitchell Trust Deed by virtue

of an Assignment of Deed of Trust ("2010 Assignment") recorded on August 17, 2010 in the Salt
Lake County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 11012216.

g.

Plaintiff is the current holder of the Note and Rider.

I
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h.

Pursuant to the terms of the Mitchell Trust Deed, Note, and Rider, plaintiff

or plaintiff's predecessors-in-interest, loaned, advanced and disbursed the sum of $1,000,000.00
to or on behalf of, and to the benefit of, defendant Paula A. Mitchell.
i.

The Note obligated defendant Paula A. Mitchell to make monthly

principal and interest payments to plaintiff or plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest, beginning July
1, 2006.
The Note provides that the initial rate of interest agreed to be paid by
defendant Paula A. Mitchell is 6.500% per annum.
k.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell's obligations under the Note, Rider, and

Mitchell Trust Deed were secured by the Property.
1.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell breached the terms and conditions of the

Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed by failing to make the required monthly payments when
due.
m.

Based upon defendant Paula A. Mitchell's failure to pay the monthly

payments under the terms of the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed, defendant Paula A.
Mitchell is in default.
n.

Because defendant Paula A. Mitchell was in default and breached the

terms of the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed, plaintiff accelerated the entire unpaid balance
as immediately due and payable.
5.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell failed to properly controvert or provide a writte

r 11 T.'

r
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response to the following material facts, as required by Rules 56(a)(4) and 56(a)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the following material facts are therefore deemed admitted:
a.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell failed to cure the default under the terms of

the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed.
b.

The last payment made by defendant Paula A. Mitchell under the terms of

the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed was on April 21, 2010.
c.

Defendant Paula A. Mitchell has not made a payment under the terms of

the Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed since April 21, 2010.
d.

Defendant has not paid any of the monthly payments due and owing under

the Mitchell Trust Deed, Note and Rider since May 1, 2010.
e.

The terms of the Note and Mitchell Trust Deed allow plaintiff to recover

its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with this matter.
f.

The terms of the Mitchell Trust Deed allow plaintiff to invoke the power

of foreclosure sale and any other remedies permitted by applicable law.
g.

As of May 31, 2017, the amount due and owing to plaintiff under the

Note, Rider, and Mitchell Trust Deed is $1,343,034.81, plus additional interest, attorney's fees,
costs, taxes, and other fees which will continue to accrue after May 31, 2017.
6.

The Affidavit of Alvin Denmon used to support plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment is made on personal knowledge, sets forth facts that are admissible in evidence, and
shows that Mr. Alvin Denmon is competent to testify on the matters stated therein.
5
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7.

Plaintiff complied with its obligations regarding its initial disclosures pursuant to

Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
8.

Based on the above, judgment should enter in favor of plaintiff and against

defendant Paula A. Mitchell for the amount of $1,343,034.81, plus additional interest, costs,
taxes, and other fees owing to plaintiff incurred after May 31, 2017.
9.

Plaintiff is entitled to judicially foreclose the Mitchell Trust Deed and sell the

Property to recover any unpaid obligations owed to plaintiff under the Mitchell Trust Deed and
Note.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to an Order of Foreclosure Sale ordering the Property

foreclosed and sold by the sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah according to the law and
practice of this Court to satisfy the judgment set forth above as due and owing to plaintiff.
11.

Plaintiff or any other party to this action may become a purchaser at any

foreclosure sale, and that following the sale, the sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, is
ordered to execute and deliver a certificate of sale as required by law; and that upon expiration
of the period of redemption as described by law, the Sheriff is ordered to execute and deliver a
Sheriff's Deed to the purchaser of the Property; and that the purchaser of the Property be let into
possession of the Property upon production of the Sheriff's Deed.
12.

Upon any judicially-ordered sale of the Property in this court action and

expiration of the period of redemption, surplus proceeds, if any, beyond plaintiffs lien, costs, and
costs of sale, shall be deposited and interplead in a new court action pursuant to Utah Code
6
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§ 78B-6-904 or § 59-1-29, with notice to all parties in this action, so that all those who claim any
interest in the Property may assert their claims to such excess proceeds and their respective
priorities in such new proceeding.
13.

Upon the expiration of the period of redemption applicable to judicial foreclosure

sales, that the defendants and all persons claiming by, through, or under them, or any of them, be
forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, claim, interest and equity of redemption in and to
the Property and each and every part thereof, and that plaintiff have deficiency judgment against
defendant Paula A. Mitchell, if applicable, for the full amount of any sums which may remain
owing to plaintiff under the obligation evidenced by the Mitchell Trust Deed and Note after due
and proper application of the proceeds of the sale of the Property as hereinabove stated.
14.

The clerk of the court is hereby ordered, authorized and directed to issue an

Order of Foreclosure Sale effectuating this Final Order and Judgment.
15.

All other parties to the case are in default and entry of a judgment of priority in

favor of Plaintiff is therefore appropriate.
16.

Pursuant to the terms of the parties' written agreements, Plaintiff is awarded its

attorney fees and costs incurred in this action in an amount to be determined upon the filing of
plaintiffs Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs.
17.

The court has considered and overrules all objections to the form of this order and

the accompanying judgment, whether those objections are specifically referred to herein or not.
Many of those objections have been the subject of prior written and oral rulings by this court and
7
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by the Utah Court of Appeals, all of which are incorporated herein.

**END OF DOCUMENT**
**Electronically signed by the Judge in the top-right corner of the first page.**
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Notary's Copy Certification
On this 18th day of December, 2017, I certify that the document identified as
Simplifile Document Number 2F6A6B98-64B9-B2E3-C43A-B6E3AE075918,
is a true, exact, complete and unaltered scanned image made by me of "14.64383.2 ORDER" presented to me
by the document's custodian, eTitle Insurance Agency, and that, to the best of my knowledge, said electronically
scanned image is neither a public record nor a publicly recorded document, certified copies of which are
available from an official source other than a notary.

f

_,atA-49".

Alyse Ruth Lewis
3269 South Main #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Notary Public
State of Utah
My commission,number is 692249
My commission expires on December 1, 2020

Seal:
Commission Number: 692249
ALYSE RUTH LEWIS
Notary Public State of Utoh
My Commission Expires on:

•
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SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
COURT SERVICES DIVISION
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss. SHERIFF'S OFFICE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

RETURN ON SHERIFF'S DEED AND CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify and return that I received the hereto annexed Blue Back Certificate of
Sale on the
Property sold on the
Date
Deed mailed to / picked up by

******************************************************************************

RETURN ON SHERIFF'S LEVY - RECORDED
I herewith return Recorded copy of Certificate to court without further service by me.
Date recorded: February 23, 2018
******************************************************************************

I herewith return said papers to court without further service by me.
Dated March 9, 2018
Court: Third District Matheson Salt Lake County
Civil No: 160902472
Docket No: 17-16331
By
Police
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CERTIFICATE OF SALE
ADAM GARD I HER
ORDER OF SALE
RECORDER ,
T OE COUNTY, ljTO,H
LH'
F
I
ED
POLICE
IN THE DISTRICT COURT,
765 3 900 14
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
T 84119
BY
CPA, DEPUTY M 1 P
JUDGMENT RENDERED
November 27, 2017
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, fka
ORDER OF SALE ISSUED
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
December 12, 2017
FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
PROPERTY SOLD
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYBS,
February 13, 2018
CIVIL NO. 160902472
Plaintiffs,
vs
PAULA A. MITCHELL; PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION; AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants,

REAL ESTATE

I hereby certify that under the judgment and decree and Order of Sale of the court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in an action pending in said Court in the above named suit, I
was commanded to sell the property described, according to law, and apply the proceeds of such
sale toward the satisfaction of the judgment in said action, amounting to the sum of
$1,343,034.81, with interest, costs, attorney's fees and Sheriffs fees, amounting in all to the sum
of $1,343,604.74.
On the 13th of February 2018, at 12 o'clock noon of said day at the County Courthouse,
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah and after due and legal notice I caused to be sold
at public auction, according to law, the real property to The Bank of New York Mellon, fka The
Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of the CWMBS Inc, CHL Mortgage
pass Through Trust 2006-HYBS, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-HYBS, who
made the highest bid for the sum of $1,275,000, lawful money of the United States, for the real
estate in said Order of Sale described as follows, to-wit:
Lot 804 B, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE 8B
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements,
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property.
I further certify that said property is subject to redemption in lawful money of the United
States pursuant to the statute in such cases made and provided.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, February 14, 2018
ROSIE RIVERA, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah

By •3A.

yriDdck.
Police Offic r
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

RULING AND ORDER

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

April 27, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is Plaintiff's supplemental submissions regarding the reasonableness
of hours spent by attorneys in litigating this case. Both parties have filed papers
related to this request and plaintiff has filed a Request to Submit for Decision.
At the hearing held in this matter on March 13, 2018, and in a follow up Ruling and
Order dated March 14, 2018, the court made certain interim rulings regarding the
attorneys fee issue. Specifically, the court ruled, over defendant's objection, on the
reasonableness of the hourly rate. The court directed plaintiff to file an affidavit
that contained a detailed breakdown of the hours spent and tasks performed. The parties
briefs suggest they are in possession of such a declaration. The court, however, cannot
locate such a declaration on the docket. To ensure the record is adequate, and to
enable the court to consider the question presented, counsel for plaintiff is directed
to file (or re-file) that declaration and attachments, together with a Request to
Submit for Decision.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

BRAD G DEHAAN brad.dehaan@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

CRAIG H HOWE chowe@joneswaldo.com

EMAIL:

HILLARY R MCCORMACK hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

BLAKE D MILLER bmiller@joneswaldo.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
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Case No: 160902472 Date:

Apr 27, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
04/27/2018

Date: ____________________

/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: April 27, 2018
/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
03:45:33 PM
District Court Judge

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

RULING AND ORDER

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

April 27, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is Plaintiff's supplemental submissions regarding the reasonableness
of hours spent by attorneys in litigating this case. Both parties have filed papers
related to this request and plaintiff has filed a Request to Submit for Decision.
At the hearing held in this matter on March 13, 2018, and in a follow up Ruling and
Order dated March 14, 2018, the court made certain interim rulings regarding the
attorneys fee issue. Specifically, the court ruled, over defendant's objection, on the
reasonableness of the hourly rate. The court directed plaintiff to file an affidavit
that contained a detailed breakdown of the hours spent and tasks performed. The parties
briefs suggest they are in possession of such a declaration. The court, however, cannot
locate such a declaration on the docket. To ensure the record is adequate, and to
enable the court to consider the question presented, counsel for plaintiff is directed
to file (or re-file) that declaration and attachments, together with a Request to
Submit for Decision.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

BRAD G DEHAAN brad.dehaan@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

CRAIG H HOWE chowe@joneswaldo.com

EMAIL:

HILLARY R MCCORMACK hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

BLAKE D MILLER bmiller@joneswaldo.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
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Case No: 160902472 Date:

Apr 27, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
04/27/2018

Date: ____________________

/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
COURT SERVICES DIVISION
)
) ss. SHERIFF'S OFFICE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
STATE OF UTAH

RETURN ON SHERIFF'S DEED AND CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify and return that I received the hereto annexed Blue Back Certificate of
Sale on the
Property sold on the
Deed mailed to / picked up by
Date

******************************************************************************

RETURN ON SHERIFF'S LEVY - RECORDED
I herewith return Recorded copy of Certificate to court without further service by me.
Date recorded: May 2, 2018
******************************************************************************

I herewith return said papers to court without further service by me.
Dated May 15, 2018
Court: Third District Matheson Salt Lake County
Civil No: 160902472
Docket No: 17-16331
51"-P-wnk vt e.-.;51

By
Polite dfficer
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REAL ESTATE

AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SALE
ORDER OF SALE
IN THE DISTRICT COURT,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
JUDGMENT RENDERED
November 27, 2017
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, fka
ORDER OF SALE ISSUED
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
December 12, 2017
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
FOR THE
PROPERTY SOLD
CWMBS SERIES 2006-HYB5,
February 13, 2018
CIVIL NO. 160902472
Plaintiffs,
vs

PAULA A. MITCHELL; PEPPERWOOD
HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION; AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants,
I hereby certify that under the judgment and decree and Order of Sale of the court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, in an action pending in said Court in the above named suit, I was commanded to sell the
property described, according to law, and apply the proceeds of such sale toward the satisfaction of the
judgment in said action, amounting to the sum of $1,343,034.81, with interest, costs, attorney's fees and
Sheriffs fees, amounting in all to the sum of $1,343,604.74.
On the 13th of February 2018, at 12 o'clock noon of said day at the County Courthouse, Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah and after due and legal notice I caused to be sold at public auction, according to
law, the real property to The Bank of New York Mellon, fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the
Certificate Holders of the CWMBS Inc, CHL Mortgage pass Through Trust 2006-HYB5, Mortgage Pass
Through Certificates, Series 2006-HYB5, who made the highest bid for the sum of $1,275,000, lawful money of
the United States, for the real estate in said Order of Sale described as follows, to-wit:
Lot 804 B, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE 8B
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, appurtenances,
and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All rights, title, interest of the defendant in the property is
conveyed to the purchaser.
I further certify that said property is subject to redemption in lawful money of the United States pursuant
to the statute in such cases made and provided.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, April 17, 2018
ROSIE RIVERA, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah

BY S

0 .v.
Police Officer

u.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

RULING AND ORDER

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

June 21, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is a request to submit for decision the supplemental affidavit of
attorneys' fees and costs filed by plaintiff and the motion to strike the supplemental
affidavit filed by defendant. The motion to strike the supplemental affidavit is fully
briefed.
Based on the papers filed, the court denies the motion to strike the supplemental
affidavit of Mr. Dehaan. In this respect, the court finds and concludes that (1)
defendant's procedural objections are not well taken and those objections are overruled
by the court, (2) defendant has not shown that plaintiff's counsel committed perjury in
the affidavit, and (3) defendant is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of
attorneys' fees; the issue has been the subject of at least one hearing and a number of
written submissions from both parties and all parties have had a full and fair
opportunity to address the issue.
Having overruled the objections to the Dehaan affidavit, the court finds the tasks
performed by counsel to be reasonable and necessary to prosecute this case, and the
hourly rate charged to be reasonable, and awards attorneys' fees in the amount of
$27,480 and costs in the amount of $1,144 for a total of $28,624.00.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

CRAIG H HOWE chowe@aklawfirm.com

A195
Printed: 08/28/18 09:13:47

01609
Page 1 of 2

Case No: 160902472 Date:

Jun 21, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
EMAIL:

BRIGHAM J LUNDBERG brigham.lundberg@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

HILLARY R MCCORMACK hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

BLAKE D MILLER bmiller@aklawfirm.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
06/21/2018

Date: ____________________

/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: June 21, 2018
/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
02:54:44 PM
District Court Judge

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FK,
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

:

RULING AND ORDER

:
vs.
PAULA A MITCHELL,
Defendant.

:

Case No: 160902472

:

Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY

:

Date:

June 21, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is a request to submit for decision the supplemental affidavit of
attorneys' fees and costs filed by plaintiff and the motion to strike the supplemental
affidavit filed by defendant. The motion to strike the supplemental affidavit is fully
briefed.
Based on the papers filed, the court denies the motion to strike the supplemental
affidavit of Mr. Dehaan. In this respect, the court finds and concludes that (1)
defendant's procedural objections are not well taken and those objections are overruled
by the court, (2) defendant has not shown that plaintiff's counsel committed perjury in
the affidavit, and (3) defendant is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of
attorneys' fees; the issue has been the subject of at least one hearing and a number of
written submissions from both parties and all parties have had a full and fair
opportunity to address the issue.
Having overruled the objections to the Dehaan affidavit, the court finds the tasks
performed by counsel to be reasonable and necessary to prosecute this case, and the
hourly rate charged to be reasonable, and awards attorneys' fees in the amount of
$27,480 and costs in the amount of $1,144 for a total of $28,624.00.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160902472 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

CRAIG H HOWE chowe@aklawfirm.com
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Case No: 160902472 Date:

Jun 21, 2018

______________________________________________________________________________________
EMAIL:

BRIGHAM J LUNDBERG brigham.lundberg@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

HILLARY R MCCORMACK hillary.mccormack@lundbergfirm.com

EMAIL:

BLAKE D MILLER bmiller@aklawfirm.com

EMAIL:

DOUGLAS R SHORT drs@consumerlawutah.com
06/21/2018

Date: ____________________

/s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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DEED OF TRUST

DEFINITIONS
Words used in multiple sections of this document are defined below and other words108 defined in Sections 3,
11, 13, 18, 20 and 21. Certain rules regarding the usage of words used in this document are also provided in
Section 16.
(A) "Security Instrument" means this document, which is dated MAY 23, 20 06
with all Riders to this document.
03) "florroWcr" is

, together

PAULA A MITCHELL

Borrower is the trustorunder this Security Instrument.
(C) "Leader" is
AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER
Lender is a CORPORATION
organized and existing under the laws of NEW YORK

Lender's address is
4500 Park Granada MSN# 8VE-314, Calabasas, GA 91302-1613
(D) "Trustee" is
STEWART
MATHESON, ATTORNEY AT LAW
648 EAST PIRST SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
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MERS is a separate corporation that is acting
solely es a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. MERS is the-benelicAary under this
Security Instrument, MERS is organized and existing under the laws of De/aware, and has an address and
telephone number of P.O. Box 2026, Flint, MI 48501.2026, tel. (888) 679-NIERS,
(E) "Note" means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated MAY 23, 2006
.The
Note states that Borrower owes Lender
ONE MILLION and 00/100

(E.) "Niens" is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

Dollars ((T.S. $ 1, 000, 000.00
) plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in.regular
Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in full not later than JUNE 0 I , 2 0 36
(G) "Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer of Rights in the
Property."
(II) "Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late charges
due under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest,
(1) "Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument that are executed by Borrower, The following
Riders are to be executed by Borrower [check box as applicable]:

X3 Adjustable Rate Rader
Balloon Rider
VA Rider

' 1 Condominium Rider
1
Second Home Rider
1-4 Family Rider
---71 Planned Unit Development Rider
_1 Biweekly Payment Rider
_J Other(s) [specify]

(I) "Applicable Law" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations,
ordinances and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable Znal,
non-appealable judicial opinions,
(K) "Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments" means all dues, fees, assessments and other
charges that are imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condominium association, homeowners association
or similar organization.
(L) "Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check,
draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument,
computer, or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an
account, such term includes, but is not limited to, point-of-salo transfers, automated teller machine
transactions, transfers initiated by telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse transfers.
(M) "Escrow Items" means those items that are described in Section 3.
(N) "Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, eettleraena•award of damages, or proceeds paid by
any third party (other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages described in Seaton 5) for: () damage
to, or destruction of, the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taking of all or any part of the Property; (iii)
conveyance in lieu of condemnation; or (iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, 'the value and/or
condition of the Property.
(I)) "Mortgage Insurance" means insurance protecting Lender against the nonpayment of, er default on, the
reoun.
(P) "Periodic Payment" means the regularly scheduled amount due for (1) principal and interest under the
Note, plus (i) any amounts under Section 3 of this Security Instrument.
(Q) "RESPA" means the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. Section 2601 et seq.) and its
implementing regulation, Regulation X (24 C.F.R, Part 3500), as they might be amended from time to time, or
any additional or successor legislation or regulation that. governs the same subject' matter. As used in this
Security Instrument, "BESPA" refers to all requirements told restrictions that are imposed in regard to a
"federally related mortgage loen" even. if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage loan"
under RESPA,
al) "Successor in Interest of Borrower" means any party that has taken title to the Property, whether or not
that party has assumed Borrower's obligations under the Note and/or this Security Instrument.
TRANSeeeft. OF RIGHTS I TIE PROPERTY
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is VIERS (solely as nominee for Leader and Lender's successors
and assigns) and the successors and assigns of MFRS, 'This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (1) the
repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance of
Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and the Note, For this purpose, Borrower'
irrevocably grants, conveys and warrants to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following described
property located in the
, COUNTY
of
SALT LAttE
•
rypo of Recemding Jurisdiction)
llic,rno of Recording Jurisdiction)
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LOT 804 3, AMENDED PEPPERWOOD PHASE 03, ACCORDING TO THE PLAT THEREOP Az
RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER.

which currently has the address of
3 SOUTH MISTYWOOD IIANE# SANDY
IStrvatirity)

Utah 84092-4850 ("Property Address"):
Codoi

TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements,
Eippurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also
be covered by this Security Instillment. AU of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the
"Property." Borrower understands and agrees that NIERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by
Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MOMS (as nominee for
Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right to exercise any or all of those interests, including,
.but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of Lender
including, butnot limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawflilly seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the
right to grant, convey and warrant the Property and that the Property is unenonnbered, except for
encumbrances of record. Borrower further warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property against
ail claims and demands, subject to any encumbrancenof record.
THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform
covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument erwering real
property,
ONIFORIvl COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows;
1. Payment of Principal, Interest, Escrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges. Borrower
shall peer when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment
charges and late charges due under the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for Escrow Items pursuant to
Section 3.. Payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument shall be made In U.S. currency.
However, if any check or other instrument received by Lender as payment under the Note or this Security
Instrument is returned to Lender unpaid, Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments due under
the Note and this Security instrument be made In one or mom of the following forms, as selected by Lender:
(a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's check or cashier's check, provided any
such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or
entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer.
Payments am deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at atteh
other location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15. Lender
may return any payment or partial payment if The payment or partial payments are insufficient to bring the
Loan current. Lender may accept arty payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan current,
without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial payments in
the future, but Lender is not obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are accepted. If each
Periodic Payment is applied ,as of its scheduled due date, then Lender need not 'pay interesron unapplied
funds. Lender may hold such unapplied funds until Borrower makes payment to bring the Loan current. If
Borrower does not do so within a reasonable period of time, Lender shall either apply such funds or return
them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds will be applied to the outstanding principal balance under
the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or claim which Borrower might have now or in the future
against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument
or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this Security Instrument.
2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in this Section 2, ail payments
accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the following order of priority; (a) interest due, under the
Note; (b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due under Section 3, Such payments shall be applied to
each Periodic Payment in the order in which it became due. Any remaining amounts. shall be applied that to
late charges, second to any other amounts due under this Security Instrument, and then to reduce the principal
balance of the Note.
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If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for a delinquent Periodic Payment wait% includes a
sufficient amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may be applied to the delinquent payment and the
late charge. If more than one Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment received from
Borrower to the repayment of the Periodic Payments if, and to the extent that, each payment can be paid in
fail. To the extent that any excess exists after the payment is applied to the full payment of one or more
Periodic Payments, such excess may be applied to any late charges duo. Voluntary prepayments shall. be
applied first to any prepayment charges and then as described in the Note.
Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principal due under the
Note shall not extend or postpone the due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments.
3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due under
the Note, until the Note is paid• in full, a sum (the "Funds") to provide for payment of amounts due for. (a)
taxes and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien or
encumbrance on the Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) premiums
for any and all insurance required by Lender under Section $; and (d) Mortgage Insurance premiums, if any, or
any sums payable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage Insurance premiums in
accordance with the provisions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow Items." At origination or at any
time during the term of the Loan, Lender may require that Community Association Dues, Fees, anti
Assessments, if any, be escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and assessments shall be en Escrow Item.
Borrower shalt promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this Section, Borrower shall
pay Lender the Funds for Escrow Items 'unless Lender waives Borrower's obligation to pay the Funds for any
or ail Escrow Items. Lender may waive Borrower's obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any or all Bscrow
Items at any time. Any such waiver may only be in writing. In the event of such waiver. Borrower shall pay
directly, when and where payable, the amounts due for any Escrow Items for which payment of Funds has
been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires, shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payment
within such time period as Lender may require. Borrower's obligation to make such payments and to provide
receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to be a covenant and agreement contained' in this Security
Instrument, as the phrase "covenant and agreement" is used in Section 9. If Borrower is obligated to pay
Escrow Items directly, pursuant to a waiver, and Borrower thils to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item,
Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9 and pay such amount and Borrower shall then be obligated
under Section 9 to repay to Lender any such amount. Lender may revoke the waiver as to any or all Escrow
Items at any time by a notice given in accordance with Section 15 and, upon such revocatidn. Borrower shall
pay to Lender all Funds, and in such amounts, that are then requiied under this Section 3.
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funda in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to apply the
Funds at the time specified under RESPA, and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can require
under RESPA. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds due en the basis of current data and reasonable
estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with Applicable Law.
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality,
or entity (including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so insured) or in any Federal Home
Loan Bank. Lender shall apply► the Plinda to pay the Escrow Items no later than the time specified under
R,ESPA. Lender shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually analyzing the escrow
account, or verifying the Escrow Items; unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and Applicable
Law permits Lender to make such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law
requires interest to be paid on the Funds, Lender shall• not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings
on the Funds. Borrower and Lender can agree in writing, however, that interest shall be paid on the Funds.
Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the Funds as required by RESPA.
If there is a surplus of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall account to Borrower
for the excess funds in accordance with RESPA. If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, as defined
sunder RESPA., Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the
amount necessary to make up the shortage in accordance with RI3SPA, but in no more than 12 monthly
payments. If there is a. deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall notify
Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make up the
deficiency in accordance with RESPA, but in no mom than 12 monthly payments.
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund to
Borrower any Funds held by Lender.
4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions attributable
to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, leasehold payments or ground rents on
the Property, if any, and Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any+ To the extent that these
items are Escrow Items, Borrower shall pay them in the manner provided in Section 3.
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless
Borrower: (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien In a manner acceptable to.
Lender, but only so long as Borrower is performing such agreement; (b) contests the lien in good faith by, or
defends against enforcement of the lien in, Iegal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate tcrprevent the
enforcement of the lien while those proceedings are pending, but only until such proceedings are concluded;
or (c) secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender atibordinating the lien to this
Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien which can attain
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priority over this Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the lien. Within 10 days
of the date on which that notice is given, Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take ()neer more &She actions set
forth above in this Section 4,
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for a real estate tax verification and/or reporting
service used by Lender in connection with file Loan.
S. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the irnproveraenta now existing or hereafter erected on the
Property insured against loss by. fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage," and any other
hazards including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. This
insurance shall be maintained in the amounts (including deductible levels) and for the periods that Lender
requires, What Lender requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during the term of the Loan.
The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's right to
disapprove Borrower's choice, which right shall not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may require Borrower
to pay, in connection with this Loan, either: (a) a one-time charge for flood zone determination, certification
and tracking services; or OD a one-time charge for flood zone determination and certification services and
subsequent charges each time =mappings or similar changes occur which reasonably might affect such
determination or certification. Borrower shall also be responsible for the payment of any fees imposed by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency in connection with the review of any flood zone determination
=suiting from an objection by Borrower.
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may obtain insurance
coverage, at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any particular
type or amount of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might not protect
Borrower, Borrower's equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk, hazard or
liability and might provide greater or lesser coverage than. was previously in effect. Borrower acknowledges
that the coat of the insurance coverage so obtained might significantly exceed the coat of insurance that
Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 shall become additional
debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from
the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower
requesting payment.
All insurance policies requited by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender's right
to disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Loader as mortgagee
andfor as tin additional loss payee. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewal certificates. If
Lender requires, Botrewer shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and renewal notices. If
Borrower obtains any form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to, or
destruction of, the Property, such policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and shall name Lender as
mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee.
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may
make proof of lose if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Boirower otherwise agree in
writing, any insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall be
applied to restoration or repair of the Property, if the restoration or repair is economioally feasible and
Lender's setnirity is not lessened. During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold
such insurance proceeds until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has
been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender
may disburse proceeds fbr the repairs and restoration in at single payment or in a series of progress payments
as the work is completed. linieswan agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be
paid on such insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on
such pm:lc:eds. Fees for public adjusters, or other third parties, retained by Borrower shall not be paid out of
the insurance proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower, If the restoration or repair is not
economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance proceeds shall be applied to the
sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the exceste if any, paid to Borrower.
Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2.
If Borrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available insurance claim
and related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Leader that the insurance
carrier has offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate and settle the claim, The 30-day period will
begin when the notice is given. In either event, or if Lender acquires the Property under Section 22 or
otherwise, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any insurance preceeds In ari amount
not to exceed the amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, and (b) any other of Borrower's
rights (other than the right to any refund of unearned premiums paid by Borrower) under all insurance policies
covering the Property, insofar us such sights are applicable to the coverage of the Property. Lender may Ilse
the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the Property or to pay amounts unpaid under the Noe pr thisSecurity Instrument, whether or not then due.
6.Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the property as Borrower's principal residence
within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as
Borrower's principal residence for at /cast one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender otherwise
agrees in writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist
which are beyond Borrower's control.
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7. Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of Liao Propeetyt lespeetions. Borrower shall not
destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property.
Whether or not Borrower is residing in the Property, Borrower shalt maintain the Property in order to prevent
the Property from deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is determined pursuant to
Section 5 that repair or restoration is net economically feasible, Borrower shall prereptly repair the Property if
damaged to avoid further deterioration or damage, If insurance or condemnation proceeds am paid in
connection with damage to, or the taking of, the Property, Borrower shall be responsible for repairing or
restoring the Property only if Lender has released proceeds for such purposes. Lender may disburse proceeds
for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is
completed. If the insurance or condemnation proceeds are not sufficient to repair or restore the Property,
Borrower is not relieved of Borrower's obligation for the completion of such repair orrestoration.
Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has
reasonable cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shell give
Borrower notice at the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause,
8. Borrower's Loan Application. Bozeower shall be in default if during the Loan application process,
Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or with. Borrower's knowledge or
consent gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender (or failed to
provide Lender with material information) in connection with the Loan. Material representations include, but
are not limited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property as Borrower's principal
residence.
9. Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property and Rights Under this Security Instreunent. If (a)
Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, (b) there is a
legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property and/or rights under this
Security Instrument (such es a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture, fore
enforcement of a lien which may attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or
regulations), or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is
reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument,
including protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property.
Lender's actions can include, but are not limited to; (a) paying any 6urna secured by a lien which has priority
over this Security itliStraniant; (b) appearing in court; and (e) paying reasonable attorneys' fees to protect its
interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument, including its secured position in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not limited to, entering the Property to make
repairs, change looks, replace or board up doors and windows, drain water froze pipes, eliminate building or
other code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities turned on or off, .Although Lender may take
action under this Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not under any duty or obligation to do so. It
is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all actions authorized under this Section 9,
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9.shall become additional debt of Borrower secured
by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement
and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment.
If this Security Instrument is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease.
If Borrower aequires fee title to the Property, the leasehold and the fee tide shall not merge unless Lender
agrees to the merger in writing,
10. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan,
Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the Mortgage Insurance in effect. If, for any reason, the
Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be available from the mortgage insurer that
previously provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments
toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage
substantially equivalent to the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the
cost to Borrower of the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, from an alternatesmortgage insurer selected
by Lender. if substantially equivalent Mortgage Insurance coverage is not available, Borrower shall continue
to pay to Lender the amount of the separately designated payments that wore due when the insurance coverage
ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept, use and retain these payments as a non-refundable loss reserve in
lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such lolls reserve shall be non-refundable, notwithstanding the fact that th© Loan
is ultimately paid in full, and Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such
loss reserve, Lender can no longer require loss reserve payments if Mortgage Insurance coverage (in the
amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided by an insurer selected by Lender again becomes
available, is obtained, and Lender requires separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage
Insurance, If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan and Borrower was
required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower
shall pay the premiums required to maintain Mortgage Insunutce in effect, or to provide a non-refundableaoss
reserve, until Lender's requirement for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement
between Borrower and Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable
Law. Nothing in this Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Note.
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